

**HEGEL**

**AND THE**

**FUTURE OF**

**SYSTEMATIC**

**PHILOSOPHY**

**RICHARD**

**DIEN**

**WINFIELD**



# Hegel and the Future of Systematic Philosophy

*Also by Richard Dien Winfield*

AUTONOMY AND NORMATIVITY:

Investigations of Truth, Right and Beauty (2001)

FREEDOM AND MODERNITY (1991)

FROM CONCEPT TO OBJECTIVITY:

Thinking Through Hegel's Subjective Logic (2006)

HEGEL AND MIND:

Rethinking Philosophical Psychology (2010)

HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT:

A Critical Rethinking in Seventeen Lectures (2013)

HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC:

A Critical Rethinking in Thirty Lectures (2012)

LAW IN CIVIL SOCIETY (1995)

MODERNITY, RELIGION, AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2007)

OVERCOMING FOUNDATIONS:

Studies in Systematic Philosophy (1989)

THE JUST ECONOMY (1988)

THE JUST FAMILY (1998)

THE JUST STATE:

Rethinking Self-Government (2005)

THE LIVING MIND:

From Psyche to Consciousness (2011)

REASON AND JUSTICE (1988)

STYLISTICS:

Rethinking the Artforms after Hegel (1996)

SYSTEMATIC AESTHETICS (1995)


# Hegel and the Future of Systematic Philosophy

Richard Dien Winfield

*Distinguished Research Professor,*

*University of Georgia, USA*

palgrave  
macmillan



© Richard Dien Winfield 2014

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published 2014 by  
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries

ISBN: 978–1–137–44237–6

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

*In memory of my mother-in-law, Kusum Gupta (1935–2014)*



# Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	viii
<i>Introduction</i>	x
 <b>Part I Phenomenology and Logic</b>	
1 Is Phenomenology Necessary as Introduction to Philosophy?	3
2 Negation and Truth	20
3 How Should Essence Be Determined? Reflections on Hegel's Two Divergent Accounts	32
4 The Objectivity of Thought	45
5 Being and Idea	57
6 Truth, the Good, and the Unity of Theory and Practice	68
7 The End of Logic	83
 <b>Part II Nature and Humanity</b>	
8 The Logic of Nature	103
9 The Limits of Intersubjectivity in Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit	117
10 Economy and Ethical Community	131
11 The Challenge of Political Right	145
12 The Normativity of Globalization	159
13 Literary Form and Civilization	174
<i>Notes</i>	188
<i>Works Cited</i>	202
<i>Index</i>	205



# Acknowledgments

The following chapters incorporate text that was previously published and/or delivered at conference meetings.

Chapter 1 incorporates text published as “Is Phenomenology Necessary as Introduction to Philosophy?,” *Review of Metaphysics*, December 2011, LXV, no. 2, issue 258: 1–19.

Chapter 2 incorporates text delivered at the Metaphysical Society of America Annual Meeting, Boston, March 6, 2010, and published as “Negation and Truth,” *Review of Metaphysics*, December 2010, LXIV, no. 2, issue 254: 273–89.

Chapter 3 incorporates text delivered at the Society for Systematic Philosophy group meeting, APA Pacific Division Meeting, San Francisco, April 6, 2007, and published as “How Should Essence Be Determined? Reflections on Hegel’s Two Divergent Accounts,” *International Philosophical Quarterly* 48, no. 2, issue 190 (June 2008): 187–99.

Chapter 4 incorporates text delivered at the 30th International Hegel Congress, Vienna, April 25, 2014.

Chapter 5 incorporates text delivered at the Metaphysical Society of America Annual Meeting, Athens, Georgia, March 11, 2012, and published as “The Objectivity of Thought: A Hegelian Meditation,” *Philosophical Forum*, Winter 2013: 329–39.

Chapter 6 incorporates text delivered at the Metaphysical Society of America Annual Meeting, Holy Cross University, Worcester, MA, April 13, 2013, and published as “Truth, the Good, and the Unity of Theory and Practice,” *Review of Metaphysics*, December 2013: 405–22.

Chapter 7 incorporates text delivered at the Society for Systematic Philosophy group meeting, American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting, New York City, December 28, 2009, and published as “The End of Logic,” *Idealistic Studies* 41, no. 3, Fall 2011: 135–48.

Chapter 8 incorporates text delivered at the Society for Systematic Philosophy group meeting, American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting, Chicago, February 16, 2012, and published as “The Logic of Nature,” *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 27, no. 2, 2013: 172–87.

Chapter 9 incorporates text delivered at the International Conference on Hegel’s Thought in the Age of Globalization, University of Urbino, Italy, June 4, 2010, and published in Italian translation as “I Limiti

dell'Intersoggettività nella Filosofia Hegeliana dello Spirito Soggettivo," in G. Rinaldi, ed., *Il pensiero di Hegel nell'Età della globalizzazione* (Rome: Aracne, 2012), pp. 203–21.

Chapter 10 incorporates text delivered at the 22nd Biennial Meeting of the Hegel Society of America, DePaul University, Chicago, October 27, 2012, and published as "Economy and Ethical Community," in *Hegel and Capitalism* (Albany: SUNY Press, forthcoming).

Chapter 11 incorporates text published as "The Challenge of Political Right," *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*, no. 65, 2012: 61–74.

Chapter 12 incorporates text delivered at the International Conference on Hegel's Thought in the Age of Globalization, University of Urbino, Italy, June 4, 2010, and published in Italian translation as "La Normatività della Globalizzazione," in G. Rinaldi, ed., *Il pensiero di Hegel nell'Età della globalizzazione* (Rome: Aracne, 2012), pp. 281–99.

Chapter 13 incorporates text published as "Literary Form and Civilization," in *Literature and Philosophy: Essaying Connections*, ed. Supriya Chaudhuri (Calcutta: Papyrus, 2006), pp. 46–62.

I thank the editors, journals, and publishers listed above for their permissions.

# Introduction

The Enlightenment enjoins us to question given dogma and tradition and think for ourselves. It summons us to advance the autonomy of reason and achieve emancipation in all spheres of life. In embracing freedom of thought, action, and artistic creativity, the Enlightenment has sought, however, to provide foundations for autonomy. Reason has been subjected to a critique seeking to determine the conditions of objective knowledge. The legitimacy of institutions of freedom has been grounded in natural principles of liberty through social contract and other privileged procedures of construction. The autonomy of beauty has been rooted in privileged forms of reception. In all of these efforts, what should be self-determined is grounded upon some antecedent foundation. As a result, the autonomy of reason, conduct, and fine art is left founded upon privileged factors whose own authority is open to question. Instead of being genuinely self-determined, autonomy is reduced to something determined by something else. The project of the Enlightenment cannot succeed on these, its own terms.

Most post-Enlightenment thought has rejected the ideals of the Enlightenment by embracing the Enlightenment's fundamental assumption, that freedom has foundations. Accepting this presupposition, these critics of the Enlightenment have set about unmasking reason, conduct, and beauty as impostors whose celebrated autonomy is actually conditioned by particular factors whose privileged role is arbitrary. What these critics have failed to acknowledge is that their deconstruction of the Enlightenment project undermines the authority of their own diagnosis. By accepting that reason, conduct, and fine art are always rooted in contingent foundations, the would-be grave diggers of the Enlightenment should admit that nothing they think, do, or create has any universal binding normativity but is instead a conditioned effort relative to the contingent foundations on which it rests.

There is, however, another option for post-Enlightenment thought that does not abandon the embrace of autonomy. This avenue recognizes that freedom is self-determination and that self-determination cannot have foundations. For precisely this reason, freedom escapes the legitimation problems of all factors that are determined by something else, that have foundations, that are heteronomous. The great pioneer of

this post-Enlightenment reconstruction of rational autonomy is Hegel. He recognizes that any attempt to give foundations to normativity in theory, practice, and art subverts its own legitimation strategy when it attempts to be self-referentially consistent. Having distinguished between what confers normativity and what possesses normativity, the foundational legitimation strategy must face the problem of establishing the authority of the privileged factor on which it rests validity. To satisfy its own legitimation principle, that foundation must ground its own authority. To do so, however, that factor must overcome the distinction between foundation and what is founded and be self-determined. Therefore, there is no way to avoid acknowledging the exclusive normativity of self-determination. Any attempt to give reason, conduct, or beauty foundations – that is, to locate normativity in what is not self-determined – must end up acknowledging that only what is autonomous can be valid.

The following investigations all attempt to go beyond Enlightenment and further develop the foundation-free systematic philosophy that Hegel has inaugurated.

The first chapter, “Is Phenomenology Necessary as Introduction to Philosophy?,” considers how philosophy without foundations can get off the ground. Philosophy can begin neither by making claims about the given nor by investigating knowing, since either way unjustified assumptions must be made. In face of this predicament, Hegel presents his *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the only viable introduction to philosophy, introducing presuppositionless science by immanently critiquing the construal of knowing that presumes that cognition always has assumptions, always confronts some given. Can the challenge of completing this immanent critique in all its daunting complexity be avoided by alternative shortcuts? This first chapter examines four such options: Hegel’s complementary introductions to the *Science of Logic* and arguments on how the self-referential inconsistencies of transcendental investigation and foundationalism resolve themselves. All these alternative shortcuts are shown to rest on assumptions that only the full phenomenological investigation can overcome.

Chapter 2, “Negation and Truth,” tackles the problem of determinacy, which only a foundation-free philosophy can address without begging the question, since any appeal to foundations presupposes some privileged determinacy. At least since Plato, negation has been recognized to play a constitutive role in enabling being to be determinate. Yet too often negation has been restricted to determinacy, as if this were sufficient for individuating and comprehending objects. The negation that

affords determinacy, however, provides only the most minimal distinction of something and other, and this differentiation can successfully individuate neither, since something is other to its other, just as its other is something with an other of its own. Negation, however, has two other fundamental forms that are constitutive of the two other domains of determinacy: that of determined determinacy, containing all two-tiered relations, such as essence/appearance, ground/grounded, thing/properties, whole/parts, substance/accidents, and cause/effect, and that of self-determined determinacy, on which conceptual determination, objectivity, and truth all depend. Chapter 2 explores the differentiation and interrelationship of these three basic forms of negation and shows how all three must be given their due if philosophy is to fulfill its intrinsic vocation. In so doing, the paper draws upon arguments from Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Derrida, Pierce, and Hegel.

Chapter 3, "How Should Essence Be Determined? Reflections on Hegel's Two Divergent Accounts," examines one of the most glaring discrepancies in Hegel's successive attempts to develop autonomous reason. Hegel presents two very different accounts of the initial categorization of essence in his *Science of Logic* and his later (1830) *Encyclopedia Logic*, raising the question of whether this disparity undermines the univocal necessity of systematic logic. Chapter 3 examines these two treatments and reveals that the *Science of Logic* account captures a necessary ordering that is incompletely presented in the *Encyclopedia*. The details are provided for comprehending why the logic of essence must begin with a contrast of the essential and the unessential, how this reverts to illusory being, whose determining entails three successive forms of reflection, and finally, why identity depends upon the transformation of reflection from being positing to being external to being determining in character. Significantly, the self-developing nature of these logical developments calls into question the foundationalism entailed by any privileging of the categories of essence.

Chapter 4, "The Objectivity of Thought," confronts the fundamental problem of how thought can be objective. The answer to this question depends as much upon the nature of thought as upon the nature of objectivity. Most contemporary thinkers construe thought such that it cannot possibly be objective while construing objectivity so as to render it opaque to conceptualization. Thought is commonly held to be a subjective realm of given fixed universals governed by the principle of noncontradiction and determined in formal operations of judgment and inference, whereas objectivity is regarded to be an ever-changing domain of individuals, open to empirical examination but otherwise

indifferent to the unity of concepts. Just removing any such incommensurability between thought and objectivity, however, does not ensure that reason grasps what is. The overcoming of incompatibility still leaves problematic whether the relation of thought and objectivity is any more than an external accident devoid of truth. In face of this predicament, Chapter 4 explores how thought and objectivity have an intrinsic connection enabling reason to be objective and objectivity to be truly conceptualizable. To expose and remedy the prevailing misconceptions that must be overcome, arguments are drawn from Hegel's "Subjectivity," "Objectivity," and "The Idea of Cognition" in *Science of Logic*.

The relationship of Being and Idea has preoccupied philosophy ever since Plato. Although Plato did not explicitly distinguish the Idea from the Concept, his granting of independent being to the Ideas set the stage for regarding the Idea as having an individuality that connected the Idea to being as concepts never could be. Kant acknowledged the distinction between Concept and Idea as fundamental to that between Understanding and Reason but hesitated to ratify the connection between Being and Idea, putting metaphysics in question. Since Kant, only Hegel has sought to acknowledge the distinction between concept and Idea, without forfeiting the connection between being and Idea. Hegel has done so by conceiving the concept as containing both particularity and individuality and by conceiving the idea as the unity of concept and objectivity. Chapter 5, "Being and Idea," examines how the relation between Being and Idea has fared in the hands of Plato, Kant, and Hegel so as to consider to what degree the future of metaphysics depends upon upholding that relation.

Since ancient times, philosophers have recognized the relationship of the truth and the good to be of central importance. Nevertheless, what that relationship is has been a source of ongoing controversy. At one extreme, the truth has been identified with the good, whereas at the other, the truth and the good have been kept apart as irreconcilably separate. How the relationship between truth and the good is construed has decisive ramifications for what each is conceived to be and for how theory and practice are related. Three figures play a seminal role in exploring the relation of truth and the good: Plato, Kant, and Hegel. Through considering their respective investigations, Chapter 6, "Truth, the Good, and the Unity of Theory and Practice," shows that so long as truth and the good are held apart, not only will theory and practice be devoid of any unity, but theory will be just as unable to attain truth as practice will be unable to realize the good.

Logic, as a thinking of thinking, in which method and subject matter are indistinguishable, cannot begin with any determinate form or content without question begging. Chapter 7, "The End of Logic," examines how logic can proceed from such an indeterminate starting point and achieve closure as a valid thinking of valid thinking. Drawing upon the final chapter of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, the chapter examines the nature of the end of logic and the significance this termination has for philosophical method, the difference between truth and correctness, and the possibility of thinking what is other than thought.

Chapter 8, "The Logic of Nature," considers how nature can be conceived systematically through a critical comparison of the philosophies of nature of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. This examination proceeds upon a refutation of the reigning view of the philosophy of science, which denies that philosophy can conceive what nature is and instead limits its efforts to a reflection upon empirical natural science.

Chapter 9, "The Limits of Intersubjectivity in Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit," critiques the prevalent consensus that privileges intersubjectivity as a foundation of reason and conduct. On the basis of that critique, the chapter distinguishes those aspects of rational agency that are given independently of intersubjectivity from those that operate in and through intersubjective relationships. In so doing, the chapter shows how the subjective and intersubjective aspects of rational agency provide enabling rather than determining conditions of truth and right.

Chapter 10, "Economy and Ethical Community," considers the very keystone of economic justice. One of the most pathbreaking achievements of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* is that the economy is clearly conceived as a system of needs belonging to civil society, one of three spheres of ethical community, intermediary between the family and the state. Nonetheless, Hegel's conception of the economy as an element of ethical community has been pervasively ignored or misinterpreted, leading Hegel to be commonly placed among the many who question the ethical standing of economic relations and thereby place modernity under suspicion. The chapter refutes this pervasive suspicion of the ethical standing of civil society in general and the economy in particular and goes on to show how the ethical community of the system of needs is of vital importance in understanding the full scope of economic justice and what it takes to remake "capitalism with a human face."

Chapter 11, "The Challenge of Political Right," shows how Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* and *Science of Logic* provide the conceptual resources for resolving the vexing central problem of political philosophy – how

to conceive the universality distinguishing the ends of political association in conjunction with the reflexivity of self-government. Hegel's groundbreaking conception of the "concrete universal" makes it possible to think self-rule without eliminating political plurality, as is done by those, such as Rousseau and Carl Schmitt, who identify democracy with an immediate identity of ruler and ruled requiring the unanimity of political agents. The chapter explores how the concrete universality of political association not only legitimates representative democracy but makes intelligible how self-government can uphold the nonpolitical rights of owners, moral subjects, family members, and the individuals of civil society without undercutting the sovereignty of politics.

Chapter 12, "The Normativity of Globalization," examines how modernity has legitimacy as a normative project of foundation-free emancipation and how modernization entails the globalization of civil society and the other institutions of freedom. The chapter considers what distinguishes the original emergence of modernity from premodern civilization from the external modernization of traditional societies through the colonial and imperial interventions of nations that have independently modernized. The normative challenges of these processes are laid bare.

Finally, Chapter 13, "Literary Form and Civilization," draws upon Hegel's aesthetics to consider to what extent literary forms can be unique to different types of civilization. The chapter takes as its touchstone Hegel's controversial claim that ancient Sanskrit drama cannot be genuinely tragic owing to the character of ancient Hindu civilization. Through an examination of several renowned Sanskrit plays, contrasting them with ancient Greek as well as modern European drama, the chapter evaluates the truth of Hegel's thesis.





# **Part I**

## **Phenomenology and Logic**



# 1

## Is Phenomenology Necessary as Introduction to Philosophy?

### The path to phenomenology

In modern times, it has become virtually a natural assumption that before one can truly think what is, one first must investigate knowing to certify its objectivity.

This assumption issues from understandable skepticism about directly setting out to know what is. Any immediate claims about objects can always be doubted by questioning the validity of the knowing employed. Accordingly, it seems evident that before knowing being, one should examine knowing and supplant ontology with epistemology as first philosophy.

The knowing in question may be variously characterized, be it in terms of consciousness, linguistic practice, or some other cultural convention. Nonetheless, the turn to investigate knowing before investigating objects of knowing fatefully determines how knowing gets construed, no matter what attire is attributed to it.

This is so because the “natural” assumption that puts epistemology first rests on a fundamental presupposition of its own: namely, that knowing and its object are different from one another and independently determined. The presumption that knowing always addresses something it confronts, an independent givenness that is the foundation for any truth for knowledge, is built into the very possibility of doing foundational epistemology, of turning to investigate knowing as what comes first in philosophical inquiry. Knowing cannot be investigated without making claims about objects of knowledge unless knowing is separate and distinct from objects of knowledge. Otherwise, knowing cognition involves knowing objects, which is precisely what is suspect.

Consequently, the whole move of first turning to investigate knowing presupposes that knowing is characterized by an opposition between knowing and its object. Yet if one considers that opposition, it seems to leave knowing incapable of validating its certainties. Confronting an independently determined object, knowing may take an active or passive stance, but both options prove equally futile.

On the one hand, knowing can get at what opposes it by taking some initiative and acting upon what it is trying to know. In this way, foundational epistemology takes cognition as an instrument that comes to its object and works upon it so as to bring it into view and grasp what it is. Yet if knowing is an instrument that acts upon its given object, what gets delivered is not the object as it is in its own right but the object as it has been acted upon by knowing, as altered by the activity of knowing.

Alternately, knowing that confronts its object can try to evade this dilemma by refraining from acting upon that object and instead passively receiving knowledge of it. By so comprising not an instrument but a medium through which the object comes to be known, knowing once more fails to capture its prey. What knowing obtains is not the object as it is apart from its transmission through cognition's passive receptivity, but the object as it is refracted through that medium.

No remedy to these difficulties is provided by subtracting the effect of the activity of knowing as instrument or of the receptivity of knowing as medium. This simply puts cognition back in the opposition from which it starts, for if one subtracts the active or receptive process of knowing, one returns to confronting an object that is yet to be known.

Consequently, because foundational epistemology must assume knowing to be distinct from its object, leaving cognition an instrument or medium, it renders knowing unworkable, whether it be active or passive.

Compounding this outcome is a further problem endemic to beginning philosophical inquiry with epistemology. Taking knowing as the first object of investigation automatically renders the knowing under investigation distinct from the knowing performing the investigation. To investigate knowing as something to be known prior to knowing anything else, the knowing under scrutiny must be distinct from its object insofar as only then can that knowing be known without making knowledge claims about an object. By contrast, the knowing employed to certify knowing of objects is a knowing of knowing. Accordingly, foundational epistemology is not making use of the knowing it examines to investigate knowing. Since foundational

epistemology is thereby employing a cognition it does not scrutinize, it is just as dogmatic as those who begin philosophical inquiry by addressing what is.

Moreover, since the knowing employed to investigate knowing is necessarily different from what it investigates, it falls prey to the same dilemma afflicting the knowing it scrutinizes; namely, the debilitating predicament of accessing its distinct object by operating as an active instrument or a passive medium. How can the knowing of the foundational epistemologist possibly know the cognition it confronts as something given, when neither acting upon it nor passively receiving it can secure knowledge of what knowing is in itself?

This impasse might lead one to think that knowing, be it a cognition of objects or of knowing, can know nothing absolute but only phenomena or appearances. Yet claiming that knowing cannot get at any genuine knowledge is a knowledge claim of its own, one any consequent skeptic must refrain from asserting.

Instead, might the real lesson be that foundational epistemology's fear of falling into error about what is is precisely the error to be avoided? Can't we now just set out to know and not worry about any prior investigation of knowing? Admittedly, the parallel dogmatisms of ontology and foundational epistemology suggest that knowing must begin without any determinate claims about being or knowing, since in either case any such claims are just as arbitrary as any competing claims. Why not then begin with nothing determinate at all and so not have to worry about falling into error?

Resolving to know without appeal to givens or prior investigations of knowing is, however, just as much an assurance as any other resolve that puts itself immediately forward. Whatever ensues seems no more legitimate than any competing candidate for "presuppositionless knowledge."

## **The project of phenomenology as introduction to philosophy**

The above considerations are those Hegel lays out just before presenting the project of his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. At this precise juncture, in paragraph 76 of the Introduction to that work, he declares something that might seem completely unexpected. He tells us that the preceding reflections leave only one thing to be done: to take up knowing as it appears, address cognition as a phenomenon, and in that regard, undertake a phenomenology.<sup>1</sup>

What does it mean to take up knowing as a phenomenon, and how would doing so be different from following the “natural” assumption, which presumes that inquiry must begin by investigating knowing? In turning to investigate knowing as first philosophy, as foundational epistemology, one seeks to uncover the truth of knowing by making valid claims about what knowing is in itself. By contrast, in addressing knowing as a phenomenon, one refrains from making any claims about knowing as it is in itself. Instead, one simply takes knowing up as something given, maintaining nothing more about it than that one observe it as a stipulated content. Yet if one is not going to be making any claims about what knowing is in itself, why bother with this whole enterprise?

By addressing knowing as a phenomenon, one indeed escapes the pitfalls of foundational epistemology. By refraining from making any assertions about knowing as it is in itself, one avoids the dogmatic characterization of cognition afflicting the turn to investigate knowing as first philosophy. In so doing, one equally avoids affirming the debilitating presupposition underlying foundational epistemology: that knowing always confronts an object different from itself. Hence, one escapes construing knowing in such a way as to make cognition futile. Moreover, in so departing from foundational epistemology, one equally does not revert to the precritical dogmatism that makes ontology first philosophy by immediately characterizing what is.

Still, these avoidances comprise only the negative significance of the phenomenology Hegel proposes. To appreciate the positive option it provides and how that option might be our only option, one must recognize that phenomenology does not take just any knowing as an appearance. The knowing taken up as a phenomenon is precisely what the natural assumption of foundational epistemology takes knowing to be. Namely, the knowing to be observed as a phenomenon is stipulated to confront a given, to oppose an object independent of and distinct from itself. This construal of knowing is that which modern philosophy tends to absolutize. It is the conception of knowing that regards cognition as always having assumptions, always addressing something given, always opposing an object distinct from itself.

Although phenomenology thereby converges with foundational epistemology in addressing the same construal of knowing, it diverges by taking this construal only as an appearance, not as the absolute, inescapable structure of cognition. What phenomenology undertakes is to observe how knowing so construed attempts to legitimate itself as valid knowing and, in this respect, attempts to vindicate the whole project of foundational epistemology that presumes knowing to have this

character. By observing this stipulated construal of knowing engaged in a critique of itself, phenomenology will follow out the effort at self-legitimation of the epistemological project that assumes that knowing always has assumptions, always confronts some given that serves as its standard of truth, always has a foundation grounding the validity of its claims in some factor independent of itself.

Phenomenology will thus enable us to deal with the knowing that presumes that knowing has assumptions without ourselves making any unqualified assumptions about it or without bringing any standards of our own into play. Whereas foundational epistemology examines a cognition that does not examine itself, phenomenology observes a knowing that does critique itself, eliminating at one level at least the distinction between knowing and its object that rendered the cognition of the foundational epistemologist an unexamined instrument.

What allows the knowing under consideration to examine itself without need of our juridical involvement is the character it is stipulated to have in being what Hegel calls "consciousness." In employing this rubric, Hegel is not making any systematic claim about consciousness, for doing that would involve a reversion to foundational epistemology or dogmatic philosophical psychology. Instead, Hegel is utilizing a term that fits the stipulated construal of cognition at issue insofar as consciousness *appears* to be the type of psychological phenomenon that treats its mental content as the determination of something that it confronts. Consequently, construing knowing in these terms here signifies that cognition is defined by an "opposition of consciousness," where cognition involves two poles. On the one hand, knowing has for its object something given in its own right apart from knowing. On the other hand, knowing has its knowledge insofar as it enters into a relation with its object. The two sides of the relationship are asymmetrical, for the object does not need knowing to be what it is, whereas the knowing in question does not exist apart from relating to the object it confronts. That latter relation constitutes the knowledge claim or certainty that knowing has in confronting the object, whose independent givenness constitutes the truth of knowledge or the standard to which knowledge must conform to be valid.<sup>2</sup>

Consequently, the phenomenological observer need neither introduce any standard for evaluating the knowledge of the cognition under view nor undertake to examine whether that knowledge conforms to its standard of truth. Consciousness has its standard within its polar relation insofar as the object to which it relates constitutes the standard for its knowledge, whereas consciousness examines the correspondence of



its knowledge with that standard simply by being aware of both its own knowledge claim and the object to which it should conform.<sup>3</sup>

Hence, phenomenology has hypothesized a construal of knowing that examines its own knowledge claims. Moreover, this examination, which is built into the structure of consciousness as the phenomenon it is taken to be, is such that a specific development will ensue so long as the knowing under observation retains its defining identity by confronting something given. Insofar as there remains a distinction between knowing and its object, when knowing compares its object with its putative knowledge of it, it must discover that the object that it is addressing is not the object as it is apart from knowing. Rather, it is the object as it is given for knowing, since only in relation to knowing can the object be compared to the knowledge cognition has of it. Since the object can be appealed to as a standard only as it is given for knowing, knowing experiences that the object it confronts is not what it appeared to be – namely, something apart from knowing. The object that it confronts is the object as it is for knowing, which is a different content.<sup>4</sup>

Yet as Hegel points out, to the extent that what knowing confronts is altered, knowing's relation to its object is also altered, for its relation is characterized in respect to what it confronts. Thus, the knowing under observation necessarily undergoes a transformation through the comparing of its terms, becoming what can be considered a new shape of consciousness, retaining in a new guise of transformed relation the defining opposition between knowing's relating and that to which it relates.<sup>5</sup>

As Hegel points out, this process of transformation, where consciousness comes to experience that its object turns out to be what the object is in its relation to knowing, could be regarded as a path of despair because each successive shape would appear to be subject to the same process of inversion.<sup>6</sup> For the observer, the succession of shapes provides a necessary development insofar as once knowing construed as consciousness is stipulated, each shape of consciousness generates a specific successor determined by its own particular opposition of knowing and its object.<sup>7</sup>

Although this necessity allows phenomenology to have a nonarbitrary ordering, it is not clear how this "scientific" form<sup>8</sup> saves the observation of consciousness's path of despair from the ceaseless undertaking of traditional skepticism. As the ancient skeptics realized, because any global denial of knowing subverts itself, skepticism must be an endless task, ever casting doubt upon whatever knowledge claims it comes upon. Phenomenology would seem similarly caught in endless observation, ever confronting

more shapes of consciousness, ceaselessly emerging from further experience. Phenomenology would then be a curse, never leading beyond the futile endeavors of phenomenal knowing, never bringing them to closure, never freeing discourse from the opposition of consciousness.

The underlying problem, however, equally indicates the only possible solution. So long as the observed phenomenon of knowing retains its defining difference between knowing and its object, there will remain a difference between what the object is independently of knowing and the object as it exists in its relation to knowing. This means that when knowing examines its knowledge, it will find itself confronting an object different from what it originally took it to be. If, by contrast, these two terms come to be indistinguishable, no discrepancy will arise, and there will be no further generation of additional shapes of consciousness. The motor of the development will cease to function insofar as the constitutive opposition of knowing and its object has itself collapsed. Consequently, the nature of the development of the subject matter dictates its one and only possible terminus: the accomplished equalization of knowing and its object.

Hegel himself characterizes this possible achievement of closure in several intriguing ways at different points in the Introduction, indicating some of the complexity of the one and only possible closure of phenomenology.

At one point he describes the entire succession of shapes of consciousness as composing a self-consummating skepticism,<sup>9</sup> suggesting that the inversion by which each shape experiences its own downfall comes to the point of undermining its own undermining of conscious knowing, bringing the development to an end so as to remove the opposition of consciousness as the insurmountable construal of cognition.

At another point Hegel states that phenomenology concludes when consciousness grasps its own true nature.<sup>10</sup> That closure should hinge upon this achievement of self-knowledge has a telling plausibility. Such a shape of consciousness would effectively undermine the opposition that characterizes it, because consciousness would here discover its object to be truly itself,<sup>11</sup> eliminating any difference between what it confronts and its relating to it.

Finally, Hegel suggests that this consciousness of consciousness's own true nature will involve a recollection of all of the shapes that have led to it. That is, consciousness will achieve closure by taking on a configuration where the object it confronts is the entire preceding development of shapes, which has obtained totality by proving to be the genesis of its own consummated self-knowing.<sup>12</sup>

Anyone who has immersed him- or herself in the series of shapes that Hegel presents as making up the development leading to closure becomes quickly aware of how there are no easy solutions to obtaining the required self-knowledge by which the opposition of consciousness is to be overcome. When the shape of Understanding experiences that its object has the same inner differentiation as its own apprehension, it might appear that the emergence of self-consciousness as an object would achieve what is needed. Yet because consciousness has certainty of self-consciousness only in face of a given it still confronts, the opposition of consciousness remains.<sup>13</sup> Later, when the shapes of self-consciousness reach an experience in the "unhappy consciousness" where the unity of self-consciousness and its opposing consciousness become reconciled, there still remains confrontation.<sup>14</sup> Consciousness now takes the form of Reason, where consciousness is certain of the unity of self-consciousness with consciousness, such that the given is at one with self-consciousness, as expressed in the "category." This certainty, however, still involves opposition to the given, because the given's content has yet to be observed to exhibit its conformity with the unity of self-consciousness.<sup>15</sup> When consciousness discovers that nothing in the form of being can exhibit that unity and seeks to realize that unity in the world by transforming it, that very endeavor remains caught in opposition to the given, since its own activity proceeds only so long as that unity has yet to be achieved.<sup>16</sup> Even when consciousness is certain of realizing that unity in its own actuality, concerning itself only with what factors as that rational actuality ("*die Sache selbst*"), the abstract subjectivity of its actuality retains an opposition to the concrete presence of otherness.<sup>17</sup> The shapes of "spirit" bring consciousness to find itself in a world already realizing its own self-actualization, belonging to an ethical community in which the ends it pursues are already realized through the common activities of its members. Yet once more opposition remains, for the unity of spirit still retains a "natural" givenness extraneous to the form of ethical community, from which consciousness accordingly finds itself alienated.<sup>18</sup> Finally, religious community may transcend the externality of nature, but religious practice's relation to what is infinite still involves an opposition preventing what consciousness knows to be true from being nothing but itself.<sup>19</sup>

These complications suggest two important reasons why the unfolding of phenomenology cannot be dispensed with in any effort to overcome the construal of knowing of foundational epistemology. First, only by surmounting considerable hurdles can the opposition of consciousness be eliminated through the self-examination of the knowing that

confronts a given object distinct from itself. Second, if the removal of the distinction between knowing and its object depends upon reflecting upon the entire succession of shapes of consciousness leading to that removal, then the whole development is indispensable for this achievement. Alas, demonstrating that this second consideration is binding seems to require working through the entire development itself.

Nonetheless, the awaited goal by which the succession of shapes of experience can come to an end still remains characterized in the simplest terms. Hegel calls this consummating result "Absolute Knowing,"<sup>20</sup> signifying that final self-eliminating shape in which what is in itself and what is for consciousness have become indistinguishable, leaving knowing no longer able to find any determinate given to confront. Knowing is no longer relative to, that is, in relation to, any presupposed object. Knowing – construed as relating to the given, to an object distinct from itself – vanishes, and absolute knowing consists in nothing but this self-annulment of the knowing that presumes to have a presupposition, a foundation, a given that serves as the standard for validating its knowledge.

Accordingly, absolute knowing cannot be considered a privileged standpoint, from which what is in itself is unraveled, nor some privileged given providing some kind of absolute truth. Instead Hegel presents absolute knowing as the gateway to a knowing that can manage not to take anything for granted, not to confront anything given, and not to make any claims about being or knowing.

### **Do Hegel's introductory discussions in the *Science of Logic* remove the need for phenomenology?**

The impoverished character of absolute knowing raises anew the question of whether all the trouble leading to its emergence really need be endured. Is phenomenological investigation genuinely necessary when all it could ever conclude with is an utterly empty point of departure about which nothing determinate can legitimately be said? Hegel himself makes this question all the more inescapable by offering us two complementary introductions to his *Science of Logic*, both of which serve to pave the way for genuinely beginning philosophy as an inquiry which, more than any other, needs no introduction.

The first of these self-effacing introductions addresses the very idea of logic by drawing an initial contrast between logical science and all other kinds of science.<sup>21</sup> Insofar as logic thinks thinking, logic is distinguished by engaging in a knowing making no distinction between knowing and

its object. Admittedly, this suggests that the very possibility of logic presumes the overcoming of any such distinction between knowing and its object.

Nonetheless, precisely because logic does not employ a cognition that it does not put under scrutiny, logic can make an absolute beginning. As Hegel points out, because all nonlogical sciences think something other than thought, they investigate something different from the thinking they employ to carry out their investigation. Consequently, any nonlogical inquiry makes a relative, rather than absolute, beginning by having to presuppose the thinking it employs as well as a subject matter at least minimally determined to be other than thought.<sup>22</sup>

By contrast, logic begins without conditions insofar as its thinking of thinking has no preconceived method or subject matter. What thinking logic uses and addresses remains to be determined in the course of its inquiry.<sup>23</sup> For just this reason, the very idea of logic ends up being the idea of a science that is completely presuppositionless and indeterminate, having neither any antecedently defined method or subject matter.

Consequently, any cognition that addresses an object different from itself cannot be philosophical wisdom but only the doubly conditioned cognition characterizing the opposition of consciousness, whose structure is given and whose object equally confronts consciousness with given determinacy.

This does mean that the science of logic is inaccessible so long as we remain captive to the construal of knowing that opposes knowing to its object and distinguishes between them. In that respect, the opposition of consciousness bars the way to philosophy.

Yet hasn't that opposition been outflanked by the simple reflection Hegel has just made in distinguishing logical from nonlogical cognition? Isn't it enough to recognize the conditioned, relative character of nonlogical cognition and the unconditioned indeterminacy of logic, which can have no predefined form or content?

Hegel, of course, claims in the midst of these reflections that *The Phenomenology of Spirit* still serves as an introduction to science proper, furnishing a deduction of the concept of science.<sup>24</sup> This seems doubly odd since the science of logic cannot proceed with any predetermined method and can establish what valid thinking is only at the end of its labors. The sole way the *Phenomenology of Spirit* could provide a concept of science concordant with these imperatives of logic is if that concept consists simply in the removal of the opposition of consciousness by including within it the otherwise empty idea that genuine science must begin with the overcoming of all confrontation with the given. Only

this completely negative concept can leave the “science” free to make an absolute beginning, liberated from any determinate preconception of method or subject matter, and establish its own positive self-understanding as the final result of its development.

If, however, the deduction furnished by the *Phenomenology* delivers just this impoverished negative conception of science, why can’t the mere reflection on the idea of logic provide the same starting point and the same absolute beginning?

The possibility of forsaking the *Phenomenology*’s arduous deduction of the concept of science seems to garner support from Hegel’s introductory discussion in *The Science of Logic*: “With What Must the Science Begin?”<sup>25</sup> Through equally brief reflections upon the problem of beginning philosophy, Hegel here shows that no genuine beginning can occur unless all determinacy is left behind. This is so because nothing can be determinate without being distinguished from what it is not. Since beginning with any determinacy is thereby mediated by something else, only an overcoming of given determinacy can possibly supply a beginning to philosophical thought that does not already rest upon presuppositions but begins without qualification.<sup>26</sup>

Yet even here Hegel still maintains that the being, the indeterminacy, with which philosophy must begin is introduced by *Phenomenology*.<sup>27</sup> But how could that which has to be presuppositionless have a presupposition? How could that which needs no introduction have anything that serves as its deduction? After all, Hegel himself admits that these complementary introductory sections of *The Science of Logic* are not really necessary because we are dealing with what cannot have any presuppositions.<sup>28</sup>

William Maker, in *Philosophy without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel*, succeeds in removing the seeming contradiction by suggesting how the *Phenomenology* can coherently be the presupposition of presuppositionless discourse – that is, philosophy. Philosophy need not surrender its unconditioned autonomy because the *Phenomenology*, to the degree that it comes to closure, shows that the knowing presuming that knowing always has presuppositions subverts itself, eliminating its own constitutive assumption, and thereby removing at one blow the opposition of consciousness and any skepticism about presuppositionless beginnings. Here we have presuppositional knowing undermining itself through its own attempt to be self-consistent, eliminating the distinction between knowing and its object, and thereby ushering in the element of logic.<sup>29</sup>

Does this signify, then, that phenomenology’s introductory role merely amounts to preventing an indeterminate starting point from

being regarded as completely arbitrary and nonsensical? After all, how can one take logic's declaration of "being" seriously unless one has a sense of how not beginning with indeterminacy falls prey to either dogmatic ontology or the self-annulling project of foundational epistemology?

Yet can the significance of this radically impoverished starting point not be provided by something much less than the entire *Phenomenology of Spirit*? If Hegel's own introductory discussions in the *Science of Logic* do not suffice, what about two alternate shortcuts for avoiding the arduous observation of every single inversion of consciousness on the road to absolute knowing?

### Two shortcuts to logic?

One shortcut follows from a basic reflection upon the whole enterprise of foundational epistemology. By putting knowing first, as what must be examined before one can know objects, foundational epistemology undertakes a knowing of the knowing of objects. As we have seen, this entails that the knowing that investigates knowing is not the knowing under investigation. Because the knowing under investigation knows objects other than itself, it does not scrutinize itself. Hence it is examined by a knowing distinct from itself, leaving epistemology's own cognition unscrutinized by its investigation.

If the investigation of knowing is to escape the problem of taking for granted the knowing with which it investigates knowing, epistemology must ensure that the knowing being investigated is identical to the knowing that investigates it. How can this be possible? Simply put, for the knowing under investigation to be equivalent to the knowing that examines it, the knowing under investigation must itself be a knowing of knowing. In that case, where true knowing turns out to be a knowing of knowing, the investigation of knowing ceases to be stymied by using a cognition that is unexamined and distinct from its object. Then the cognition of epistemology is equivalent to true knowing per se, allowing epistemology to be true in its own right.

If, however, the true knowing being investigated by true epistemology must be a knowing of knowing, there can no longer be any distinction between subject and object, no opposition of consciousness where knowing confronts something apart from itself. That relationship is eliminated, and the attempt to know knowing as first philosophy finds itself driven into the element of logic, where knowing and object are indistinguishable.

This abbreviated path, whereby foundational epistemology eliminates itself in becoming self-consistent, seems to circumvent in a very short, direct way all those hundreds of pages that it takes *The Phenomenology of Spirit* to arrive at absolute knowing.

The same can be said of another ploy that emerges from reflecting upon the general problem of foundational justification, which applies to all domains of normativity, including not just truth but right and beauty, too. This widened reach is not inappropriate for addressing the core problem of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, whose wealth of shapes of consciousness includes the self-validating undertakings of cultural formations involving conduct, art, and religion, as well as scientific investigation.

In all these domains normative claims are advanced, be it about right and wrong, beauty, or religious faith. In each arena an almost natural assumption commonly prevails: that to validate something requires appealing to some independently given standard of validity. In other words, there has to be something that serves as a foundation of normativity, conferring validity upon what thereby counts as valid. A distinction is presumed between what confers and what obtains validation, a distinction between what grounds normativity and what possesses normativity. The opposition of consciousness exemplifies this defining distinction between validating foundation and what is validated.

The root problem afflicting foundational justification of any kind is the questionable status of the factor figuring as the privileged foundation of normativity. If it is to have validity as the foundation conferring validation on what possesses validity, it will have to confer its validity upon itself. To do so, however, the normative foundation must be determined by itself. Although this achieves self-referential consistency, it does so at the price of canceling the distinction between that which confers and that which possesses validity. For if the validating factor must validate itself, then the standard of validity ceases to be a foundation of something other than itself, and validity no longer derives from anything distinct from what enjoys validity. Normativity ceases to be heteronomous, and validity instead resides in what is self-determined. Yet because what is self-determined is what it has determined itself to be, it can have no given character prior to the unfolding of its self-determining process. Hence, foundational justification, by being driven to satisfy its own standard of validity, not only undercuts its defining distinction but leads to the same indeterminacy resulting from the completion of phenomenology.



No escape from this outcome is possible. If one objects to a foundation-free beginning from indeterminacy by denying that normativity can reside in self-determination, one accepts the heteronomy where some foundation determines validity. That foundation, however, can have validity on its own terms only if it determines itself, once more removing the distinction between validator and validated and once more supplanting foundational justification with an indeterminacy from which self-determination proceeds.

Does this self-elimination of foundational justification relieve us of any need to purely observe the self-examination of the phenomenon of conscious knowing as it works itself through whatever inversions it takes to put an end to its toils and our own?

Admittedly, the self-elimination of foundational justification does depend upon some preconception of normativity, of the relation between foundation and founded, of self-consistency, of how self-founding is self-determination and how the self-determined self is indeterminate until it proceeds to determine itself. By the same token, the self-elimination of transcendental inquiry through the identification of knowing as the knowing of knowing presumes some prior understanding of knowing, objects, and the difference between knowing and its object, as well as some conception of epistemology and what it means for epistemology to be internally consistent.

Similarly, Hegel's introductory account of the idea of logic depends upon a preconception of the minimal distinction between logical and nonlogical thought, as well as distinctions involving absolute and relative, subject and object, and method. So, too, "With What Must the Science Begin" takes for granted an understanding of the distinction between determinacy and being, how determinacy involves mediation and negation, and what it means for philosophy to begin.

All these presumptions could be called into question. For this reason, if they had to figure as unqualified claims, their employment would be dogmatic, and everything resting upon them would remain suspect.

Yet can what follows from them be taken seriously by treating these presumptions as phenomena about which nothing systematic is being claimed? Can they figure as phenomenological stipulations that provide the same internal critique and self-elimination of presuppositional knowing that the entire *Phenomenology of Spirit* aims to furnish?

It is important to note that Hegel expressly begins the *Phenomenology of Spirit* with no further stipulation than the minimal construal of a knowing that confronts a given object. The Introduction spells out this appearance of knowing as the opposition of consciousness, with no

further qualification. For just this reason, the starting point of phenomenological observation is that opposition as immediately at hand. All that is available to observe is a knowing that immediately relates to its object in respect to nothing but its immediate givenness, its being. Admittedly, the knowing is identified as a sense-certainty for which the immediacy of the object is present as a sensuous manifold rather than the sheer indeterminacy of being with which the *Science of Logic* must and does begin.<sup>30</sup> This added determinacy, whose content is otherwise undifferentiated, is unavoidable insofar as the being in question is that of an object standing in relation to knowing. Due to this relatedness, whereby immediacy has the form of objectlikeness (*Gegenständlichkeit*), of opposing knowing, the object cannot be being per se, which has no inner or outer relations. Yet nothing more minimal could be present for phenomenological observation given the relatedness ingredient in the *phenomenon* of presuppositional, foundational, conscious knowing. Any more content added at the outset would inject relations that are extraneous to the project of observing foundational knowing subject itself to examination. In order to respect the wholly immanent development of the stipulated subject matter, any further determination of either pole of the relation must be generated through the phenomenon of knowing's own self-investigation.

This consideration is decisive for whether alternate self-eliminating introductions to philosophy are provided by either Hegel's two introductory discussions in the *Science of Logic* or the two suggested shortcuts. If these alternatives employ more than what is contained in the bare assertion of the opposition of consciousness, their admitted stipulation will not redeem their intended role. If they be taken just as assumptions, then whatever consequences follow from them remain problematic, built upon questionable foundations. Alternately, if they be taken as unqualified claims, they constitute dogmatic assertions that cannot serve to introduce philosophy.

Hegel's introductory discussion of the idea of logic relies upon a distinction between logical and nonlogical science that depends upon the claim that logic is a thinking of thinking and that nonlogical inquiry employs a thinking different from what that thinking thinks. With this distinction in hand, Hegel then reflects upon the difference in their respective starting points to conclude that logic can make an absolute beginning, such as presuppositionless philosophy would require, from which logical method must result as the consummation of the development of logical investigation. These reflections seem to issue from little more than the initial distinction, and that distinction seems to

do little more than distinguish between knowing as consciousness and knowing that overcomes the opposition of consciousness. Nonetheless, both of these claims go beyond the mere stipulation of the opposition of consciousness itself, which provides no other knowledge claim than that what confronts consciousness *is*.

The same can be said of the meager presumptions that Hegel offers in his reflections in "With What Must the Science Begin?" There he presents the view that determinacy depends upon mediation and that a genuine beginning must not have any mediation and thus no determinacy. Hegel further notes that although a genuine beginning may be indeterminate, a being that is nothing, it is still an indeterminacy from which something will become.<sup>31</sup> This point, of course, foreshadows the logical development from being to nothing to becoming to determinate being. Once more, however, all of these rudimentary theses concerning determinacy, indeterminacy, and beginning are more than a simple articulation of the opposition of consciousness and the immediate knowledge of the being of what is given. Hence, neither of these introductory discussions can escape making positive knowledge claims whose authority is questionable.

What about the identification of knowing with the knowing of knowing, to which foundational epistemology drives itself in trying to equalize its cognition with the knowing it investigates? All this move seems to require is a stipulation of transcendental inquiry, the resolve to investigate knowing before knowing objects. Doesn't this just stipulate the opposition of consciousness as the knowing under investigation and then simply follow the implications of how that investigation can be self-referentially consistent? Admittedly, the project of foundational epistemology does presuppose that knowing confronts the given. In doing so, foundational epistemology does not regard that assumption as just a stipulation of a phenomenon. Instead, transcendental investigation addresses its object as knowing *per se*. If, however, *we* stipulate the transcendental project itself as a phenomenon and follow out its efforts to be internally consistent, won't this simply remain within the limits of phenomenology? It would, *if* the transcendental project was equivalent to the opposition of consciousness and all we encountered in its initial observation was an immediate cognition of what is immediately given. The shortcut achieved by equating knowing with the knowing of knowing begins, however, not just with the opposition of consciousness. Rather, it starts with a knowing of that opposition and then supplements this cognition with the insight that only the identification of knowing with the knowing of knowing removes the discrepancy between method

and subject matter. On both counts, the shortcut violates the proviso of addressing just knowing as a phenomenon, which minimally consists in an immediate knowing of the immediately given.

The self-destruction of foundational justification offers an analogous situation. It might seem to stipulate merely the difference between what confers normativity and what possesses normativity and then to add the insight that the foundation of normativity can possess what it confers only if it becomes self-determined. Both these theses, however, involve more than just stipulating the opposition of consciousness. To examine foundational justification involves addressing the opposition of consciousness not just as a phenomenon but as a theory of normativity. Moreover, affirming that foundational justification resolves itself into an identification of normativity with self-determination presupposes some understanding of self-determination and normativity. That understanding is equivalent to neither the stipulation of conscious knowing nor the immediate consciousness of what is.

Accordingly, phenomenology does not give way to any easier entrée to philosophy. The necessity to undergo Hegel's propaedeutic ordeal looms before all who would enter the element of logic.

# 2

## Negation and Truth

### From nothing to negation

The place of negation in truth has been acknowledged yet misunderstood ever since Aristotle remarked that truth involves stating the being of what is and the nonbeing of what is not, whereas falsity involves affirming the being of what is not and the nonbeing of what is.<sup>1</sup> Following Aristotle's observation, negation has been treated as if it only truthfully figured in the denial of what is not. Negation has otherwise been held to be absent from the being of what is as well as from its affirmation.

The exclusion of negation from anything positive has seemed conclusively certified by Aristotle's first principle of thought, the principle of noncontradiction, that nothing can be and not be at the same time in the same way.<sup>2</sup> Supposedly, unless being and its negation are held entirely apart, nothing can be determinate, nothing can be determinately meant, and nothing can be determinately known.

Taken to an extreme, the exclusion of negation from being renders negation equivalent to nothing. This equation of negation and nothing has lent support to the Parmenidean view that being is all that is, that there *is* no negation, and that nothing cannot be the same as being. Certainly, if nothing is taken to be negation, it does make a difference whether nothing is or is not. Nothing, as negation, as otherness, is certainly different from what it negates. Of course, if one treats being as what is *other to* negation, being becomes a determinate being, which is different from its negation. These confusions of being and determinate being and of nothing and negation preclude any identity of being and nothing.<sup>3</sup> Yet nothing, as purely indeterminate, as containing no otherness of its own, is indistinguishable from being.<sup>4</sup>

That being is nothing and nothing is being is the perennial outcome of ontology's quest to think what being is. The moment any determination is assigned to being, being gets characterized in terms of some determinate being, undermining the attempt to think being as such.<sup>5</sup> As soon as being is identified with some determinacy, all other determinacies are thereby robbed of being, and being ceases to be common to everything that is. For this reason, ontology is compelled to acknowledge the indeterminacy of being.<sup>6</sup> That indeterminacy leaves being immediately nothing and nothing immediately being. There can be no transition from being to nothing for there is no third term, no mediation either connecting them or keeping them apart. Any attempt to insert some boundary that needs to be traversed by some mediating process only confuses being with determinate being and nothing with negation.<sup>7</sup>

Consequently, Parmenides cannot successfully prevent being from succumbing to becoming, for becoming just is being that is immediately nothing and nothing that is immediately being. Becoming, however, does not contain negation. The two sides of becoming, ceasing to be (being that is nothing) and coming to be (nothing that is being), do not confront one another as something and other – that is, what it is not. Because ceasing to be leads to nothing, which is indistinguishable from the being that comes to be, both sides of becoming are themselves indistinguishable. As a result, becoming's own constitutive dual movement subverts itself, leaving Heraclitus just as empty-handed as Parmenides. Ceasing to be and coming to be both themselves cease by reverting to their points of departure: being that is nothing is being, just as nothing that is being is nothing. Becoming thereby collapses into a unity of being and nothing, a unity that is stable insofar as it no longer contains ceasing nor coming to be. This unity is not just being or nothing or becoming. It rather holds being and nothing together without relying upon any other term. Consequently, the unity of being and nothing is immediate, uniting being and nothing in the form of being.<sup>8</sup>

This stable unity of being and nothing comprises determinate being precisely because nothing determinate can enter into determinate being without taking for granted what must be explained. Since only indeterminate factors can comprise determinate being, there is nothing with which to distinguish determinate being from being, nothing, or becoming than this unity of being and nonbeing, which is itself not just being, nothing, or becoming. Determinate being, as the immediate unity of being and nothing contains determinacy, or quality as such, in the form of being or immediacy. Determinacy or quality cannot itself contain any determinate factors, any qualities, for that would qualify

quality per se, rendering determinacy as such relative to some specific determinacy, introducing the same question begging that afflicts ontology when it seeks to specify being in terms of some determinate being.<sup>9</sup>

Yet the form of being in which determinate being has quality is subject to the same development that being undergoes. The being of quality is immediately the nonbeing of quality, for no boundary keeps them apart. Just as being is nothing and nothing is being, so determinate being becomes a determinacy that is and is not – which is to say that determinate being becomes a *determinate* determinate being. Instead of just being immediate, determinacy comes to have a determinate being, comprising both the being of quality and the nonbeing of quality. This brings negation to the scene in conjunction with reality. Reality is, as the philosophical tradition has long recognized,<sup>10</sup> the being of determinacy in contrast to negation, which is the nonbeing of determinacy. Reality is more than being, just as negation is more than nothing. Each is an aspect of determinate determinacy, enabling determinate being to be not just immediately but determinately.

Yet just as determinate being becomes determinate in form, containing both the being and nonbeing of quality, so reality and negation themselves have determinate being. Since being and nothing are immediately one another, the being of quality comprising reality is just as much the nonbeing of quality, just as negation as the nonbeing of quality is just as much the being of quality. Accordingly, reality and negation comprise not merely aspects of determinate being but determinate beings that confront one another. Reality is *a* determinate being having its determinate character by not being what is other to it; namely the determinate being of negation. Their contrast allows for something to be – namely a determinate determinate being – which, as such, stands in contrastive relation to its otherness, its negation.

Plato, in the *Sophist*, draws out the ramifications of these developments, revealing why negation cannot be excluded from the truth of what is. As the Stranger there explains, being may be different from negation, but nothing that is can fail to be different from other things that are. Otherwise, a being forfeits its distinguishable determinacy and reverts to indeterminate being in general, which is indistinguishable from nothing. Hence, all beings – that is, determinate beings – participate in difference, being other to what they are not. This form of otherness is negation, and to be something, a being must participate in negation in order to not be what is other to it. Consequently, the truth of being, understood to extend to determinate being, must itself contain

negation, for to say that what is *is* requires differentiating each being from what it is not.<sup>11</sup>

The crucial role of negation in enabling something to be determinate and thereby different from something else has since been celebrated as a principle fundamental to the determinacy of both being and knowledge. Spinoza, of course, proclaimed that “determination is negation,”<sup>12</sup> duly confirming Plato’s insight that to be something requires otherness to maintain its difference to anything else.

More recently, Saussure secured the determinacy of meaning in the endless contrastive web of language wherein each term has definite significance only through negation, through not being what other terms signify. Then, of course, meaning resides in not signifying what other terms do, leaving the determinacy of every term always lying beyond itself in the endless expanse of other terms composing the former’s negation. Derrida makes this never-ending dissemination of meaning all-determining, treating determination by negation as the all-inclusive principle of discourse.<sup>13</sup> Like Saussure before him, Derrida presumes that his own pronouncements about the dissemination of meaning have a communicable fixed meaning. Yet Derrida’s exclusive reliance upon negation for the fixing of determinacy cannot hide a dilemma implicit in the endlessness of the dissemination of meaning that he acknowledges.

### **The limits of determination by negation**

Although negation is constitutive of determinate determinacy, the determination negation provides is too impoverished to provide for anything more than the basic distinction of something and other. By itself, determination by negation cannot constitute any determinacy determined by some prior determiner, such as in the two-tiered relationship of essence and appearance, thing and its properties, whole and parts, grounded and grounded, or cause and effect. Nor can determination by negation provide for any self-determined determinacy, including individuality and its related categories of universality and particularity. All negation delivers is the contrast of something with what it is not, a contrast hardly sufficient to individuate beings or meanings. Moreover, determination by negation cannot even sustain its own difference as an independently abiding contrast.

This becomes evident the moment one focuses on how meager the contrast of something and other that negation involves is. Something is a determinate determinacy simply in not being what is other than it. Something *per se* is not determined by possessing any determinate



qualities, like a thing with properties, for such determinate qualities are themselves something. Nor is something as such a particular, related to other instances of a universal they share, maintaining their plurality by being differentiated particulars or individuals. Particularity, universality, and individuality themselves depend upon factors that are already something determinate, as well as upon determinacies that differentiate themselves in the way in which the universal can be only a one over many by being particularized into a plurality of individuals.

Instead, something is merely by being what its other is not. Yet the other of something is not just being or nothing, whose indeterminacy provides no determinate contrast. The other is instead itself a determinate determinacy, owing its determinacy to negation by not being what something is. Accordingly, something is in virtue of being in relation to an other, which is itself only determinate by having something as *its* other. This means that something is also an other in relation to its own other, just as the other of something is something in relation to what it is not – namely its other.

Therefore, although something and other are what they are only by standing in contrast to one another, their contrast leaves something and other taking on the same determinacy. Something and other both figure as something and as other. Something is also the other of its other, just as its other is also something for which something figures as its other. Consequently, determination by negation cannot succeed in maintaining their distinction. Far from providing individuation, as Saussure and Derrida would like to maintain, the contrast of something and other turns out to relate something to something that has the same determinacy. Determination by negation thus leads from the contrast of something and other to the self-elimination of the contrast. What results is not relation to other but self-relation. Because the other to which something is constitutively contrasted turns out to be something, just as something turns out to be the other of its other, something relates to itself in relating to what is initially its negation.

That which is only self-related is the one.<sup>14</sup> As the one, self-related determinacy has no relation to other, no external negation. Beyond the one can only be the void, the absence of otherness. Yet the absence of otherness is no different than the one itself, for the one, as self-related determinacy excludes all relation to other. The one therefore cannot help but generate the many, repelling from itself other ones, which, insofar as they have nothing to distinguish themselves from one another, equally come together or attract. This coincidence of repelling and attracting ones constitutes quantity, insofar as quantity combines continuity and

discreteness. Quantity is always divisible into units, but its component units have nothing between them keeping them apart.

As these conceptual developments indicate, determination by negation may be limited, but it does make possible quality and quantity, as well as the measure relations that join quality to quantity, enabling quantitative determination to become qualitative. Nonetheless, if negation is to play a role in truth and truth encompasses more than quality, quantity, and measure, negation must operate in fundamentally different manners.

### Negation in determined determinacy

That negation takes on new indispensable forms is first manifest in the categorial domain of determined determinacy, where determinacy is determined by a determiner. This sphere contains all categories where the coeval contrastive determination of something and other is supplanted by two-tiered relations such as essence and appearance, ground and grounded, whole and parts, thing and properties, substance and accidents, and cause and effect.<sup>15</sup>

These two-tiered relations have much in common with Peirce's realm of secondness, insofar as the immediacy of given determinacy characterizing firstness is supplanted by relations in which each determinacy is relative to something that posits its determination. Peirce, however, treats categories of firstness as if a single immediate term were involved, neglecting how determinate determinacy depends upon negation, which requires something to be in relation to an other.<sup>16</sup> Consequently, the distinction between categories of determinacy and determined determinacy is between not single unrelated terms and terms in relation but relations of coeval factors and relations between factors where one determines the other.

Insofar as any relation of a determiner and what it determines involves determinate determinacy, negation and the whole realm of determinate determinacy is presupposed and incorporated. Yet in order for determinacy to be *posited* rather than coevally given, determinacy must become mediated by something that underlies it as its determiner. This mediation minimally removes the immediacy with which quality, quantity, and measure comprise contrastive relations of terms having no primacy with respect to one another. The content of these terms is not thereby annulled or modified. Rather, that content is simply rendered mediated by a determiner, giving it the form of a posit posited by some positor. This formal character of the mediation is exemplified by how ancient

skeptics suspended judgment by treating what had counted as given reality as mere phenomena, relative to and conditioned by some factor. The skeptics' suspension of judgment denied not the content of appearance but simply its independent being.<sup>17</sup>

In the same way, the negation constitutive of what content becomes mediated remains in force, but the immediacy it has as a single level of determinacy now becomes annulled. This nullifying negation, however, cannot consist in contrasting quality, quantity, and measure with an other's quality, quantity, or measure, for that would reinstate qualitative difference without introducing any two-tiered relations. The negation must rather be something other to all such contrastive difference.<sup>18</sup> What the determiner determines certainly has a determinacy of its own. Yet as determined by the determiner, the otherness of the posit is illusory, for it depends entirely upon the determiner for its mediated being. For this reason, determined determinacy reflects its determiner, even if the determiner cannot determine something unless its posit is distinguishable from the positing responsible for it.<sup>19</sup> Consequently, the differentiation between determined determinacy and its determiner involves a dual negation.<sup>20</sup> Besides containing the negation contrasting something and other, the two-tiered determination contains the negation of independent immediacy constituting the difference between a mediator and what it mediates.<sup>21</sup>

This type of dual negation has been privileged by modern philosophy in the principle of sufficient reason, according to which everything has a ground – which is to say that all being is determined determinacy, mediated by some determiner. Since Kant, the privileging of determined determinacy has led to a prevailing resignation that reason can never know anything unconditioned, leaving knowledge restricted to what is conditioned by an antecedent foundation. This result is unavoidable when philosophy takes a transcendental turn and treats objectivity as determined by the structure of knowing. Then all objects are conditioned by the same determiner – namely the conditions of knowing. Objectivity is then subject to an external necessity that applies to all its objects alike, irrespective of what they are. Instead of composing a world of embodied forms, nature becomes a realm ordered by laws of matter, indifferent to form and import, imposing a mechanistic determinism excluding life, beauty, and freedom from objectivity.

Whether advanced as a universal metaphysical principle, such as by Leibniz, or as an empirically universal principle, such as by Kant, the principle of sufficient reason is just as inadequate as the principle that all determinacy is negation. The equation of negation and determinacy

cannot account for more than given determinacy and ultimately fails to maintain the distinction between something and other. For its part, the privileging of determined determinacy undermines itself, bringing forth a new form of negation that overcomes the limitations of two-tiered categories.

On the one hand, if knowledge is restricted to determined determinacy, the determiner which conditions objects of knowledge can never be known. Kant may have been unperturbed by having to treat the conditions of knowing as unknowable things in themselves, but the absolute privileging of two-tiered determination leaves knowledge restricted to appearances, whose underlying essence or ground always eludes capture. If the determining essence be known, like everything else, as determined by something else – that is, as having a sufficient reason – it either forfeits its foundational role or is both determined and determining.

The latter equalization is actually inescapable, for the distinction between determiner and determined undermines itself. Whatever form it takes, the determiner is a determiner of determined determinacy only insofar as there *is* something it posits or mediates. The determined determinacy thus actually determines the determiner to be a positor. In so doing, the erstwhile determined determinacy figures as a determiner of the erstwhile determiner, which now figures as a determined determinacy. For example, a cause is a cause only in virtue of its effect, which, in causing the cause to be a cause, renders that cause an effect of its own effect. Consequently, just as something and other both figure as something and other, so cause and effect both figure as cause and effect. Whereas the removal of the contrast of something and other ushered in self-relation, the removal of the distinction between cause and effect ushers in reciprocity, where cause and effect swap roles with one another, with the cause being the effect of its effect and the effect being the cause of its cause. The reciprocally causal factors thus eliminate their own difference and in so doing remove the last vestige of two-tiered determination. Reciprocity thereby gives expression to the result of two-tiered determination in general: determiner and determined emerge as one and the same. Instead of being determined by something other and determining something else, what does the determining is equally what gets determined.<sup>22</sup>

### **Negation in self-determined determinacy**

Determinacy, initially contrastively determined by negation and next determined by a prior determiner, has now emerged as self-determined

determinacy. The prior forms of negation remain incorporated, for determinacy entails otherness, just as determining and being determined involve the negation that removes the immediacy of determinacy. Yet self-determination cannot occur unless both these negations are themselves nullified.

On the one hand, self-determined determinacy must give itself new determinacy to be *determined*. Yet because this new determinacy is not something else, but the determination of the self that is underway determining itself, its otherness must be absorbed into the unity whose very identity consists in being what it has determined itself to be.<sup>23</sup> By making itself other to what it immediately constitutes, self-determined determinacy is what it has been all along – self-determination.

On the other hand, the mediation of the new determinacy by its determiner must equally be overcome. The new determinacy is posited not by something different from itself but by a self-determining determinacy of which it forms a stage in its ongoing self-constitution. The mediation of the new determinacy thereby constitutes a self-mediation, rendering the process as a whole something immediate insofar as it is not mediated by anything external to itself. Self-determined determinacy is determined and is determining but only in and through itself.<sup>24</sup>

The nullifying of the immediacy of the new determinacy, whereby it is something other to what determines it, and the nullifying of its mediation, whereby it becomes integrated into something self-mediating, together represent a third basic form of negation. What makes this form so significant for philosophical truth is that it is constitutive of universality and the particularity and individuality inherent in the universal.

This has been perennially misunderstood by those who mistakenly determine the universal as quality, through the contrastive determination of negation, or as essence, through the two-tiered determining of determined determinacy. In the first case, the universal is treated as something coevally other to the particular, leaving the universal with no intrinsic connection to what confronts it externally. On this basis the universal is either a nominalist figment of subjective thinking having no presence in particulars or an independent reality whose participation *in* particulars remains suspect. In the second case, the universal is treated as an underlying essence, of which the particular is only an illusory reflection. The universal may thereby mediate the particular, but its mediation is hobbled with a formality that leaves unspecified how the distinguishing content of the particular is otherwise related to the universal. In both cases, the universal does not determine itself but either confronts what it is not or determines something phenomenal.

Accordingly, the universal does not relate itself to universal determinations not already found within it from the start. As a consequence, thought is left incapable of connecting different universals to one another through thought alone. The universal is stuck with a fixed content, with which it remains formally identical, according to the principle of noncontradiction. Reason thereby becomes reduced to an instrument of analysis, which can conceive what is contained within some given or reflected in some appearance but not generate any new content from thinking. This leaves philosophy incapable of arriving at truth through reason alone, relegating thought to examining the consistency of deductions from given premises according to presupposed rules of inference or reflecting upon what is contained within the results of empirical observation.

The negation of self-determination surmounts these limitations. To be at one with itself, the universal must have a particularization, since otherwise it has no particularity with which to relate *as* the universal. In differentiating itself in its particularity, the universal acquires determination, but this determination is not merely qualitative, as something it is not. The universal carries *itself* over into particularity. Particularization is thereby a *self*-determination enabling the universal to be what it is. Particularity is not merely a reflection of the universal either, for if it were, the universal could not have determined *itself* in achieving particularization. It would instead have determined something else, a determined determinacy that might reflect it but not participate in it. Nor could particularity have any immediate being of its own, for as determined by an essence, it would merely be an illusory nullity, devoid of any independence. Because particularity is the self-differentiation of the universal, it has just as much independent being as universality.

Individuality is unthinkable without the negation characterizing self-determination. Individuation cannot be secured through the determination by negation contrasting something with an other. Something and other are hardly unique; they end up playing identical roles. The self-relation into which something and other revert is not individuality either, for self-related determinacy is just the one, whose only determination consists in excluding otherness. Since this exclusion opposes the one to the void, whose own exclusion of determinacy makes it just another one, the one reverts to the many, whose indistinguishable plurality results in the unity of continuity and discreteness of quantity rather than in individuality.

The two-tiered categories of determined determinacy are equally insufficient for constituting individuality. To be determined by a determiner

is hardly any basis for individuation. The same determiner can condition multiple phenomena. This is exhibited in Kantian nature, where the world of appearance conditioned by the structure of consciousness is governed by laws of matter in motion, indifferent to the individuality of each object. To be unique requires not contrast with otherness or determination by something else but being determined in and through oneself – that is, being self-determined. Because what is self-determined owes its character to its own being, it cannot fail to be individual. Universality and individuality do not confront one another qualitatively, as something and other, or as essence and appearance, as nominalists and Platonists respectively maintain.<sup>25</sup> Universality entails individuality because the particularization endemic to the universal is a *self*-determination. Even when universality takes the form of an abstract quality inhering in instances or a class containing members, its particulars must be individuals in order to maintain their plurality. As instances and as members, each particular figures alike, with the same relation to its universal. Unless they are not just particular but uniquely differentiated particulars, that is, individuals, the constitutive distinction between inhering universal and instance and between class and member collapses.

To be determined in and through itself, individuality must involve the same form of negation pervading self-determination. The individual is something and, hence, confronts otherness, but the individual requires more than determination by negation. The individual is also determined and therefore contains the negation of immediacy. Yet the individual is determined not by a determiner it reflects but in and through itself. Accordingly, the negation of immediacy of its determination must no less nullify any mediation that points beyond itself. The mediation must be kept self-mediating so that individuality excludes determination and negation by other.

These requirements indicate how individuality and universality cannot be opaque and unrelated to one another. They also foreshadow how conceptuality and objectivity must share the sort of negativity that permits their congruence.

### **Negation, concept, objectivity, and truth**

Objectivity cannot be other-determined by negation, like reality, for objectivity is a totality unto itself, independent of otherness.<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, objectivity can no more be a phenomenal existence, whose immediacy is negated by some concealed ground to which it is relative.

Objectivity, as a self-standing independent domain, must have an unconditioned, immediate being but also be entirely internally determinate. For this reason, objectivity cannot be known through categories that grasp what is a posit of something else. Objective knowledge depends instead upon conceptual determination precisely because the concept, or the universal as such, exhibits the same self-mediated negativity that a free-standing totality requires to be determinate in and through itself rather than a posit relative to some determining condition.

Objectivity is therefore doubly worthy of being what truth concerns. On the one hand, objectivity does not owe its determinacy to what it is not, like reality, nor is it relative to some condition. Knowledge restricted to reality could never know the other in contrast to which reality is determinate nor secure individuation even if it did. Alternatively, knowledge restricted to existence could never escape the relativity of being conditioned by something that falls outside the purview of such knowing. On the other hand, the self-standing independence of objectivity enables conceptual determination to be congruent with objectivity, allowing thought to be objective. This makes possible the correspondence of concept and objectivity, providing for truth that is unqualified.

The capacity for truth therefore does presuppose the capacity to negate but not simply because, as Hans Jonas affirms, only one who "can say 'no', can entertain truth."<sup>27</sup> This negative freedom to deny is only one side of the negativity and autonomy required for truth. In theory and practice, naysaying by itself leaves only doubt and destruction. To provide self-determination, negation must involve not just liberation from the given<sup>28</sup> but also the positive autonomy to establish new determinacy by a subject who therein remains at one with itself. This positive freedom is prerequisite for truth because it is the same self-determination whereby the universal particularizes itself, enabling thought to have the same intrinsic determination, the same "synthetic a priori" character, which objectivity exhibits in being an independent totality.

"Correctness" may offer a fit of subjective representations with given phenomena, where both sides of the relation are conditioned and relative. Truth demands a correspondence overcoming these limitations. The self-related negativity of objective thought and of conceptually congruent objectivity leaves behind the givenness of determination by negation and the relativity of determined determinacy. In so doing, the negation in self-determination secures truth for the freest and most universal science – the pure conceptualizing of philosophy.



# 3

## How Should Essence Be Determined? Reflections on Hegel's Two Divergent Accounts

### **Logical rigor and the challenge of Hegel's two accounts of essence**

Hegel's *Logic of Essence* has presented a special challenge to readers. On Hegel's own account, the categories of essence are the most difficult to comprehend<sup>1</sup> and that difficulty has been accentuated by the primacy that often gets ascribed to them. The logic of essence addresses determinacy as determined by some prior determiner, something exemplified in such two-tiered relationships as essence and appearance, ground and grounded, a thing and its properties, a whole and its parts, and cause and effect. Accordingly, the categories of essence appear privileged to those who regard determinacy as always grounded in some foundation.<sup>2</sup> That presupposition is shared by conscious experience in that consciousness constitutively treats its mental contents as representations reflecting objects that ground their truth. Even when philosophical speculation makes a transcendental turn and treats the object of experience as determined by the structure of knowing, constructed objectivity remains within the orbit of the logic of essence.<sup>3</sup> Whether grounded in things in themselves or in cognition, what is knowable gets construed in categories of essence, where determinacy is always posited by a determiner, whose own determining character resides in its relation to its posit.

If this categorical framework of essence were to be absolutized, reason would be trapped within the foundationalism endemic to the opposition of consciousness, where knowing always must adjudicate its claims by appeal to some privileged ground. In that case, the object of knowing would always be a determined determinacy, determined by some foundation. Because knowledge would extend only to what is founded upon

a foundation, the foundation would itself always elude cognition insofar as it cannot qualify as a determined determinacy but only as a privileged determiner. If the foundation were to comply with its own standard for knowledge, it would have to determine itself. Then, however, the foundation would cease to determine something derivative, eliminating the distinction between what is founded and what founds. Foundational justification would thereby collapse, leaving as its remain that which is self-determined rather than determined by a prior determiner.<sup>4</sup> The reason at work in logic escapes this dilemma insofar as logic's thinking of thinking has an object that cannot be determined by anything but itself. To validly conceive valid thinking, the thinking of thinking can be no different from its object. Hence, what must conceptually order its subject matter is that subject matter itself. Although logic may be self-ordering, that does not mean that categories of essence cannot arise as part of the logical development of self-thinking thought. These categories of essence cannot be all-encompassing, but they can make up a way station by which conceptual thinking constitutes itself in its full self-determined development.

Within that development, the dual relationship of determined and determining determinacy presents a theoretical challenge posed by every category pair that essence involves from its emergence out of the logic of being until its self-elimination at the threshold of the logic of the concept. At each juncture, thought must contend with comprehending how one term can ground another, even though its grounding character depends upon what results from its positing.

What compounds this difficulty is a fundamental discrepancy without parallel in Hegel's development of logic. Generally, Hegel's *Science of Logic* and *Encyclopedia Logic* correspond as well as any comprehensive systematic treatment can match its abbreviated chapbook presentation. In the case of the opening of the Logic of Essence, however, one finds a glaring disparity. The *Science of Logic* begins determining the categories of essence with an entire first chapter devoted to detailing the contrast of the essential and the unessential, which resolves itself into the relation of essence and illusory being, which generates the relation of reflection, which takes three successive forms: positing, external, and determining reflection. Only with the completed development of these forms of reflection does Hegel proceed in Chapter 2 to address the determinations of reflection, beginning with identity, which then entails difference, which engenders contradiction. By contrast, the final 1830 version of the *Encyclopedia Logic* begins the development of essence directly with identity, from which point the succession of categories

presents in abbreviated form what follows from that same category in Chapter 2 of the *Science of Logic*.

What makes this discrepancy potentially troubling is the unity of form and content that logic must sustain to be systematic. Insofar as logic consists in the valid thinking of valid thought, what and how it thinks should be one and the same. The ordering of the subject matter is itself the topic under consideration, and for this reason Hegel can properly observe that logic presupposes the overcoming of the opposition of consciousness, where knowing and the object of knowing are distinguished from one another.<sup>5</sup> Because subject and object are indistinguishable in logic's thinking of thinking, form and content are united. The development of the content is contained in the content, for the thinking of thought determinations is itself what is under investigation. As such, the content is self-developing, delineating in thought the process of thinking. This reflects how logic cannot begin with a presupposed method anymore than it can begin with a presupposed content. If logic were to order thinking by a given method, the authority of that method would be beyond logical scrutiny and nothing more than a dogmatic assumption. Moreover, if the thinking of thinking were given prior to and independently of logical investigation, logic would have nothing to do. Similarly, if logic were to begin with any given content of thought, that content would be as unjustifiable a presupposition as any given procedure. Logic's unity of form and content precludes either method or subject matter having any predetermined character. Because the subject matter is its own development, at the outset no form or content can already be at hand.<sup>6</sup>

For this reason, logical development must be unitary. If the same content could be developed by alternative routes, then method and content would fall asunder. Instead of being inherent in logical categories, logical ordering would be external to them. Form would be indifferent to content and each category would be something given to the thinking that externally links it to other terms. Instead of being systematic, logic would be afflicted by a dual dogmatism, condemned to take for granted the content it thinks and the thinking by which it orders its content. This signifies that essence cannot legitimately have two different developments. Instead, the content of each and every category of essence should be univocally and uniquely tied to the ordering of the development in which it arises.

In light of this requirement, some commentators have taken the disparity in Hegel's two accounts to cast into doubt the very possibility of a systematic logic.<sup>7</sup> Admittedly, if the disparity were not a contingent

lapse on Hegel's part but something endemic to logical investigation, then reason's self-examination would be fraught with arbitrariness. This would leave philosophy an idle pursuit, incapable of ever establishing the authority of thinking. To demonstrate that this is the case, however, is self-defeating. Any claims about the arbitrariness of thought would either purport to have a necessity conflicting with that arbitrariness or admit to being contingent assertions no more compelling than any others.

This difficulty may preclude *knowing* with justification that reason is impotent, but it does not rule out the possibility that reason's self-justification may be elusive. What alone can defeat that latter possibility is the accomplished deed of systematic logic. To that end, the controversy over the path of essence calls out for resolution.

The discrepancy between the accounts of the *Science of Logic* and of the 1830 *Encyclopedia Logic* could conceivably reflect several scenarios: First, both accounts may be invalid, offering arbitrary pretenders for a systematic argument. Second, one account may be correct and the other deficient. If the account of the *Encyclopedia Logic* is right, then the whole discussion of Chapter 1 of the *Science of Logic* is at best a superfluous introduction, offering nothing of substance for the development.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, if the *Science of Logic* account is valid, then the category of identity with which the *Encyclopedia Logic* begins the determination of essence presupposes all the moves detailed in Chapter 1 of the *Logic of Essence* in the *Science of Logic*.

Whether or not Hegel has succeeded in systematically conceiving essence, the actual order in which he wrote the two accounts might suggest that he considered the 1830 *Encyclopedia Logic* to be not only his last but his most adequate take on how essence should be determined. Although Hegel began revising the *Science of Logic* in his later years, he never made it beyond the *Logic of Being*, whose final version appeared in 1832. Presumably the 1830 *Encyclopedia Logic* benefited from almost two decades of reflection on how to improve upon the 1813 *Science of Logic's* *Logic of Essence*.

Even if this were so, it hardly relieves us of the responsibility to think things through ourselves. Hegel may well have preferred his final say on the matter, but he may not be the best judge of his own accomplishments. Or perhaps pedagogical expediency rather than theoretical change may have led him to leave out of his 1830 *Encyclopedia Logic* lecture guide any explicit treatment of the moves detailed in the first chapter of the *Science of Logic* *Logic of Essence*.

Given these possibilities, how can we settle the controversy? Two complementary investigations must be pursued.

On the one hand, the initial, minimally constitutive determination of essence must be identified, and it must be established whether this is equivalent to the determination of identity. If essence is not immediately identity, one must explore what follows from essence's initial specification and determine whether the categorical development detailed by Hegel in Chapter 1 of the *Science of Logic* Logic of Essence captures the proper advance.

On the other hand, if essence is not immediately identity, one must establish why identity cannot be or be thought without antecedent determinations of essence. Indeed, if Hegel's *Science of Logic* account is to be vindicated, it must be shown how identity depends upon the successive transformations of the essential/unessential, illusory being, and the three forms of reflection.

These two investigations converge insofar as the investigation of whether essence is immediately identity or arrives at identity through further categorial development will equally indicate whether identity presupposes other determinations of essence.

### **The minimal determinacy of essence**

In determining Essence it is important to recognize its double significance. Essence comprises both a category and a categorical realm within which Essence takes successive forms resulting through the characteristic positing distinguishing the transitions of the Logic of Essence from the passing over of one term into another of the Logic of Being and the development of the Logic of the Concept.<sup>9</sup> For this reason, when Hegel affirms in the *Encyclopedia Logic* that Essence is Identity, this need not signify that Essence is immediately Identity. It might equally signify that Identity is a stage in the transformations undergone by Essence through its defining positing.

To determine with what the Logic of Essence begins, two avenues present themselves. One consists in considering how the Logic of Being achieves closure and what that closure immediately yields. The second consists in paying heed to the dual relation that the minimal determinacy of essence has to all further specifications of essence. On the one hand, the minimal determinacy can neither presuppose nor incorporate any further determinations of essence. On the other hand, essence's minimal determinacy must be presupposed and/or incorporated in every other specification of essence.

Hegel ushers in the end of the Logic of Being through an infinite progression of measure relations. Measure, the qualitative quantum,

engenders this endless process insofar as every measure ties a quality to a range of quantity, whose own continuity with other quantities relates it to other measures, each of which points beyond itself to further quantities to which different qualities are linked. In this succession, where qualities and quantities continually give way to others subject to the same overcoming, every measure is rendered a transient element, mediated by the series in which it figures. Herein every qualitative and quantitative determination becomes reduced to a fleeting moment of a process positing each one to just as soon supersede it with others. The continuous process itself plays a role that no term in the Logic of Being can assume – namely, it operates as the unitary positor of being in its entirety, reducing the whole sphere of being to a posit, subsidiary and derivative of the abiding process's mediating activity. *This* eliminates the constitutive framework of the Logic of Being, in which every determinacy has its character by being in contrastive relation to coeval others. The equiprimordiality of the determinacies of being has here given way through their own transitions. What they have engendered is a two-tiered structure in which determinacies are determined by a logically prior determiner, where being is mediated by that which consists in nothing other than mediating being.<sup>10</sup>

If the logic of essence is occupied from start to finish with how this two-tiered realm of determined determinacy works itself out, there can be little room for anything in essence to precede the bare relationship of the mediator of being and being that has relinquished its erstwhile immediacy to be so mediated. This is because nothing can belong to this two-tiered realm without already involving determinacy that is mediated, as well as the relation to the determiner that posits that determinacy, rendering it mediated. Minimally speaking, that determiner is defined by nothing but its prior determining, whereas the mediated determinacy is minimally defined by being the posit of that determiner. Both determiner and determined determinacy can get further qualified, of course, and if that is to occur systematically rather than arbitrarily, it will occur through nothing but the positing at hand in the minimal specification of determiner and determined determinacy. If instead either tier of the relationship acquires content from some other source, that acquisition will depend upon maneuvers having nothing to do with logical development.

If we take stock of this predicament in light of the divergent paths of the *Science of Logic* Logic of Essence and its *Encyclopedia Logic* counterpart, the question arises as to which, if any, truly fits the immediate outcome of the Logic of Being. Can Hegel's apparent last word on the

matter hold sway? That is, does identity consist of nothing more than the minimal relation of determiner and determined determinacy or does essence immediately emerge as the contrast of the essential and the unessential, with which the Logic of Essence begins in the *Science of Logic*? Or is the starting point of the Logic of Essence something else?

### **The rationale for beginning the logic of essence with the relation of the essential and the unessential**

At the very outset of the Logic of Essence in the *Science of Logic*, Hegel presents a preliminary division, asserting that essence initially issues from being to confront being as an other, as the *unessential*, that being in relation to essence proves to be not merely unessential but essenceless and thereby *illusory being*, and that, finally, this illusory being, comprising essence's own posit, falls within the orbit of essence's determining and constitutes *reflection*.<sup>11</sup> Identity will enter in only once reflection becomes determining, enabling essence to have a character posited by and as itself.

This threefold succession might appear suspect. From the start, essence seems to relate to its posit as not just something other to essence's determining. Instead, that posit stands as something devoid of the immediacy that essence has in mediating rather than being mediated by any coeval or underlying factor. Moreover, since essence's posit shows itself to be mediated only by referring back to essence's determining of it, this reflecting of essence seems to render essence reflection from the very outset.

Yet as Hegel emphasizes, when essence arises from being, having superseded being's immediacy by constituting the process positing the realm of being in its entirety, this has occurred without any intervening ground. Being, in and of itself, has become the posit of something constituted by being not simply its other but its positor. Nevertheless, as emergent, essence is *immediate* essence<sup>12</sup> rather than essence that has further qualified itself through prior positings of essence. As such, it has a given determinacy, which, to be determinately given, must stand in contrast to some equally given other. Although the sphere of being may have relinquished its own form of immediacy, it still retains determinacy, whose content is simply given to the process that mediates it. The residual givenness of content of what is posited is exhibited in how being gets treated when relegated to a realm of "appearance" or mere "phenomena" by ancient skepticism or Kantian transcendental idealism. Although being now counts as merely relative to our experience or to

some concealed ground, it does not lose any of its manifold character but simply forfeits its independent being.<sup>13</sup>

Accordingly, at the very moment that essence emerges by overcoming the immediacy of being, its relation to what it posits remains caught in the contrastive terms of determinate being.<sup>14</sup> This makes it appropriate to characterize that initial relation as one contrasting essence, figuring as something essential, to its posit, figuring as something unessential.

By contrast, identity does not involve that holdover of determinate being, where essence is a something relating to its posit as something else. Identity rather requires that what becomes self-identical posit a differentiation *of itself* whose difference immediately reverts to a self-relation. Identity must involve both differentiation and self-relation. Without them both, identity would revert to either the indeterminacy of being or the other-relatedness of determinate being.

With self-relation, but without any difference, identity would be no different from the one. Like identity, the one is self-relation but a self-relation devoid of any determinate content. Hence the one stands in contrast to nothing determinate; that is, to the void, the very exclusion of anything other. Because the void, in excluding all determinate being, consists of the same empty self-relation as the one, the one passes over into the many, where indistinguishable ones exclude one another, each separated by a void, whose own reversion to a one renders their mutual repulsion an attraction, leading to the identity of discreteness and continuity by which quantity is defined. All these relationships involve coeval factors rather than the two-tiered opposition of determining and determined characterizing essence.

Although identity must thus involve determinate differentiation, the difference necessary to identity cannot remain something other, since then identity will lack the self-relation on which its identification depends. The difference must be an internal difference, signifying that it has no independent being but merely reflects that which posits it. Thereby, essence retains the self-relation that allows it to become the relation of identity. In so doing, however, identity involves more than essence's minimal relation of posit and positor as it initially emerges from the overcoming of the immediacy of being. Although the posit has the form of something mediated by essence, essence's determining act does not yet provide for the content of what it posits. For this reason, that content retains an externality that prevents it from already encompassing an internal differentiation. Not until essence reflects itself in its posit in such a way as to be determining of its content can identity arise.<sup>15</sup>



These considerations indicate that the *Science of Logic* correctly inaugurates the Logic of Essence with the contrast of the unessential and the essential. Although the *Encyclopedia Logic* appears to omit the initial moves that might allow for identity by referring to essence as identity from the start, paragraph 114 does briefly allude to how the identity of essence is first trapped with the determinations of being and therefore initially relates to an externality, which warrants being called the unessential.<sup>16</sup> The same paragraph then mentions that the inessential is essence's own show within itself, suggesting that it thereby figures as an illusory being. Nothing more, let alone any mention of the three forms of reflection, is provided before the *Encyclopedia Logic* launches into its account of identity in the next paragraph.<sup>17</sup>

This leaves us before two intertwined questions: What does follow systematically from the unessential and the essential, and does the path delineated in the *Science of Logic* properly establish identity as the outcome of the forms of reflection that follow upon the reversion of the unessential and the essential to the relation of illusory being?

### **From the essential and the unessential to illusory Being**

Hegel's own account of the transition beyond the essential and the unessential might suggest a subjective ploy, depending upon a change of view on the part of the logical investigator. Hegel intimates that the opposition of the essential and the unessential rested upon a failure to take note of a no less crucial aspect of essence – that the unessential to which essence is contrasted is essence's own posit. Once this feature is duly recognized, the unessential sheds its external otherness to essence and figures as an illusory being, a being whose determinacy has no independent standing.<sup>18</sup>

If the move from the essential/unessential to illusory being depended upon a "theoretical" convenience, the transition would not be inherent in the content of the categories, destroying the unity of subject and object, of method and subject matter, of form and content constitutive of logic and its overcoming of the opposition of consciousness. The contrast of essential and unessential would be deprived of any nonarbitrary standing, and illusory being would be advanced as the "real" starting point of essence.

What can and does refute any such departures from systematic development are two considerations. One is the above-presented argument as to how essence's emergence from being leaves it caught in a contrast of determinate being, where the given content of its posit renders that posit

an unessential something related to an essential other. This precludes illusory being from constituting the initial determination of the Logic of Essence. The second deciding factor lies in how the contrast of the unessential and the essential entails illusory being.

As Hegel himself points out,<sup>19</sup> the unessential may be distinguished from the essential, but it is not simply something in relation to an other. The unessential may have a given content, but this cannot retain the character of a being in itself that faces essence across a boundary that limits each term equivalently. To be unessential, the content must just as much forfeit the independent immediacy it appears to have and count as the posit of the essential it faces. The essential must have something determinate to relate to in order to be the determiner of something determined. The determinate being to which essence relates is its own posit rather than an externally given other. By being determined rather than simply being given, the determinacy of the unessential is something mediated by essence. As determining, essence is not just something essential on a par with the unessential. Instead of being equiprimordial with its posit, essence underlies the unessential, making the unessential's independent otherness a mere show, a phenomenon whose being is illusory rather than immediately given.<sup>20</sup> To emphasize how the posit of essence is distinguished from essence but not as an immediate other, Hegel terms the transformed unessential "nonessence."<sup>21</sup> This constitutes illusory being by immediately forming a nullity, null in having no being apart from essence, which removes the form of independent givenness from its posit. Nonetheless, essence's nonessence has an immediacy insofar as it is determinate. This immediacy, however, is only through the negation that essence effects by rendering the unessential something mediated by essence.

For this reason, the immediacy of illusory being is a *reflected* immediacy, directly manifesting its dependence upon essence.<sup>22</sup> To be illusory is to exhibit the mediating of essence, which renders the content of illusory being a show of the essence that it is not. Illusory being is thus not that of another but the illusory being of essence itself.<sup>23</sup>

Of course, if illusory being reflects essence, it owes that reflective character to the determining of essence. That determining therefore reflects itself in positing illusory being. Accordingly, essence has emerged as a process of reflection, showing itself in what it posits.

## From illusory being to the forms of reflection

Essence has an illusory being by giving itself a determinacy within itself, both distinguished from its unity and immediately rendered

null.<sup>24</sup> This comprises reflection insofar as essence here determines a determination whose illusory character manifests the mediating of essence, enabling essence to relate to its own determining by means of a posit, without thereby relating to an independent other. Essence first retained an immediacy of its own as emergent from a sphere of being whose given manifold it still opposed, as something essential facing something unessential. By positing illusory being, essence has overcome its initial contrast to otherness, rendering itself a movement of reflection.<sup>25</sup>

The term “reflection” has a dual logical significance. On the one hand, it constitutes the category that arises from illusory being, presenting essence in a new configuration. On the other hand, “reflection” has a generic character shared by the three forms – positing, external (presupposing), and determining reflection – that Hegel offers in succession. According to the series, reflection, minimally determined – that is, as it has immediately emerged from illusory being – is positing reflection. Positing reflection then transforms itself into external (presupposing) reflection, which finally reverts to determining reflection, allegedly setting the stage for essence to become determined as identity.

To begin with, is Hegel correct in identifying reflection as being immediately positing reflection? In a basic respect, reflection cannot fail to be positing, for unless essence posits illusory being, that determinacy does not manifest essence’s determining mediation. Accordingly, reflection *per se* can be nothing less than positing. In order for positing reflection to be a particular type of reflection contrasted with others, reflection must take on further determination and do so in virtue of nothing other than what positing reflection has to offer.

Positing reflection relates essence to itself in virtue of a determinacy that shows its mediation by essence. What positing reflection does not do is derive the content of that determinacy from essence’s mediating activity. Essence’s positing renders that content illusory; that is, something whose givenness has no independent being. Nonetheless, that content is still immediately distinguished from essence’s process and consists of something that that process appropriates rather than creates. Illusory being *belongs* to essence, but essence does not provide any principle by which the illusory manifold can be *derived from* reflection. As a consequence, when essence posits what reflects its mediation, essence *presupposes* the given content to which it gives the form of something mediated.<sup>26</sup> Positing reflection thus becomes presupposing, external reflection, taking as given the content that it renders a posit in order to reflect itself.

External reflection may proceed from a given content to which it relates, but its relation to that given renders that externality a differentiation internal to essence. By reflecting externally, by appropriating a given determinacy and positing it, essence brings content within itself.<sup>27</sup> Because that content is determined to reflect essence, to be determined by essence and not by anything other to essence, what essence presupposes gets rendered a determination *of* essence. Consequently, external reflection becomes determining reflection. No longer positing an illusory being with a given content nor presupposing what it posits, essence now fully appropriates what reflects it, both positing its reflection and incorporating the full content of what it posits.<sup>28</sup>

As determining reflection, essence remains a movement where determined determinacy is distinguished from the determining that mediates it. Because this distinguishing is reflection, essence relates to itself in what it posits. Because its reflection is now determining, essence relates to itself as removing the externality of the content of what it posits. As such, essence has acquired a posited inner differentiation in which it is at one with itself.<sup>29</sup>

Essence, now determined through determining reflection, has become an internally determinate reflection, or what Hegel calls “an essentiality,” which exhibits the show of illusory being entirely within itself.<sup>30</sup> Although essence is thereby determinate, it does not owe its determination to any relation to other. It is no more an essential something contrasted with an unessential something than a particular essence distinguished from others. Through determining reflection, essence has achieved its determinacy entirely due to the determining inherent in its self-reflection.<sup>31</sup>

## The emergence of identity

We have reached the threshold of identity. Identity involves both self-relation and a differentiated content by which essence can be determinately at one with itself. “An essentiality” without further qualification is just this, and this is why Hegel sees fit to begin his account of “The Essentialities or Determinations of Reflection,” the second chapter of the *Science of Logic* Logic of Essence, with identity.<sup>32</sup>

Determinate self-relatedness is what distinguishes identity from the empty self-relatedness of the one, which has its counterpart in the void. The one is self-related by excluding all relation to other. This is why the void, that beyond in which nothing determinate resides, is that alone in which the one is not. As such, the void both presents no limit for the

one and constitutes the same exclusion of otherness characterizing the one. Accordingly, the void is another one, which once more confronts a void that reverts to yet another one, leading to a repulsion of ones constituting the many.<sup>33</sup>

By contrast, identity achieves self-relation through an internal content in which the possessor of that content reflects itself. Like the one, identity does not involve relation to any equiprimordial other. For this reason, identity is not an individuation, involving a contrastive relation between coexistent individuals.<sup>34</sup> Identity instead escapes relation to other by thoroughly mediating its own differentiation, rendering it an internal content that only a determining reflection can so posit. Identity thereby involves not the contrastive relation of something and other but the two-tiered relationship of determiner and determined determinacy, distinguishing the entire categorical realm of essence from that of being.<sup>35</sup>

Essence cannot be identity when it first emerges from being. Because emergent essence confronts a manifold whose form of immediacy is removed but whose “phenomenal” “appearance” retains its given content, essence is not here self-identical but rather an essential something confronting an unessential other. In order for essence to be a relationship of identity, the externality of the unessential must be removed. This is what is progressively accomplished through the successive transformations essence undergoes in the path leading from the essential and unessential to illusory being and then the three forms of reflection.

Consequently, the difference between the accounts of the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopedia Logic* does not call into question the prospects for a univocal systematic determination of essence. The categorical development with which the *Science of Logic* unfolds the logic of essence from its emergence from being to its arrival at identity has vindicated itself. By contrast, the *Encyclopedia Logic* has left out crucial steps without which identity cannot be constituted. This need not signify that Hegel late in life wrongly concluded that these steps were systematically dispensable. The *Encyclopedia Logic*, after all, is merely a guide for accompanying his university lectures, a guide that throughout severely compresses the more complete argument supplied by the *Science of Logic*. Hegel’s sin may be only one of omission, of a concerned pedagogue who might never have imagined that abbreviation in the *Encyclopedia Logic* would serve as ammunition for critics of the *Science of Logic*.

# 4

## The Objectivity of Thought

How can thought be objective? The answer to this question depends as much upon the nature of thought as upon the nature of objectivity.

### **The common subjectivization of thought**

Most contemporary thinkers construe thought such that it cannot possibly be objective, while construing objectivity so as to render it opaque to conceptualization.

Thought is commonly held to be a subjective realm of given fixed universals governed by the principle of noncontradiction and ordered by formal operations of judgment and inference. Thought is understood to confront an alien objectivity, which faces conceptualization as an independent domain of singular contents. Thought itself is considered to be bereft of any capacity to generate spontaneously concepts of its own. Rather, thought must find its contents either by reflecting upon the given usage of language or by abstracting from the phenomena found in experience.

In either case, conceptualization is limited to the formation and employment of abstract universals or classes. Abstract universals are the common marks abstracted from a plurality of perceived individuals in which they are found to inhere. These perceived individuals are distinguished by a plurality of given features, whose immediate presence provides no basis for establishing any necessary connection between some or all. Accordingly, whatever commonalities get abstracted are completely indifferent to what else individuates the objects in which they inhere. Consequently, thinking such abstract universals provides no ground for knowing anything else about the individuals who possess them. That is, the abstract universal does not particularize itself but

depends upon extraneous givens to supply its instances. The possession of abstract universals by a plurality of individuals does allow for conceiving classes of individuals who possess various common factors. Once an abstract universal is found to inhere in some individuals, they can be thought to be members of the class of all individuals who have that feature. Their class membership, however, determines nothing more about what else they may or may not have in common. Like abstract universals, classes do not particularize themselves. Accordingly, conceiving abstract universals or class memberships allows for no further *a priori* knowledge about any objects to which they are found to apply.

Insofar as thought is here restricted to abstract universals and classes that do not differentiate themselves, thought is left with fixed, isolated contents. Such thought determinations do not transform themselves, becoming what they are not and forging relations among different concepts. Instead, thoughts are rigid contents that always remain self-identical. Consequently, different thoughts that are not part of one another can never stand in relation through thought alone. Only intuitions or some other nonconceptual resource can bring concepts into any synthetic connection. *A priori* synthetic judgments that are based exclusively on thought become impossible. Accordingly, thinking cannot independently generate any new content. All reason can do is analyze concepts that it finds itself furnished with, be it by psychological nature or nurture or linguistic practice. Whether concepts stand in relation to anything other than what is contained in themselves is beyond the power of reason to ascertain. Thought can thus never establish its own objectivity nor account for the necessity of any concept it finds itself thinking. At best, reason can confirm the internal consistency of the givens with which it occupies itself. All its judgments and inferences can have only a formal necessity, confirming the consistency or inconsistency of different concepts, since the truth of the contents entering judgment and inference cannot be established independently by thinking.

Moreover, because concepts are restricted to abstract universals and classes, judgments and inferences all retain a subjective element. This subjectivity is due to the abiding presence of extraneous connections. Abstract universals and class memberships may well inhere in and subsume individuals, respectively. Since, however, individuals possess particularities unrelated to each common mark and class membership they possess, each judgment and inference can be supplanted by others that just as easily apply to the individuals at hand. It will always be possible to predicate something else of an individual and to derive different conclusions from the same major or minor premise by way of

a different particularity. Consequently, which judgments are made and which inferences are drawn are contingent upon the arbitrariness of the subject rather than being inherent in the objects themselves.

With thought trapped within subjectivity and schematized by formal logic, objectivity is left an ever-changing domain of individuals, open to empirical examination but otherwise indifferent to the unity of concepts. Since objects as they are given possess no discernible principle for determining their internal and external differentiation, no forms or purposes have any necessary, *a priori* hold upon them. What happens to any is completely extraneous, leaving every object prey to determination from without that is indifferent to what they are. If any strict principle is to be found, it can reside only in laws determining matter spatiotemporally, applying to objects irrespective of what their kind or end may be. What an object is can be identified only through a contingent assembly of abstract universals or a corrigible, empirically derived family resemblance, whose boundaries are as arbitrary as the extent of observation.

Such an objectivity presents an insurmountable obstacle to any objective thinking or any true grasp of what is. First of all, the individuality of such an objectivity is opaque to conceptualization. Second, there is no way in which such an objectivity can contain any unconditioned, autonomous reason. Insofar as objectivity retains a materially conditioned character, it excludes the objective presence of any free engagement, be it theoretical or practical. Nothing and no one in the world can think or act without having theory and practice rendered relative to external contingencies that rob thought and action of any unconditioned authority.

### **The pitfalls of immediately identifying thought and objectivity**

Just discounting any such incommensurability between thought and objectivity and presuming instead their correspondence, however, does not ensure that reason grasps what is. If thought and objectivity are taken to be in immediate identity, with being offering reason a field in which to read off the embodiment of its own given concepts, both domains retain a common form of dependency that leaves their respective truth in question. Namely, if both reason and objectivity have matching given contents, neither can be determined in and through themselves. Reason finds itself encumbered with various concepts, whose content and unity are not the product of thinking but an endowment with which reason



finds itself gifted. That this endowment be true, let alone complete, is open to question. This is especially the case since the corresponding endowment of objectivity must be encountered in some activity consisting in more than the logical exercise of reason thinking its own concepts. If thought has a given content, then concepts remain bound by the principle of noncontradiction, just being what they are and nothing else. Each universal remains self-identical, without differentiating itself into its own particulars or securing its relation to what lies outside thought. As a result, thought can no more generate new content of its own than it can bridge the gap between universal and individual or between subjectivity and objectivity.

This is true even if the stipulated conformity of thought and being were to allow for not just abstract universals and classes but the relatively more concrete universality of genus and species, so privileged by the ancients. Although the unity of the genus contains its differentiation into species, it does so immediately. The genus and its species are given by themselves as fixed determinations, with no additional principle provided to move from the genus to its speciation. Hence, the givenness of the content of reason leaves the very presence of the genus an accident of thought or, alternatively, an accident of objective nature. Accordingly, even if grasping the genus allows for a priori judgments about its species, the necessity of the genus and its speciation is subject to question. Moreover, even if species are derivable from the unity of the genus, the members of the infima species, which has no subspecies below it, are not differentiated by its unity. These members remain individuals whose species being is indifferent to what distinguishes them from one another. In that respect, they are just like members of a class.

### **The suspect objectivity of transcendental thought**

On all these counts, the presumption that thought and objectivity coincide remains problematic and incapable of securing truth for itself. The situation is not remedied by taking the unshaken opposition of thought and objectivity as an incentive to subject knowing to a preliminary examination of its own authority so as to determine whether thought can obtain any objectivity. This transcendental turn, which supplants ontology with epistemology as first philosophy, can be taken in various ways, with different characterizations of knowing. In every case, however, the only way the prior investigation of knowing can establish its objectivity is if knowing determines its objects. Only then can the examination of knowing bear upon the true character of objectivity

without appealing directly to the given, which is what the critical turn calls into question.

Since the foundational epistemology of transcendental investigation is a knowing of knowing that puts under scrutiny a knowing of objects different from itself, the cognition of the transcendental investigator is distinct from the cognition it critiques. Failing to investigate its own knowing of knowing, transcendental investigation takes for granted its own transcendental cognition and makes direct claims about the character of the knowing of objects that are just as dogmatic as the immediate claims about being that it considers suspect. Transcendental inquiry *finds* the structure of knowing as something given, describing its structure, be it as consciousness or language, and privileging it as the determining foundation of knowable objectivity.

Moreover, since transcendental investigation turns to investigate knowing without making direct claims about what is, it must presuppose that knowing is different from its object, even if its object must be in some respect a construct of the structure of cognition. If knowing were not considered different from its object, there would be no way of investigating knowing without directly investigating objectivity. All this reinstates the subjectivity of thought in several fundamental respects.

First, knowing is construed such that it can know objects only to the extent that it determines them. That is, knowing can know only what it puts into its objects. This renders knowable objectivity a construct of knowing, leaving it something relative to cognition. This renders objectivity a phenomenon that at most can retain *intersubjective* validity but not unconditioned truth. Of course, even the claim of intersubjective validity can be questioned, since transcendental investigation takes for granted its own cognition.

Secondly, because the difference between knowing and its object must be presupposed, there is a residue of givenness opposing subjectivity that cannot be a product of the determining of cognition, just as knowing itself has a given structure that cannot be the product of its own determining. This not only confronts cognition with an object in itself that cannot be known but renders cognition a subject in itself that is equally off limits to any objective comprehension.

What compounds the subjectivity of thought is how objectivity must be construed. Since knowable objectivity is determined by the selfsame structure of knowing, objectivity is determined by something other than itself and determined such that all objects are constructs of the same underlying cognitive foundation. On the one hand, objectivity

is thereby subject to an external necessity precluding any self-determination. Secondly, the external necessity pervading objectivity applies to all objects equally since it derives from the same cognitive foundation, which determines objects in general. Objects therefore are subject to the same external determining no matter what they are. That is, objects are subject to law that applies to them all equally. Therefore, objective necessity is a law determining objects with indifference to their form or import. With formal and teleological causality excluded, the law of objects is therefore a law of matter, applying exclusively to the spatiotemporal determination of things by efficient causality. As such, knowable objectivity has no place for the self-moving reality of life or the self-determination of thinking and acting rational individuals. This not only puts in limbo the possibility of self-consciousness and knowledge of other subjects but prevents the activity of autonomous reason from transpiring in the world.

It also leaves the individuality of objects untouched by the only remaining objective universality – the law of matter. To the extent that actuality depends upon individuality, all that can be known a priori is the pure *possibility* of a nature governed by material law. Certain concepts may determine the type of unification at hand in the judgments expressing the external determinism of objectivity. Even these concepts' objectivity is merely hypothetical, however, since only something beyond thought (e.g., sensible intuition in the case of Kant) can provide for the actuality of objects. Moreover, this actuality, whenever it be experienced, is still only phenomenal, leaving understanding with but a semblance of genuine knowledge.

## **Objectivity without conditions**

Foundational epistemology may reduce objectivity to an appearance conditioned by subjectivity, but objectivity can be a worthy object of knowledge only if it stands on its own. For this independence to be comprehended, it is necessary to avoid conflating objectivity with reality and existence. Although the philosophical tradition, like natural language, has distinguished these terms, clarity on their distinction has rarely been upheld.

Reality, the being of determinacy or the being of quality, cannot be the bona fide object of truth due to how determinacy maintains its specification. To have reality – that is, to be determinate – something must stand in contrast to another. Reality owes its own definiteness to its opposition to what it is not: its negation.

This predicament provides a minimal exemplification of the principle of noncontradiction. To be a determinate something, a factor must be distinct from what it is not. Tellingly, the principle of noncontradiction does not account for *what* something is, just that it be not whatever it is not. In other words, the principle of noncontradiction must take for granted the givenness of determinacy as well as the plurality of determinacies. Since this means that determinacy must be and be conceivable independently of the principle of noncontradiction, the principle of noncontradiction cannot be the first principle of being or reason that it has been reputed to be. This should come as no surprise, for determinacy cannot be based on any determinate principle without question begging.

Similarly, the contrast of reality and negation, as well as the contrast of the resultant something and other, does not account for any further specification of the opposing terms. Consequently, the minimal opposition of something and other cannot individuate either term, for something is just as much the other of its other as its other is a something that has the former something as its other. If objectivity were reduced to reality, to something owing its specification to its negation, to its otherness, the determination of objectivity would depend upon what is not objective. Objectivity would thereby be relative to something nonobjective, subverting its own objective character. Moreover, it would be dependent upon a contrast whose terms cannot successfully sustain their own distinctive character in their opposition to one another. Reality may provide the minimal threshold of determinacy, but it cannot provide any abiding individuality.

The situation is no better if objectivity is identified with existence. Existence issues from the relation of ground and grounded. That two-tiered, foundational relation is accepted as a universal principle of objectivity by early modern philosophy, which makes the principle of sufficient reason, that everything has a ground, either a metaphysical principle of things in themselves (e.g., Leibniz) or a principle reigning just over objects of experience (e.g., Kant). Either way, it presents a two-pronged dilemma for retaining objectivity as an object of truth.

If objectivity is itself to be understood as grounded, as having a foundation, it rests upon something that is not itself objective. If true knowledge be restricted to what is objective, then the ground of objectivity is beyond genuine cognition, leaving objectivity itself unknowable.

On the other hand, the distinction between ground and grounded gives way. The ground of objectivity functions as a foundation only insofar as there is something grounded. What is grounded thus grounds

its own foundation, just as its ground is equally grounded by it. Since both ground and grounded swap roles, the difference on which their relation rests unravels. Instead, we are left with an existence of mutually conditioning factors where each both conditions and is conditioned by its counterpart. To the extent that all such factors interact in the same way, their field of existence is governed by a law applying to them all indifferently. As such, the nexus of necessitation to which they are subject cannot account for their differentiation. Once more individuation is lacking and the lawfulness of existence is an empty form.

This lack of individuality is already present whenever objectivity is construed to have foundations. What is grounded may rest upon its ground, just as what is caused may be conditioned by its cause, but there is nothing about the relation between foundation and founded that insures that what is founded is uniquely determined by its foundation. Each ground may ground multiple factors just as each cause may have multiple effects. In each case, the individuality of what is conditioned cannot be derived from its foundation.

What makes objectivity the worthy object of truth is precisely the independent individuality that reality and existence cannot provide. Objectivity has individuality to the extent that it is not relative to other factors but determined in and through itself. Unlike something that owes its determinacy to opposition to otherness, objectivity is a freestanding totality. Instead of being a phenomenon grounded in something nonobjective, objectivity retains its nonsubjective character in having a unity of its own that provides for its specific content. Objectivity is one but not an empty one standing in a void, whose own exclusion of otherness generates a plurality of identical ones. Rather, objectivity is concrete, with a unique content that derives from nothing but itself.

Objectivity is thus at one with itself but not by reflecting itself in a given content, like the self-identity exemplifying the principle of noncontradiction. Such formal identity (expressed by the formula  $A = A$ ) is at hand in each and every self-reflecting factor no matter what internal differentiation it happens to have. Consequently, such identity is just as much a diversity of self-identical factors whose likeness or unlikeness to one another is contingent upon extraneous comparisons. By contrast, objectivity owes its differentiation to itself. At one with itself in its specific differentiation, objectivity is unique and individual. Objectivity is not one possible world among others. Rather, objectivity can be known in its own right without qualification. It is thereby the proper object of truth.

## Thought and individuality

Although the individuality of objectivity has been taken by the likes of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to render objectivity opaque to thought, it is precisely this individuality that secures objectivity's conceivability. The intrinsic connection between thought and the individuality of objectivity has been obscured by the failure to comprehend how the universal, or the concept *per se*, necessarily involves both the particular and the individual.

The intrinsic connection between the universal and the particular and the individual is evident even in the two least concrete forms of universality, the abstract universal and class. Although the abstract universal and class have unities that are indifferent to what distinguishes their instances and members, respectively, both universals cannot be what they are without particularization. An abstract universal cannot be abstracted in the first place unless a plurality of individuals is at hand that possess some common mark that renders them its particular instances. Similarly, a class cannot have its encompassing unity unless there are members who belong to it. In each case, the particulars in question cannot enable the universal to be a one over many unless they are distinguished from one another. Yet just being an instance of an abstract universal or being a member of a class does not differentiate instances or members. They all share in being particular in just the same way. Consequently, the particulars must not only be particularizations of the universal; they must be differentiated particulars or individuals as well. Otherwise, the plurality of instances and members collapses, universal and particular become indistinguishable, and the universal loses its constitutive relation to particularity. The abstract universal and class are thus intrinsically connected to both the particular and the individual, as must be any form of universality.

For this very reason, it would be a mistake to confuse the universal with the quality of something, the property of a thing, or identity. Quality, as the being of determinacy, has reality in contrast to negation, to what it is not, but this opposition does not give quality any particularization nor individuate what is qualitative. Quality just opposes its negation rather than stands in relation to instantiations of itself. Similarly, the properties of a thing all belong to it, but the thing is not a universal for which they are its particulars. The properties of a thing have no intrinsic connection to one another or to the thing to which they belong, which is why an empiricist like Locke was compelled to impute some power to a thing to unite its properties but never could locate a basis for so

doing. For its part, identity does depend upon some given internal determinacy in which something can reflect itself, since otherwise there is nothing determinate with which it can equate itself. Yet since this applies to each and every identity, the content in question has no more of an intrinsic connection to identity than the internal differentiation of anything else that is self-identical. Moreover, that internal difference is not a particular among others, for it only reflects an identity that has no other distinction. Identity is therefore not a universal, nor is the difference it contains a particularization providing individuality.

Unlike quality, property, and identity, the universal differentiates itself and remains self-related in its differentiation. In this way, it exhibits individuality, which joins universality and particularity by being a unique unity determined in and through its own differentiation.

Insofar as the concept *per se* is the universal, the connection of universality with individuality as well as particularity allows for objectivity to be conceivable. It does so, moreover, by enabling the conceptualization of objectivity to grasp objectivity as it is in and of itself. This is so because the individuality of concept and objectivity involves an independence that allows thought to be autonomous and thought objectivity to remain determined as it is in its own right instead of being reduced to a construct of subjectivity.

We therefore do not have to be a divine mind endowed with intellectual intuition or intuitive understanding in order to conceive objectivity as it is in its own right. Whereas such divine intellectual intuiting or intuitive thinking would constitute the independent being of its objects, the autonomy of our thought can lay hold of the independent determinacy of objectivity without thereby engendering or sustaining it.

### **Self-determination, universality, and objectivity**

What makes this comprehensible is how self-determination is tied to universality in its relation to particularity and individuality. This connection has largely been ignored due to the prevalent reductions of universality to quality or essence. Since quality is determined by opposition to its negation, it is not self-determined but other-determined. Similarly, essence posits appearance, which may reflect essence, but appearance is not essence itself. Accordingly, when certain Platonic dialogues present the universal as an essence that is reflected in deficient sensible imitations, only the universal form retains genuine reality. It does not determine *itself* in its sensible appearance but only shines forth, as through a glass darkly.

By contrast, the individuals that compose the particularization of the universal are no less real and independent than the universal itself. They are not derivative phenomena of some concealed ground but rather the universal's own realization. The basic logic of the universal exhibits this thoroughgoing unity. Since the universal differentiates itself through the particular, it renders itself another particular differentiated from its particular. This makes the particular something universal, encompassing particular and universal alike, while making the universal a genus with two differentia, the particular and the universal in its contrast to the particular. The universal figures as the genus of the particular and itself since their differentiation is inherent in its own unity. Moreover, since the particular and universal are differentiated, they are not just particulars but equally individual. As a result, the individual is no less particular and universal, just as the universal is no less particular and individual and the particular is no less universal and individual.

This way in which every aspect of the universal is itself the totality in which the universal consists is symptomatic of how self-determination and universality go hand in hand. The self that is self-determining is universal to the extent that it is poised to determine itself in the differentiation it must give itself to be self-determining. This determination does not owe its specification to anything else, be it a coeval other or an underlying ground. The emergent differentiation is *its* particularization since it is a determination *of* the self. Consequently, the autonomous self is an individual, determined in and through itself, uniting its differentiation with its unity as something self-determining.

The defining predicament of philosophy only underscores the connection between freedom and universality or freedom and reason. If philosophy is to avoid dogmatic assumptions about its method and subject matter, it cannot begin with any preconceptions about what it is to investigate or how it is to proceed. Accordingly, philosophy has to develop itself autonomously, on the one hand liberating itself from the hold of given dogma and on the other hand subscribing only to what it has established through its own independent activity. It should come as no surprise that the self-determining endeavor of philosophy ends up knowing by means of concepts alone – that is, by means of the immanent development of the universal.

Precisely insofar as conceptual determination is self-determining, conceptualization can think through the self-constitution of its subject matter. What is thinkable in its own immanent development can only be what is determined in and of itself; that is, what is objective. So long as a subject matter is not autonomously developed but has



its determinations mediated by something distinct from itself, there remains a subjective character to these characterizations, since they rely on something extraneous to the subject matter. Because the universal is self-determining rather than conditioned, thinking the concept of an object grasps it independently of any external conditions, of any contingent particulars, of anything other than what it is in and of itself. For this reason, not relative phenomena, but only what is self-subsistent and independently individual can be conceptualized.

Employing images or general representations derived from experience to access an object leaves it encumbered by the particularities of both its given appearances and the sensibility and imagination of the subject. Any subject matter that is other-determined or a construct of knowing is not susceptible of an *immanent* determination. Since what is other-determined or constructed is conditioned rather than independently individual, it can be explored only by a comprehension that orders it from without. Accordingly, the results of that ordering cannot be what an object is in and of itself.

By contrast, objectivity is the one and only *object* of autonomous reason, just as autonomous reason is the only theorizing that can address objectivity as it is in its own right. Autonomous reason is therefore objective, just as objectivity is inherently rational.

# 5

## Being and Idea

The relationship of Being and Idea has preoccupied philosophy ever since Plato. Although Plato did not explicitly distinguish the Idea from the Concept, he recognized that if ideas were just subjective universals lacking intrinsic objective reality, philosophy's search for wisdom was a hopeless endeavor. How then could ideas, exhibiting the universality of reason, have objective truth?

### Idea as eternal logos

Plato's solution involved determining the Idea to be both the vehicle of thinking and the fundamental specification of objectivity. The logos of ideas simultaneously comprised the content of philosophical thought and the actuality of being. This dual character insured that pure thinking would have objective truth and that being would have rational intelligibility.

In order for the Idea to unite thought and being, the universality of the Idea could not be devoid of individuality, insofar as objective existence carries with it individual being. Plato attached individuality to the Ideas by determining them to be true realities in their own right, opposing the phenomenal realm of the sensible appearances that deficiently resembled them. Aristotle criticized this decisive move, pointing out, as Plato himself had done in the *Parmenides*, that the separate existence of the Ideas contradicted their role as the common essence of sensible appearances. The Ideas could not be both at once, individual beings and a "one over many," without introducing an infinite regress of further "ideas" providing unity for the separately existing Idea and the many whose shared nature it comprised.

The crux of Plato's difficulty lies in how the particulars in which the Idea "participates" lie outside the separate reality of the Idea's universal essence. This division is inherent in Plato's application of the categories of essence and appearance to the relation of universal and particular. Essence determines its appearance as a separate domain of determined determinacy, leaving essence determining not itself but something other. Although appearance may reflect essence, it does so as a secondary realm from which essence remains distinct. So long as the universal is construed as an essence whose particulars merely reflect its determining function, the universal remains on a tier prior to that of the derivative particulars. The individuation of particulars from one another thereby remains outside the level of universality. Any claim that the universal Ideas have intrinsic objective individuality must then remain suspect. Although the separate reality of each Idea may stand distinguished from the being of every other Idea, that individuation does not contain the particulars that each Idea is supposed to inform. The particularization of the Idea falls outside its own unity, and as a result the individuality of being cannot be reconciled with the universality of thought.

### **Idea as regulative tool**

Kant, like all modern philosophers other than Hegel, accepts the failure of the Platonic Idea as insurmountable and condemns philosophy to the divide between thought and being. Conceptual determination, as Kant most emphatically affirms in his critique of the ontological proof for the existence of God, cannot impart existence, which is not a predicable concept but something that only sensible intuition can confirm. Concepts, on this view, consist either in universals abstracted from given phenomena or in categories that define the logical relations distinguishing the different forms of judgment and the necessary connections of representations that determine possible objects of experience. The former empirical concepts leave out of account what individuates the particulars they mark in common, since an abstracted concept provides only what its particulars share, not what distinguishes them from one another. The latter a priori concepts may determine possible objects of experience, but these categories apply to objects of experience in general, without differentiating them from one another. Consequently, neither empirical concepts nor categories determine the individuality with which actual existence can be distinguished from mere possibility. This leaves conceptual thought empty, devoid of any actual object, and understanding must be supplemented by sensible intuition to have anything existent to think.

Nonetheless, Kant acknowledges the distinction between Concept and Idea as fundamental to that between Understanding and Reason. The understanding is a faculty of judgment, whose concepts are conditioned formal universals that must obtain their particulars from intuition. Empirical concepts are conditioned insofar as they are abstracted from given experience, which signifies that the commonalities they represent never exhibit necessity but remain merely provisional generalities. Empirical concepts are equally formal insofar as they extract general features from individuals, leaving behind every other aspect differentiating these. The pure concepts, the categories, are equally conditioned, for they apply only to appearances relative to our cognition. The categories are equally formal, for they determine the necessary relations of the representations of objects while leaving otherwise undetermined the given matter supplied by sensible intuition.

Since empirical concepts and categories have a conditioned formal universality, it can be no surprise that they lay hold only of phenomenal experience, a domain conditioned by the structure of consciousness in which every object is contingent and subject to an external necessity. As Hegel notes, this limitation signifies that such concepts are incapable of being true, for they cannot determine what is genuinely objective, what is determined in and through itself, but only the relative appearance of some undisclosed ground.

Kant recognizes that the Idea is not conditioned and formal, like the concepts of Understanding. The Idea is the vehicle of reason, for in thinking Ideas reason conceives what is unconditioned, thereby operating as the faculty of principles.<sup>1</sup> Kant identifies the unconditioned object of the Ideas as lying at the apex of syllogistic inference, to which reason ascends in search of the ultimate principle from which judgments of a certain type derive. Here, through syllogizing on the basis of principles, reason seeks to provide "that cognition in which I cognize the particular in the universal through concepts."<sup>2</sup> This suggests that the Idea might have an intrinsic connection to individuality, insofar as syllogizing reason subsumes individuals under the universal (of the major premise) by means of the particular (of the minor premise). That intrinsic connection between universal and individual, on which the objectivity of thought would depend, must be qualified, however, owing to the character of syllogism. As Hegel emphasizes in his unmasking of the subjective character of inference, the determination of the individual through the universal in syllogism retains a formality insofar as the three terms of syllogism remain external to one another and thereby are not yet wholly intrinsic to one another.<sup>3</sup> This externality allows

for various substitutions, expressed by how the schemas of syllogisms employ variables for their expression.

Since for Kant the categories determine the different functions of judgment that underlie the different forms of syllogism, Kant differentiates the Ideas in function of the categories. With each Idea reason thinks the specific unconditioned from which each type of syllogism and its component judgments can follow. The objects of the Ideas are unconditioned, unlike relative phenomena, but can the Ideas have objectivity and enable reason to know what is true and not just an appearance?

Kant denies the Ideas any truth for two complementary reasons.

First, because the Ideas have unconditioned objects, they transcend experience with its conditioned phenomena subject to external necessity. The Ideas cannot correspond to appearances. Only categories that determine what is conditioned, that is, those that Hegel develops in the *Logic of Essence*, can apply to phenomena. This restriction weighs against the truth of Ideas only if one presumes that "objective" knowledge is confined to appearances.<sup>4</sup> In making that claim, Kant is oblivious to how it precludes any bona fide knowledge, let alone any proper knowledge of the structure of cognition that underlies experience, a structure whose understanding and self-consciousness wields a spontaneity barred from knowable phenomena.

Second, the Ideas lack truth insofar as the apex of each syllogism has opposing determinations, leaving reason trapped either in paralogisms (in which unity is ascribed a simple subject to which no given internal differentiation can correspond), antinomies (in which the series of dynamical relations have contradictory boundaries), or sophistical inferences of Ideals (where the manifold of existence is grounded on an absolute unity that cannot be conceived to fit that manifold).<sup>5</sup> These oppositions cannot be supported so long as thought is held to be governed by the principle of noncontradiction. Kant's adherence to the principle of noncontradiction goes hand in hand with his limitation of concepts to conditioned formal universals. So long as a concept just is what it is and does not become what it is not, it is a fixed, static term that cannot engender its own particularization or undergo any development. Pure thought, restricted to immobile concepts, can only be analytic, thinking what is contained in each given concept. So long as concepts are just self-identical, thinking alone can never establish any relations between different concepts or between concepts and what is not a mere concept. Such thought must acknowledge its own inability to generate new content and seek particular filling from sensible intuition or linguistic usage. If any synthetic a priori knowledge is to be had,

it can derive only from how different concepts are necessarily related through a third nonconceptual term thanks to the way understanding and sensibility combine to constitute experience.

As a consequence, Kant cannot ratify any connection between Being and Idea that could enable metaphysics to account for more than phenomenal experience. Instead, Kant can afford reason only a regulative function, where the Ideas do not provide any true knowledge but only constitute something reason finds itself compelled to think in trying to locate some ultimate unity to the judgments of understanding.

### **Idea as self-determined unity of concept and objectivity**

Since Kant, only Hegel has sought to acknowledge the distinction between concept and Idea without forfeiting the connection between being and Idea. Hegel has been able to do so due to two fundamental departures from Kantian thought. First, Hegel has conceived the concept to entail particularity and individuality. Second, Hegel has conceived the Idea as the unity of concept and objectivity. On these bases, Hegel is able to establish the Idea as the proper subject matter of philosophical thought.

To begin with, Hegel secures the connection of the concept and individuality by making manifest a basic relationship that has escaped most theories of universality, including those of Plato and Kant. Even the most formal types of universality, abstract universality and class, cannot retain their universal character without involving both particularity and individuality. Although abstract universals are extracted from given individuals whose other distinguishing features are indifferent to the abstracted commonality they share, these particulars cannot have their plurality unless they are differentiated from one another. As particulars, each instance of the universal relates to the universal in the same way. Every particular has the same universal, and this common relation does not distinguish them. If universality involved only the particular as particular, it would lack any resources for preventing particulars from collapsing into a single term, which would then undermine the commonality of the universal, which depends upon being shared by a plurality of instances. To be particular, the particular must also be distinguished from other particulars, and this requires that it be a differentiated particular; that is, an individual. Class, like the abstract universal, must similarly involve individuality as well as particularity. All class members have the same formal relation to the class grouping they share. For there to be a plurality of members, each must also be distinguishable from its

peers. The class must therefore contain not just particular but individuated members. Otherwise, the class collapses into a single undifferentiated term, and the constitutive relation between class and member disappears.

That both particularity and individuality are ingredient in universality is indicative of how the universal is self-determined and developmental in character. As Hegel points out in the concept of the concept in the *Science of Logic* as well as in the introduction to the *Philosophy of Right*, the universal can be what it is only by particularizing itself, generating determinacies distinct from its initially undifferentiated unity. These determinacies do not, however, remain something other to the universal nor posited appearances in which it reflects itself. Rather, the determinacies the universal generates are its particularization only insofar as the universal has its own unity in them. The universal is at one with its particularity, and this unity of universal and particular constitutes individuality since the individual is at one with itself through nothing but its own internal specification. The individual is not individuated by contrast with something else, for the opposition of something and other leaves each playing both roles – something is the other of its other, just as something's other is a something in relation to what is other to it. Nor is the individual individuated by being posited by an essence or any other determiner. Essence can have multiple appearances, each of which equally reflects what posits it. What is determined by a distinct determiner need hardly be its sole product. Only by being determined in and through itself is the individual uniquely determined, and this it achieves by uniting universality and particularity, being at one with itself in its own differentiation.

That self-determination is the logic of universality, particularity, and individuality may secure the autonomy of thought and enable freely developing concepts to be intrinsically connected to what is individual. Still, for thought to be objective, two further requirements must be met.

First, objectivity must have a conceptualizable independence of its own. Otherwise the concept remains incompatible with objectivity, condemning thought to what Hegel characterizes as the opposition of consciousness, where knowing confronts what is always extraneously given.

Second, the correspondence of objectivity with conceptual determination must be both subjectively and objectively ratified. If it is achieved only in the subjective arena of theory formation, the correspondence lacks objectivity, whereas if the correspondence is achieved only in the objective realm of practice, the transformation of the given in accord with the concept is not thereby thought.

Hegel's *Science of Logic* establishes how objectivity is inherently conceptualizable by clearly distinguishing objectivity from determinate being and existence. Determinate being always owes its character to its contrast with what it is not. Consequently, determinate being cannot be the proper object of true knowledge, for it always must be conceived in virtue of what it is not; that is, through what is not objective. Similarly, existence cannot be truly known, for existence consists of interdependent entities that condition one another in terms of laws of appearance. Since the phenomena of existence are relative to one another, any absolute knowledge is precluded. Existence rests upon what never itself appears, leaving knowledge of phenomena hanging over an inscrutable ground. Objectivity escapes these limitations of determinate being and existence by being determined in and through itself. Objectivity is absolutely independent, and this freedom from determination by other factors is what renders objectivity compatible with the autonomy of the concept, of the universal. Only conceptual thought can grasp what is objective, for only objectivity has being in its own right. A thinking that determines something other than itself can grasp only what is conditioned and relative. A thinking that is self-determined, by contrast, can think the self-constitution of what is determined in and through itself.

The achievement of truth, of the correspondence of concept and objectivity, cannot lie in either concept or objectivity alone. No matter how concepts, judgments, and syllogisms are modified, these modifications remain within the field of conceptual determination and never exhibit any actual correspondence of concept and objectivity. The same is true of any alterations of objectivity. No matter how objects may be modified to accord with subjective concepts, the modifications remain within the field of objectivity, without containing the correspondence of objectivity with concepts. In both cases, correspondence lies outside both subjectivity and objectivity.

In order for there to be truth and for philosophy to conceive it, there must be and be thought the unification of concept and objectivity. This unification is what Hegel introduces as the Idea, and it alone can provide the proper object of philosophy.

Hegel develops the Idea in two successive ways. First, he unfolds the logical forms of the Idea: Life, Cognition, Willing, and the Absolute Idea. Then moving beyond logic, Hegel thinks through the Idea of Nature and the Idea of Spirit, whose culminating development as Absolute Spirit terminates in the Idea of philosophy, which is distinguished from logic by being the cultural actuality of living individuals who think the Idea in its manifold forms. Although Hegel does incorporate concepts,



judgments, and syllogisms within the development of the logical and real Ideas, he does not determine the Ideas as the unconditioned principles from which syllogisms proceed. To follow Kant in doing so would reduce the Idea to a subjective factor, losing the relation to objectivity and forfeiting truth.

Instead, the Idea as Life, as Cognition, as Willing, and as Absolute Idea always contains a dynamic relation between concept and objectivity. The character of this dynamic relation is different in each of these four logical stages of the Idea. Only in the Absolute idea does the correspondence of concept and objectivity have a form that is as much conceptual as objective. Then alone does the Idea become the proper object of philosophy.

The Idea as life starts with a unity of concept and objectivity given by the outcome of the teleological process, where the realization of the subjective end in objectivity produces a conceptual determining that objective process comes to embody. This unity is not determined by the Idea itself but rather has an immediate being, reflecting its emergence from the logic of objectivity. This immediacy of the Idea as life is comparable to the given character Plato ascribes to the Idea as the logos of being and thought. Just as the Platonic Idea has a fixed determination, so the Idea as life operates with a given nature with which the life process begins and ends. Organic unity sustains itself through the interdependent workings of the differentiation it has by nature. This active self-affirming unity allows life to function as an end in itself, realizing its unity through the process of its internal particularization, whose constituent organs enable one another to function and uphold the whole to which they belong. The life process is thereby both subjective and objective, since it realizes its universal unity through a particularization that is already always at hand. Life's unity of concept and objectivity, however, is just as much immediately given as self-sustained. This form of immediate being signifies that the Idea as life does not know itself nor provide a process that can be at one with its own conceptualization.

Since life has an immediate being, it stands in contrast to what it is not; namely, a lifeless other. To remain alive, however, life must sustain itself in its relation to what is lifeless and not succumb to the processes of inorganic objectivity. This relation to other by which life upholds itself is metabolism. Through metabolism, what is alive gives life to what is inorganic. Thereby the living organism reproduces itself in what is other to it. This introduces a distinction between the individual actuality of life and its universality, which now exists as a species being or genus that

transcends the existence of individual living things in which the genus no less has its reality.

This opposition between the universality of life and its individual actuality supplants the immediate unity of the Idea as life with a unity that is to be achieved from a confrontation between the universality of the Idea and its given individual being. The ensuing process, which entails an oppositional cognition, leaves the Idea grappling with a subjective form similar to that to which Kant condemned the Idea.

Here, as theorizing oppositional cognition, the Idea unites subjectivity and objectivity by modifying conceptual determinations so that they correspond to what is given in the opposing objectivity. This achievement of correspondence or truth occurs, however, only in theory, for objectivity is not altered by the cognitive process. Subjectivity transforms itself to accord with the objectivity it opposes, but that alteration remains theoretical rather than practical. Consequently, the Idea of oppositional cognition cannot be a proper vehicle of philosophy since its truth remains merely subjective.

The converse undertaking of the Idea of the Good or of Willing suffers from the opposite deficiency. Theorizing in search of truth made manifest that success is unobtainable so long as theory formation was not paralleled by a corresponding modification of objectivity. The remedy is sought in the Idea of the Good, where truth is to be made rather than cognized by transforming a given objectivity to accord with conceptual determination. Due to the opposition from which the realization of the Good proceeds, making objectivity true remains a vain enterprise. As not yet Good, objectivity is devoid of the process required to have it conform to conceptual determination. The Good, as a merely subjective aim, however, lacks the objective resources necessary to alter the objectivity that does not correspond to theory. If those objective resources were at hand, objectivity would already contain the process of its transformation, and the intervention of subjectivity would be superfluous. And if objectivity were to be made Good, the correspondence of truth would be at hand in an alteration of objectivity without any alteration in conceptualization. The *pursuit* of the Good thus turns out to be just as hopeless as the *pursuit* of Truth. The opposition of conceptualization and objectivity that figures from the outset leaves the unity of the Idea a one-sided travesty of itself. For oppositional theory, the correspondence of concept and objectivity is merely subjective, whereas for oppositional practice, the correspondence of concept and objective is merely objective.

These complementary deficits set the stage for the final development of the logical Idea that overcomes them at once. In order for truth to

be achieved and for the good to be actualized, the conceptual development that accords with objectivity must become equivalent to the objective development that accords with conceptualization. Then the corresponding process of the Idea is both subjective and objective, and the knowing of truth by concepts is equally the making of truth in objectivity.

The immanent conceptual development of systematic logic comprises the Idea that is absolute and no longer relative to any unresolved opposition of subjectivity and objectivity. Logic, as a thinking of thinking, is what it thinks. Subject and object are one and the same in logic. Moreover, the process whereby logic's valid thinking of valid thinking knows itself to be the science of logic is equally the process of the self-constitution of its subject matter. In logic the conceptual development knows itself to be in accord with the self-determination of its object. The latter objective self-constitution is no less the conceptualization of its own truth. This is so because the logical development that constitutes the object of logic equally constitutes logic's knowing of itself as the true cognition of the being of logical determinacy. The correspondence of the concept and object of logical determinacy is thus achieved both in the conceptualization and the objective constitution of logic. The absolute idea, which is the unfolding of logic as the science of logic, therefore provides truth that is as much conceptual as objective.

Although Hegel presents the absolute Idea as an exemplar of philosophical truth that paves the way for the ideas of nature and spirit, one wonders how, when logic is left behind, any further Ideas can unite concept and objectivity both conceptually and objectively. Logic, after all, is the only discipline in which subject and object or method and subject matter are indistinguishable. In every other science, including any further philosophical inquiries, the thinking of the investigation conceives something different from itself. How then can philosophy grasp the Idea of nature or spirit without falling back into the subjectivity of oppositional theorizing where the correspondence forged in theory has no counterpart in any development of the object of investigation?

The key to any solution lies in recognizing what the idea of nature or spirit involves as *Idea* rather than as mere *concept* or mere *objectivity*. The concept of nature or spirit is a product of theorizing that seeks the unconditioned, universal determination of these nonlogical objects without thereby altering them or having any intrinsic connection to any process in these objects themselves. Similarly, the objectivity

of nature or spirit does not itself consist in the conceptualization of their being. A different situation unfolds when what philosophy thinks through is the *Idea* of nature or spirit. The development of the Ideas of nature and spirit is the conception of the objective self-constitution of nature and spirit, as well as the self-constitution of that subject matter as it is in and through itself. Both sides are secured by philosophical thought, doing nothing but following out the self-development of that Idea. Conceptual thinking can achieve this due to the two sides that Hegel identifies with the concept's self-determined character: namely, in conceptual determination positing and being in and for itself are united. The representational thinking of the Understanding posits something different from itself, altering what it thinks, imparting an external necessity to the relative, conditioned phenomena whose nature is prescribed by the Understanding. By contrast, because conceptualization posits what is determined in and through itself, the autonomous reason of philosophy thinks out what is both conceptually determinate and objective: namely, an Idea.

That this can be done with the Ideas of nature and spirit as well as with the Idea of logic is further underscored by the ultimate feature of the Idea of spirit. Insofar as the Idea of spirit concludes with the cultural reality of philosophy, the nonlogical Ideas generate in objectivity as well as in conception the philosophical grasp of their own truth. This result is an unavoidable imperative for philosophy. Any theory that cannot show how nature and spirit give rise to and contain true philosophical knowledge of these spheres displays its own futility. Accordingly, philosophy must turn its gaze on the Idea, for considering anything else leaves reason outside the truth.

# 6

## Truth, the Good, and the Unity of Theory and Practice

Ever since Plato, philosophers have recognized the relationship of truth and the good to be of central importance. Nevertheless, what that relationship is has been a source of ongoing controversy. At one extreme, truth has been identified with the good, whereas at the other, truth and the good have been kept apart as irreconcilably separate. How the relationship between truth and the good is construed has decisive ramifications for what each is conceived to be and for how theory and practice are related.

Three figures play a seminal role in exploring the relation of truth and the good: Plato, Kant, and Hegel. Through considering their respective investigations, we will find that so long as truth and the good are held apart, not only will theory and practice be devoid of any unity, but theory will be just as unable to attain truth as practice will be unable to realize the good.

### Plato and the good

No treatment of the good is more enigmatic yet tantalizing than Plato's series of accounts in books VI and VII of the *Republic*. Socrates introduces talk of the good in book VI in connection with the very practical concerns of justice, suggesting that without knowledge of the good, no ruler can know what form should be imposed upon the body politic to render it just.<sup>1</sup> The good would appear to be the proper object of political wisdom, without knowledge of which the good cannot be realized in the state. This requirement is what gives the body politic its special nonnatural, spiritual character. The state cannot have an organic unity like the economic order of the City of Pigs, which embodies a form that is not willed nor need be known by any of its members. An

organism reproduces itself through the complementary workings of its organs, whose "division of labor" functions without any organ having to know the form of the whole and acting to impose that order upon it. Mere organisms, like the market, lack a ruling element, and only when the "natural" existence of family and economy are threatened by the nonnatural pursuit of wealth does a ruling agency become a necessity, ushering in a new form of association whose "form" cannot be realized without being known and willed. Accordingly, what that form should be becomes a normative concern that can be resolved only by knowing and willing what is good.

The good might then appear to be an ideal that can be brought into being only by the initiative of individuals who act to realize it in a world that does not yet embody it. Yet bringing the good into being through the founding of the just state is not the same thing as pursuing the activity of ruling that operates only from within an existing body politic. If political association must contain a ruling element that knows and wills its form and justice requires that that ruling element know and will the good, then the good can only be aimed at by an agency that is a part of the order that realizes the good. In other words, the political pursuit of the good is an activity that properly operates only within an existing political association that already embodies the good, which contains the knowing and willing by which it is actualized. The state may come into being through a founding act, but that founding is not part of the state's actuality and extinguishes itself with the advent of the founded body politic. Nonetheless, the actuality of the state is different from that of an artifact, for the good it should embody contains the knowing and willing that continually sustains its own order.

This distinguishing self-informing character of political association calls into question Socrates' recurrent identification of ruling with craft. That identification construes ruling as the activity of a governing political class upon a distinct subject class on which the order of the whole is allegedly imposed like form upon matter in the making of an artifact. What Socrates ignores here, as well as in his parallel account of ruling and ruled parts of the soul, is that the ruling agency is part of that upon which ruling directs its informing activity. Unlike craft, ruling has a reflexive character that is consistently realized only when politics takes the form of self-government, where ruler and ruled are one.<sup>2</sup>

Socrates declares his inability to conceive how there can be self-rule or self-control, bewailing the impossibility of thinking how the same agency can be agent and patient at once.<sup>3</sup> This theoretical inability is reflected in and underlies Socrates' paradoxical claim that the good, which must

be known and willed for justice to be realized, is something of which he can provide no proper knowledge. In the *Meno* Socrates might appear to escape his conundrum by granting the statesmen correct belief if not genuine knowledge of the good. Nonetheless, the *Meno* itself suggests that right opinion about politics cannot be nailed down without the account that knowledge of the good provides.<sup>4</sup> So the *Republic* can still insist that without such knowledge the reality of the good can never be secured and certified.

To grapple with the good, despite self-professed ignorance Socrates introduces the three famous pictorial accounts of the good, and it is here, in the analogy of the sun, the divided line, and the myth of the cave, that the relation of truth and the good takes center stage. The good now acquires a new character that seems to have little relation to its original practical significance. Whereas before, the good enabled citizens to know what is just and then will in accord with justice, here the good makes it possible for all truth to be known and realized. As the analogy of the sun depicts, the good is the source for the being of what is and the knowledge of that being. This foundational role of the good operates both with respect to the true nature of things and to their phenomenal manifestation. On the one hand, the good is the source of the intelligible forms that both compose the true reality of being and the concepts of true knowledge, enabling what is not only to be but also to manifest itself to thought as it is in itself. On the other hand, the good equally allows being to appear to experience, securing the “participation” of the forms in sensible phenomena and the perception of them by embodied selves.<sup>5</sup> This foundational role reflects, on the one hand, how the intelligible forms do not provide for their own being or their own accessibility to thought or, for that matter, for the engendering of the phenomena and experience in which they participate. It also reflects, on the other hand, how our reason by itself cannot guarantee the correspondence of its concepts with the true nature of things. Instead, the good must provide for both being and thought and secure their conformity.

Moreover, in order for the good’s own role to be known, the good must equally manifest itself to knowing as it is in itself by providing for the form of the good and for its valid thinking.<sup>6</sup> Only then can we be sure of knowing the truth, for without true knowledge of the good and its foundational role, we cannot be certain that any of our other concepts are in accord with the true nature of what is.

The good performs all of these services, so necessary for truth, only by being that which is beyond all assumption, that which can be

apprehended immediately only at the apex of knowing and being, as pictured in the Divided Line. Only by ascending the levels of cognition and of existence from what is most phenomenal to what is most true and rational can the neighborhood of the good be approached, and only on its immediate encounter can an individual be sure of leaving the cave of appearances behind.<sup>7</sup>

What the good provides for is not truth as correctness, the mere fit of phenomena and experience. It rather concerns truth as the correspondence of reason with itself, as it is in the form of unchanging and independent true being with what it is in the form of true thought, equally eternal and resting upon itself. Although both sides are inalterable and intrinsically determined, Socrates realizes that they depend upon something else for their correspondence. The good is needed to secure the connection that furnishes truth precisely because both being and thought are regarded to have a fixed, given character, such as can uphold the principle of noncontradiction. They each are just what they are and nothing else, and they cannot become what they are not. For this reason, neither side can by itself secure its unity with what is different from itself, at least in form.

The good, however, suffers from the same fixed, given character. As the source of being and thought that secures their correspondence, the good cannot issue from any other factor, nor does it have any further determination of its own. It can only be taken in immediately. There is no way of finding in it any account of just how it plays its foundational role or of how its privileged function is to be verified. Although the good must provide for the form of the good and the truth of thinking that form, the fulfillment of that imperative cannot be unequivocally confirmed. Since no other principle can be invoked to establish the boundaries of the good, it remains a mere assertion.

Is there any connection left between what the good constitutes as first principle of the truth of all being and knowing and what it initially constitutes as first principle of conduct? Or are theory and practice irrevocably separate owing to the distinct senses of the good in its seemingly separate capacities as foundation of truth and of valid conduct?

What might seem to unite both senses of the good and thereby unite theory and practice is Socrates' repeated claim that knowledge of the Good is tied to the doing of the Good. This appears to contradict the *Meno's* account of the statesman's right opinion, since that suggests that rulers can do good without genuinely knowing the good. There is a contradiction, however, only if doing good *always* involves knowledge of the good. It leaves open the possibility that good conduct can occur



without knowledge of the good, even if knowledge of the good always involves doing good.

The latter identification of the knowing and doing of the good would seemingly preclude any criminal action; that is, any doing of wrong with knowledge that one's act is wrong. This would thereby make impossible due punishment as opposed to instruction about what is good. The identity of knowing and doing good would equally seem to preclude any independence of will from reason, ignoring the challenge of competing inclinations that leads Aristotle to make habit the midwife of virtue.

These problems are somewhat mitigated by taking seriously the idea that the practical realization of the good is political association and that pursuit of the good is properly the work of members of the state. In that case, membership will involve the proper education in and lawful training in accord with the good, so that knowledge of the good will be obtained in conjunction with habituation to the ways of the good. Still, to be disposed to do good does not preclude acting out of character and doing wrong intentionally.

Moreover, the unification of the two senses of the Good is cast in doubt by the Myth of the Cave and the corresponding discussions where Socrates raises the problem of compelling the philosopher to descend into the shadows of phenomenal political life and take up the chains of rule.<sup>8</sup> The philosophizing that seeks to know the good and then know the other ideas in their truth is acknowledged to not be equivalent to the activity of ruling. This admission raises the vexing question of who can and will want to compel philosophers to rule, putting the whole fabric of justice in jeopardy.

Plato may have raised the prospect of uniting the good and truth and with it, theory and practice, but the problems he uncovers cast in doubt whether this can be done.

Kant is content to leave Plato's quest unfulfilled and accept the radical difference between truth and the good and between theory and practice. Can this option be valid?

## **Kant and the disunity of theory and practice**

Kant recognizes truth to consist in the correspondence of putative knowledge with its object. Although that object could be a mathematical construct or something ideal, the *objective* reality of knowledge depends upon knowledge claims corresponding to something that is given independently of knowing. To the extent that what is independent of

knowing can be accessed only by how it appears to cognition, objective truth seems to be equivalent to correctness, the mere conformity of representations to appearance. Nonetheless, Kant acknowledges a conceptual element to truth. This is so because representations can be about objects rather than subjective illusion only if representations are connected in ways determined by categories.

Knowing has no way of assuring that the content of any representation corresponds to some thing in itself, insofar as knowing is assumed to confront the given and have access to it only as it appears to knowing. This assumption is basic to the transcendental turn resulting from Kant's suspicion of immediately reading off the character of what is and doing ontology as first philosophy. One can investigate knowing without making claims about objects only if knowing and objects of knowing are given independently of one another. If then knowing relates to an object different from itself and can never verify that the content of its representations conforms to things in themselves, knowing can look for what is nonsubjective only in the relationship between its representations. Knowing can secure the reference of its representations to objects by distinguishing between connections of representations that are arbitrary and those that are necessary. Necessary connections provide a nonsubjective element that can be considered objective as well as intersubjectively valid if they hold true of cognition or, as Kant puts it, consciousness in general. Insofar as representations must fit within the unity of self-consciousness to be represented at all, they must have that much necessary connection. Accordingly, objective knowledge will involve the conformity of representations to appearance, with the further qualification that those representations and appearances exhibit necessary connections among themselves. Insofar as necessary connections of representations are judgments and judgments have different forms distinguished by relations determined by different categories, the necessary relations of representations will be determined by categories. Such categorial determination cannot exhaust the entire content of objects, since it applies only to the relation of representations and not to their contents. Accordingly, objective knowledge can never just be about what knowing "puts" into its object. Rather, appearances have an independently given character, reflected in the receptivity of sensibility.

Accordingly, even though one may have a priori knowledge of the form of appearances, including their basic dynamic relationships, objective knowledge still involves an activity whereby the knowing subject confronts an independently given object in conformity with which it seeks to mold its representations. Objective truth is obtained through

this subjective alteration whereby one makes one's mental content fit what one finds given in experience.

The good, by contrast, is for Kant exclusively a matter for conduct. The good represents that end in accord with duty that the agent aims to bring into being by acting with lawful intentions. The good accordingly unites happiness with duty in that the realization of the good is equivalent to achieving what is lawfully intended, which will automatically bring satisfaction to the agent who exercises a good will. The good is aimed at as something that is not yet at hand and which can be achieved only through the independent initiative of the agent who pursues it. Consequently, the good consists in an end whose achievement takes the form of an activity by an agent who makes given objectivity conform to its lawful intention. The given objectivity in question involves both the nature of the subject and the nature of the world, for the agent cannot realize the good without making its own inclinations conform to duty and take action in the world that alters the given state of affairs accordingly.

One might wonder how Kant could possibly sustain this view of the good in light of politics. Even in his own account of civil government, which is instituted through social contract to uphold person and property, the legislative activity of citizens operates under a constitutional framework that already realizes right, understood as the legal condition in which individuals are treated as subject to law they impose upon themselves. Consequently, it might seem that the good that citizens will is something already at hand that contains that activity of its own realization, just as does the good of Plato's republic. Kant, however, like all his social contract predecessors and successors, treats the body politic as instrumental to the realization of a good consisting in exercising a privileged form of willing, that of person and property, as determined prior to and apart from political association. If the state were for its own sake, its existence would automatically fulfill its end. When political association is instrumental, as it is in social contract theory, the existence of the state can never guarantee that the good is at hand, for political association may or may not uphold that distinct end for which it is merely an instrument.

Not only do the internal conditions of the state leave the realization of the good always an ought, but the external relations of states to one another leave domestic right in jeopardy. As Kant acknowledges, even a league of nations can never guarantee that the good is realized, for no international body has the binding authority of domestic government. The "perpetual peace" that can assure that civil government functions

remains an unrealized ideal.<sup>9</sup> Hence, the realization of the good remains an imperative. Instead of ever having a secured embodiment, the good calls for action aiming to transform the given so as to conform to duty.

The good's predicament is the opposite of the theoretical securing of truth. Whereas truth is obtained theoretically by altering subjective determinations to conform to the objective given, the good is realized practically by altering given reality to conform to subjective lawful intentions. With truth and the good so determined, theory and practice are irrevocably opposed. Theory never achieves what practice intends, just as practice never accomplishes what theory seeks.

These converse determinations of truth and the good have become prevailing dogmas, so entrenched that any alternative seems inconceivable. Theorizing has been broadly assumed to consist in a subjective activity in which the knower obtains truth by altering subjective determinations to accord with what is given in opposing objectivity. Practice, by contrast, has been presumed to consist in the attempt to alter the world as it is given so as to conform to as yet unrealized, subjective ends.

Can theory distinct from practice be true? Can practice distinct from theory be good? These questions need to be asked, and an answer has been provided in the far reaches of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, where few dare to tread. In the section "Cognition," addressing the so-called theoretical and practical ideas, Hegel lays out arguments exposing the decisive pitfalls of theory and practice that remain separate from one another.<sup>10</sup> When these are understood, we will be in a position to comprehend how philosophy depends upon combining truth and the good and uniting theory and practice.

## The limits of theory without practice

Let us follow the broad outline of Hegel's account of the theoretical idea, whose cognition is not philosophical knowing but the theorizing that is distinct from practice. Such theorizing pursues truth, which consists not in the correct fit of representations with phenomena but in the correspondence of concept and objectivity. Theory aims not at qualified opinion, confined to representations that are relative to a particular subject and phenomena that are relative to external conditions. Theory recognizes that what can be the only proper object of truth is objectivity, which is not some appearance relative to some concealed ground but that which is determined in its own right. It can be known as such provided theory modifies its own concepts so as to conform

to objectivity. Concepts rather than representations are the vehicles for true theory because they have a universality that is independent of the particulars that relativize representations. Truth is to be obtained by the knowing subject altering its own conceptual formulation or theory so that it corresponds to what exists in and of itself.

Given that theory addresses objectivity as given independently of theorizing, theory can operate either analytically or synthetically but not both at once. On the one hand, theorizing can proceed by analyzing given objectivity, uncovering conceptual determinations in what it confronts. On the other hand, theorizing can begin with thought determinations and combine them with what it finds given in opposing objectivity. These alternative options involve the familiar procedures that have been taken to exhaust the possibilities of theory, given the prevalent assumption that theory and practice are separate. Although all such analytic and synthetic theorizing aim at attaining truth, the way they operate makes it impossible for them to achieve their goal.

Analytic knowing comes first, insofar as theory without practice seeks truth as something to be attained by molding concepts to fit what cognition finds its object to be. Consequently, theory has no true determinations until the subjectivity of knowing has altered itself to accord with given objectivity. There are no valid concepts to combine with what subjective knowing encounters in objectivity until cognition has uncovered conceptual content in what it confronts. Synthetic knowing must therefore follow upon analysis.

Can theory capture its prey by proceeding analytically? Opposing objectivity is to be known in truth by finding in its individual being universal determinations that can be theorized. Theory seeks to arrive at truth by achieving an identity between concept and objectivity in the subjective domain of theory construction. For this to be possible, theorizing must presume that objectivity contains conceptual determinations. Otherwise analysis will be fruitless, and theory without practice will be a vain endeavor.

Operating on this basis, analytic theorizing faces three insurmountable problems.

First, the assumption that objectivity is conceptually determinable cannot be established by analysis. This is so because every engagement in analysis takes that assumption for granted. Of course, this problem of circularity might seem remediable by simply proceeding with analysis and arriving at truth by finding concepts in objectivity. Any success in that endeavor would seem to vindicate the underlying presupposition of analytic theorizing.

Secondly, however, the opposition from which analytic theorizing proceeds precludes the success for which it is aiming. Insofar as the subjectivity of knowing confronts given objectivity as something it opposes, the unity of concept and objectivity that theorizing achieves occurs only in the subjective domain of analytic concept formation. Although analysis may presuppose that concepts are found in its object, the uncovering of conceptual determinations is the work of the abstraction of theorizing. Objectivity remains exactly what it was before the engagement of theory building. Although truth unites concept and objectivity, analysis produces that unity only in a subjective manner in the medium of conceptualization. In this respect, the unification of concept and objectivity that analysis achieves cannot conform to what objectivity is in its own right.

Thirdly, this discrepancy is manifest in the inability of analytic abstraction to produce results that are in unity with the given individuality of objectivity. The abstractions of analytic thought leave behind everything individual and changing in the given. Objectivity necessarily contains more than analysis extracts, which is patently obvious in how any theorizing by abstraction must select among the manifold determinations of the given and privilege some as against others. Moreover, not only does analytic theory not correspond to objectivity as it is in its own right, but analytic theory cannot verify the strict universality and necessity of any of its abstractions. To the extent that theorizing approaches objectivity as something it confronts, it always finds objectivity in individual encounters that can never guarantee the ubiquity of any extracted determinations. That those determinations are there to be encountered in every such confrontation can never be established by any particular engagement or engagements in abstraction. Consequently, analytic theorizing can neither grasp objectivity as it is in full nor validate that the concepts it abstracts have any genuine objective universality.

Can synthetic theorizing overcome these limitations? The attempt to do so underlies the efforts of each of the familiar options of theoretical synthesis: definition, division, and the proving of theorems through construction. In contrast to analytic theorizing, all these types of synthetic theorizing supplement abstracted concepts with further determinations found in the given. By combining these found specifications with abstract concepts, definition, division, and theorem proofs all seek truth in an enriched unity of concept and objectivity.

Definition starts with an abstraction, some preliminary preconception of its subject matter, and then seeks to find the particular differentia sufficient to define that entity. By combining the preliminary

abstraction with found particular features, synthetic theory attempts to find the true nature of its object. The preliminary abstraction does not contain these differentia, for if it did, the definition would not be synthetic but analytic. Theorizing must instead go outside the abstract determinacy of the term to be defined and uncover in objectivity the particular specifications that are essential. Definition itself does not contain any justification for what it combines with its subject. It connects subject and differentia with just the copula of its judgment, leaving its alleged truth in the form of a mere assertion. Insofar as the abstract subject does not contain the essential particulars, the appeal to objectivity must supply the needed evidence. Objectivity, however, confronts theory with a given manifold offering no sufficient basis for discriminating between incidental and essential features. Due to the particularity of observations, they cannot certify any selected difference to be a genuine differentia. Hence, definition cannot succeed in obtaining the truth for which it aims.

Division fares no better. It begins with some putative genus that it then proceeds to divide into its constituent species so as to arrive at a true determination of some object. Insofar as the putative genus does not already explicitly contain the determinations that division will lay out, theorizing must turn to objectivity to supply the content for its differentiations. Once more, the indifferent manifold of objectivity does not already supply the organized differentiation that theorizing must accomplish. Accordingly, what divisions are made are ultimately subjective in origin and authority. The differentiated content may be at hand, but how it is to be divided is something decided by the theoretical activity. As with analysis, the accomplished specification occurs in the arena of conceptualization rather than in objectivity itself.

Theorem proofs might seem to overcome this subjective residue in synthetic knowing by demonstrating the nonanalytic connections that are made. This is done by employing constructions to provide intuitive evidence that theorem relations are true. Here synthetic theorizing knows the truth to reside in what it makes. What it makes, however, is made in theory alone. The construction of theorem proof is purely ideal. It does not transform objectivity. Rather, it operates in the subjective arena of theory construction, just as do all other engagements in theory without practice. Consequently the truth of theorems depends upon the assumption that what occurs in theory corresponds to what applies to objectivity. That assumption can no more be verified by any theorem than can the global assumption of theory without practice.

## **The limits of practice without theory**

Theorem proofs may not secure truth, but they indicate that the limitations of theory without practice lie in a failure to make over objectivity in a way that corresponds to the making of theory. Practice without theory takes up this task in its completely converse pursuit of the good. Truth, as sought by theory without practice, consists in the identity of concept and objectivity achieved subjectively by theory formation. The good, as sought by practice without theory, consists in the identity of concept and objectivity achieved objectively through the alteration of the world through action.

On these terms, the good is something that has yet to be realized. Practice without theory will bring the good into being by making objective subjective determinations that are the ends of action. The ends of the good, however, are not just any subjective ends. They rather are made up of ends that are universally valid. As such, they are conceptually determinate ends. Consequently, the pursuit of the good is not just teleological action, which translates some subjective aim into reality. Action to realize the good aims more specifically at something conceptually necessary. Nonetheless, this practical truth is not yet embodied in the world and can only be realized through action that transforms given objectivity to accord with what ought to be its true determination. The pursuit of the good aims at making objectivity true, whereas the pursuit of truth aims at making subjectivity accord with given objectivity.

Can the pursuit of the good possibly succeed? Whereas theory, as distinct from practice, presumes that objectivity accords with conceptual determinacy, practice, as distinct from theory, presumes that objectivity does not accord with valid concepts. Valid concepts constitute the end that practice seeks to realize by transforming given objectivity. If objectivity does not conform to the valid concept of the good, how can the pursuit of the good succeed? The transformation that is required must occur in objectivity itself, and for that reason it requires objective means. This requirement has two sides: one within the objective presence of the agent and one within the world upon which the agent acts.

On the one hand, agency itself must have a worldly, objective actuality that can be made to conform to the realization process of the good. The embodiment of the agent must itself undergo the appropriate alterations to act upon the world. Otherwise, the good remains an unfulfilled, merely subject end. On the other hand, the world that confronts the agent must also be susceptible of providing the means for its own alteration in accord with the good. If, however, the whole basis of the pursuit



of the good is that objectivity is not in accord with its valid concept, it is unclear how objectivity can possibly be made good.

In order for objectivity to be made good, objectivity must itself cooperate and, in effect, make itself good. If that is the case, however, the whole pursuit of the good is just a sham. Practice simply occasions what is already inherent in objectivity.

Moreover, if objectivity were to be made good, practice, as the pursuit of the good, would be eliminated. Since the achievement of the good renders the pursuit of the good superfluous, the pursuit of the good makes sense only so long as the good is not achieved. Hence, practice not only presumes that given objectivity does not conform to the good but that practice itself cannot be good.

In all of these conundrums of practice, what puts the achievement of the good in question is the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity or of valid concept and self-subsistent actuality that is presupposed by the pursuit of the good. What would remove this opposition is the unity that the pursuit of truth takes for granted. The good would already be realized if objectivity were in unity with valid concepts, as theory presupposes in order to take seriously its own quest for truth.

Conversely, the difficulties of theory without practice would equally be overcome if the activity of theorizing did what practice aims to do. If theorizing equally transformed objectivity to accord with its concepts, the achievement of truth would be not just subjective but objective as well. What takes place in theory formation would occur equally in objectivity. Then the quest for truth would succeed in capturing objectivity in full and with universal necessity.

## **Philosophy and the unity of theory and practice**

What then would the unity of theory and practice comprise?

First of all, it would signify a unity of concept and objectivity that is just as much subjective as objective. The process of conceptual determination that is in accord with objectivity, that is, true, would equally comprise a process of its object by which it becomes conceptually determinate, that is, good. What knowing undergoes in its own domain would be equivalent to what the object of knowing undergoes in itself.

Secondly, the individuality of objectivity would cease to be alien to conceptual determination. The universality of thought would accordingly individuate itself just as the individuation of objectivity would be inherent in its conceptually determinate nature. Theory would no longer confront an object distinct from its own process. Conceptual

determination would neither involve a merely analytic theorizing nor a merely synthetic theorizing. Theory at one with practice would no longer wield concepts lacking individual determinacy, requiring theorizing to obtain their content by finding in given objectivity some content to extract to which universality would be externally conferred. Nor would theory need to supplement the results of analysis by combining abstracted concepts with further content found in objects, given or constructed in intuition. Instead, theorizing that obtains truth and realizes the good would be analytic and synthetic at once. On the one hand, the process of conceptual determination would generate its own individuated subject matter without having to depend upon forays into something beyond itself. On the other hand, the process of conceptual determination would just as much comprise the self-constitution of its object, whose differentiation would remain within the unity of its concept. The unification of concept and objectivity that occurs both subjectively and objectively would thus be synthetic and analytic at once. It would be synthetic since conceptualization engenders an objective differentiated content, becoming something other than what it is at the outset. It would equally be analytic since this differentiation remains immanent to the unity of theorizing.

What could possibly comprise the thinking and the object of thinking that could exhibit the combination of truth and good, where conception is in a unity with its object and that unity is both in the process of conception and in the process of the object? The theorizing would be objective and not confront an opposing given objectivity, whereas the objectivity would comprise the same process of determination that the thinking of it involves.

The answer is brutally simple. Thinking that thinks itself will be an objective thinking, realizing in its conceptual formation the self-constitution of its object. This is the genuine recipe of logic, which eliminates the difference between knowing and its subject matter by thinking thinking.

Formal logic does not achieve this unification because merely formal logic conceives a thought process whose operation is external to what it thinks. Formal logic models a thinking that is mired in the opposition between knowing and its object, method and subject matter, and theory and practice. It models a thinking that operates either analytically or synthetically but never both at once. Formal logic describes a conceptualization whose character does not determine the content of its subject matter but informs thinking irrespective of what its object may be. Formal logic is the recipe for a thinking that is empty and must seek

its content from intuition or linguistic usage. It is anything but a model of philosophical thought.

By contrast, a logic that is truly reflexive, that is what it thinks, achieves what philosophical knowing must consist in to overcome the limits of theory that is opposed to practice. To escape the dilemmas of all confrontation with the given and all opposition of theory and practice, philosophy must think without appeal to any assumptions concerning its own form or its subject matter. To have any hope of being true, its thinking must develop autonomously, engendering its own content by itself and in so doing provide the determination of its object as it is in and of itself. Logic, as the thinking of thinking, provides the starting point that unifies the pursuit of the truth and the good by being the process that is at once the subjective and objective corresponding of conception with what is conceived. Logic achieves this insofar as its thinking of thinking generates simultaneously its form and content, its knowing and its object, in correspondence with one another. Moreover, to the extent that logic provides the valid thinking of valid thinking, it ends up knowing the correspondence of its conception and its object to be at hand both subjectively and objectively. The object of logic knows itself to be in accord with its own conception, just as the subject of logic knows itself to be an objective thinking.

Logic cannot, however, begin with any given form or content, for doing so would beg the question of what the thinking of thinking turns out to be. Instead, logic must proceed without any given form or content, and this indeterminate starting point is precisely what philosophy requires for avoiding presupposing its method or subject matter. If philosophy instead began with a given form or a given topic, its thinking would be different from its object, theory and practice would once more fall asunder, and its pursuit of truth would be fruitless. Only what follows from a beginning stripped of any determinate form or content can comprise an objective thinking that unites what the separate pursuits of truth and the good seek to no avail.

Nonetheless, the unification of theory and practice in philosophical logic is only the beginning of philosophical inquiry. It leaves us with the looming challenge of determining how philosophical thinking can move beyond logic to think what is other than thought without reverting to a confrontation with the given.

# 7

## The End of Logic

### **The initial convergence of philosophy and logic**

If philosophy were to begin with any determinate method or subject matter, philosophical investigation would condemn itself to a hypothetical wager of opinion relative to its initial assumption of some form or content. The procedure and topic of philosophy, however, are themselves philosophical issues that must be decided within and by philosophy itself. Philosophy therefore finds itself in the radical predicament of having to begin instead without making any specific assertions about its knowing or its object. Surmounting relativity by calling into question all assumptions about what philosophical investigation should address and how it should proceed, philosophy is necessarily an empty word at the outset of its labors. All that can be anticipated is that philosophy must exhibit a complete self-responsibility, liberating its investigation from all external dictates and operating with sovereign autonomy. Philosophy must be what it exclusively determines itself to be, and what that is cannot be duly manifest until the conclusion of its self-constituting activity. This is not to say that philosophical investigation is limited to thinking itself. Rather, to the degree that philosophy conceives everything disclosed through the autonomous workings of reason, whatever it reveals about whichever objects fall under philosophical purview must be determined prior to philosophy's arrival at its own self-conception. This is so because philosophy will conceive these objects as well as itself, and it can only know itself in this its encompassing character *after* these other objects have been philosophically determined. Otherwise, what philosophy includes as part of its content cannot yet be grasped. Accordingly, insofar as philosophy conceives more than philosophical

investigation, the conception of philosophy must be the last destination of philosophical inquiry.

Logic may not be identical with philosophy in its totality, but logic's thinking of thinking can begin only in the same way that philosophy must commence. Unlike any other investigation, logic operates with no distinction between knowing and its object, form and content, or method and subject matter. Whereas all other conceptual investigations use thinking to conceive something other than the thinking they employ, logic thinks its own thinking. Nonlogical investigations, by distinguishing their knowing from their object, always presuppose their method, for what they examine is something else that can be examined only with some method already at hand. Accordingly, nonlogical inquiry is relative to and conditioned by the assumption of the procedure, the form, the thinking by which its topic is ordered. Hence, if philosophy were to begin as a nonlogical investigation, it would forfeit any claims to unconditioned truth.

Not surprisingly, because logic proceeds without differentiating its knowing and its object, it cannot begin with either a determinate method or subject matter without begging its question. Since logic aims to think thinking, what thinking is cannot be determined at the outset, for then logic has nothing to do. Rather, in order for logic to establish what valid thinking is as the outcome of its investigation, that inquiry must begin without any prior determination of the form or content of thought. Consequently, logic proceeds with the same absence of any determinate claims about method and subject matter with which philosophy must begin.

This convergence between the starting point of logic and that of philosophy does not render logic and philosophy one and the same. It rather signifies that philosophy must begin as logic and that the termination of logic must bring philosophy to a new nonlogical stage of its development if philosophy is to conceive something more than self-thinking thought.

In so doing, logic takes on three convergent identities of its own, consisting, respectively, in the theory of determinacy, the theory of self-determined determinacy, and the reflexive theory of logical investigation.

First, just as philosophy must commence without confronting any givens, so logic must begin without reference to any procedures or terms yet generate its own form and content. By not taking any determinacy for granted, logic, like philosophy with which it converges, can therefore provide a theory of determinacy that does not beg the question by

assuming what it sets out to conceive. Logic does this by providing a development of determinacy resting upon no prior given or determiner; that is, by developing determinacy from indeterminacy. All investigations that have a determinate foundation, by contrast, cannot provide a theory of determinacy, for they take determinacy for granted.

Second, because logic, like philosophy, must develop from an absence of all determinacy without reliance upon any determinate procedure, it can develop only as a self-determined, completely self-constituting process. Insofar as this self-development must proceed from indeterminacy rather than from some determinate given or determiner, it is not the self-determination of some antecedent substrate or foundation but self-determination per se. Consequently, the theory of determinacy that logic makes possible by developing determinacy from indeterminacy is ultimately a theory of self-determined determinacy.

Moreover, whereas philosophy is an empty word at the outset, so logic has no determinate significance at the start other than proceeding from the elimination of all distinction between knowing and its object or method and subject matter. The removal of any subject-object polarity, of any confrontation with the given, is the common point of departure of logic and philosophy, without which thinking remains condemned to a conditioned enterprise relative to a presupposed cognition and an assumed object of inquiry. Precisely because logic proceeds from no determinate preconception of its method or content, logic must arrive at the conception of its own thinking of thinking at the end of its own investigation, for that investigation is nothing other than that reflexive endeavor that cannot conceive itself until it has completed its self-conception. Accordingly, whereas philosophy must conclude with the conception of philosophical discourse, logic must consummate itself and philosophy's initial undertaking by arriving at the concept of logical science.

How can logic be at once the theory of determinacy, the theory of self-determined determinacy, and the theory of self-thinking thought? That is, how can determinacy entail self-determination, and how can self-determination yield the concept of logic, bringing closure to logical investigation?

## The road to conceptual determination

These questions are addressed at greatest length by Hegel in his *Science of Logic*. The so-called Logics of Being and Essence, the first two of the three parts of the *Science*, provide together a demonstration of how the

theory of determinacy entails the theory of self-determined determinacy or self-determination. They do so by providing a detailed account of how determinacy arises from indeterminacy, then reverts to determined determinacy posited by an underlying positor, and finally engenders self-determined determinacy once what determines and what gets determined become indistinguishable.

Although substantiating the actual development demands a critical thinking through of every stage of the argument, the general itinerary should not be surprising. Determined determinacy involves determinacy at both levels of what determines and what gets determined. Consequently, the rise of determinacy from indeterminacy must precede the positings of determined determinacy. Similarly, self-determination involves not just determinacy but both a determiner and determined determinacy. Self-determination may remove the distinction between determiner and determined, but it incorporates both in the process wherein they are one and the same. Accordingly, self-determined determinacy presupposes both determinacy and determined determinacy. This is why when self-determined determinacy arises, it emerges in a form that betrays its own character. Although self-determination is what it determines itself to be, it immediately emerges not from itself but from the antecedent dissolution of the distinction between determiner and determined, which itself follows upon the rise of determinacy from indeterminacy. Self-determined determinacy cannot possibly be present at the outset of the supposed process by which self-determination constitutes itself, for then self-determination would be immediately given rather than be determined by the self-determining in which it consists. Precisely because self-determination is what it determines itself to be, it cannot have any determinate given character but must emerge from indeterminacy. In so doing, however, self-determination must emerge through determinacy and determined determinacy, which only retrospectively can be seen to compose constitutive stages in the determining by which self-determination arises.

Although this suggests why the converging prospects of logic and philosophy together lead to self-determined determinacy, it is far from clear how the autonomy endemic to both has anything to do with thinking of thinking or conceptual cognition more generally. Hegel provides the first clue for making a connection by identifying the third part of his logic, which addresses self-determined determinacy as such, as the Logic of the Concept. Unlike any thinker before, Hegel explicitly identifies the immediate determination of self-determined determinacy with the concept, explicating the unity of determiner and determined

as the determination of universality, particularity, and individuality or the concept as such.

Previous thinkers have instead mistakenly characterized the universal in terms of either the given determinacy of the Logic of Being or the determined determinacy of the Logic of Essence. The empiricists commit the first blunder by treating the universal as if it could be found in given sense contents that completely resemble one another. The universal is simply identical with each of these givens, supposedly enabling associative imagination to abstract it from the plurality of sensations that contain the same contents. What cannot be explained, however, is how these identical contents can be both identical and plural, as well as how the “universal” can be distinguished from any of its “instances.” Because all the “particulars” are given in the same simplicity and their “common” universal is indistinguishable from them, what keeps them from collapsing into one is as mysterious as how any can retain any individuality.

Plato commits the mistake of identifying the universal with essence, treating particulars as if they were appearances of the universal, which determines them as deficient replicas of itself. By giving the universal a prior privileged being of its own while relegating particulars to posited illusory beings, Plato cannot escape the “third man” difficulties he diagnoses in the *Parmenides*.<sup>1</sup> For if the universal posits its particulars, they lack the independent being of their source, leaving inexplicable how the universal can participate in what remains fundamentally apart from it.

These difficulties are surmounted when universality is understood to exhibit self-determined determinacy. In that case, the universal differentiates itself as particularity and, in so giving itself new determinacy, remains at one with itself as an individual, determined in and through itself.

Insofar as universality is the concept as such, the connection between self-determination and universality unites conceptual determination and autonomy. This indicates how the autonomy endemic to both logic and philosophy in general requires conceptuality. It also signals how conceptual determination – that is, thought logically rather than psychologically considered – can be free of foundations, liberated from determination by contrast to some given or determination by a prior determiner.

Nonetheless, the determination of the concept’s constitutive universality, particularity, and individuality as self-determination does not of itself introduce cognition, let alone the cognition of logical science, with which logic should close. The concept neither knows itself nor



any object other than itself simply by differentiating itself as universality, particularity, and individuality. The same can be said of judgment and syllogism, into which the concept develops. Judgment and syllogism both further the self-determination of the concept by enabling the differentiations of the concept to be determined by one another. In judgment, one concept term, the individual or particular, is immediately determined by another, the universal (e.g., the individual is the universal), whereas in syllogism, concept terms determine one another through the mediation of the third (e.g., the individual is the universal through the particular). In neither case, however, do concept determinations involve any objects, either theoretically, by according with what the object independently is, or practically, by making the object what they are. Objects may certainly embody the concept or the immediate and mediated relations of concept terms in judgment and syllogism. Yet such embodiment is not itself contained within these conceptual determinations.

Accordingly, if the development of determinacy / self-determined determinacy is to become a conceptual *cognition*, the concept must first give rise to objectivity, from which theoretical and practical relations of concept and objectivity can proceed. Objectivity cannot be invoked by appeal to some given, for that would only reinstate dogmatic reference to assumed contents from which logic and philosophy must liberate themselves. Instead, objectivity must arise from the same presuppositionless development of determinacy that becomes self-determined determinacy; that is, conceptual determination.

Hegel himself accounts for the emergence of objectivity when disjunctive syllogism determines the extremes of inference so that they not only become indistinguishable, removing the need for mediation through a third concept term, but do so by becoming identical to the mediation that unites them.<sup>2</sup> This removes the last remaining "subjectivity" of their determining, insofar as the determination of concept terms has become intrinsic to their own character rather than dependent upon any external relating. Universality, particularity, and individuality remain defining factors, but their determination by one another now constitutes a completely self-subsistent totality.

What distinguishes objectivity from reality and from appearance or existence is that objectivity has just such freestanding independence, making it the worthy object of true knowing. Reality, the being of quality, depends for its determinacy upon its contrastive relation with negation. Consequently, something real is what it is only by not being what it is not; that is, by not being something else. Yet because something other is

something real as well and something real is the other of something else, the contrasting factors turn out to be identical with respect to one another. Therefore the contrastive determination of reality cannot arrive at any individuation of its entities. Instead, what results is an endless dissemination of factors whose relation to other ends up being indistinguishable from a relation to self. This renders determination by negation ultimately equivalent to the solitary exclusive being of the selfsame One.<sup>3</sup>

Appearance and existence, for their part, derive their determinacy from something else, from either an underlying essence, in the case of appearance, or other things with whom they stand in dynamic interrelation, in the case of existence. Consequently, knowledge restricted to either remains conditioned by something else that eludes capture – respectively, the undisclosed essence or the network of interdependence that transcends each existent.

Objectivity, however, by being independently and intrinsically determinate, is eminently suited to being known as it is in itself. Unlike phenomena that reflect something else that remains hidden, objectivity is self-contained and manifest in its own right. Precisely because it has this freestanding being, objectivity is susceptible to conceptual determination, which exhibits the same self-determined character that objectivity possesses as a totality unto itself.

### **Truth versus correctness**

Accordingly, objectivity can be conceived in truth rather than merely represented “correctly.” “Correctness” consists in the match between given phenomena and subjective representations. Because phenomena are not self-subsistent totalities but given as a posit of something else, their own truth is always questionable. They are simply what appears to some subjectivity that molds contents of its own so as to correspond to those phenomena. The phenomena are relative to that subjectivity, as well as to whatever underlies them as an undisclosed foundation.

Truth, by contrast, properly involves the intrinsic correspondence between objectivity and conceptual determination. Objectivity can figure in truth because objectivity is not conditioned or relative to anything else but is self-subsistent. Conceptual determination for its part is not relative to any standpoint or other determining ground because the differentiation of universality is self-determination.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, a conceptual determination that conforms to objectivity exhibits the same intrinsic rather than extrinsic determination constitutive of objectivity itself.

That conformity, however, requires a relating of concept and objectivity in their distinction and identity. Their distinction must be retained together with their identity, since otherwise concepts have no truth relation to independent objectivity, and all there are are concepts by themselves or objectivity by itself.

Moreover, not just the discrete characters of concept and objectivity but their true correspondence must be intrinsic rather than extrinsic. If the correspondence of concept and objectivity depends upon anything extraneous to them, their conformity is relative to a third factor of dubitable authority. Whether that mediating factor is something in which they come together or an external agency that joins them, correspondence remains "subjective" in that it is not inherent in the corresponding factors. To be true and not merely correct, concept and objectivity must unite through their own autonomous development.

One side of that intrinsic corresponding is established when objectivity arises from the concept's development into judgment and syllogism. The other side of the intrinsic emergence of truth is the development by which objectivity becomes in accord with a conceptual determinacy it distinguishes from itself. Hegel describes how this occurs in the passage from Mechanism to Chemism to Teleology, which successively make up the three processes constitutive of objectivity.<sup>5</sup> Although Mechanism begins with self-subsistent objects whose external relationship is completely indifferent to what they are, their independent being is inseparable from this external mechanical relationship. Accordingly, mechanism engenders chemism insofar as the external relations between objects turn out to reflect their distinct identities, rendering objects externally tied to one another in function of their differences. In teleology, objective process enables the external determinacy of an end to inform the independent being of an object. To the extent that an end exhibits the self-realizing character of the concept while enlisting objectivity to conform itself to that end, teleology results in the general process of truth, which Hegel calls the "Idea."

### **The limits of cognition and the opposition of theory and practice**

That process, however, does not itself involve cognition, any more than do the merely subjective determinings of the concept or the merely objective processes of objectivity. In order for truth to be *known*, the intrinsic correspondence of concept and objectivity must be conceptualized, and that conceptualization must become thematic. The conceptualization

of truth is not at hand in the immediately given unification of concept and objectivity achieved through teleology. Instead, the Idea exhibits the process of Life, where the unity of concept and objectivity is the intrinsic presupposition and result of their own differentiation.

In order for logic to arrive at the concept of itself and emerge as the completed thinking of thinking, the conceiving of truth must be conceived. It is not enough for truth to be the content of determination. Logic must also determine the conceptual knowing of (i.e., the thinking of) truth. Cognition is the process whereby the unity of concept and objectivity is conceptualized. Cognition does not merely confront objectivity. It seeks truth – which is to say that cognition aims to arrive at the concept of the conceptual determination of objectivity. For this reason, cognition falls within the logical consideration of the Idea, which addresses the various determinations of the unity of concept and objectivity. If logic is to involve a true thinking of true thinking, it must engender the determination of cognition, the determination of that process that has as its aim the conceptualization of truth.

Nonetheless, when Hegel turns to the concluding development of logic, the so-called Absolute Idea, he does not characterize it as cognition. Instead, the Absolute Idea is first described in two complementary ways that each include cognition as but one element of an encompassing identity. On the one hand, Hegel identifies the Absolute Idea as uniting Life and Cognition.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, he characterizes the Absolute Idea as uniting the Theoretical and Practical Ideas.<sup>7</sup> The theoretical and practical ideas consist in cognition and its converse, the theoretical idea aiming at Truth by conceiving the conceptual determinacy of given objectivity and the practical idea aiming at the Good by making objectivity accord with its true concept.

Both these characterizations indicate how cognition – at least, as minimally determined – cannot bring logic to closure nor constitute the self-thinking of logical science. Cognition's deficiency is signaled by how the unities defining the Absolute Idea relegate cognition to a one-sided fragment of a whole. To the extent that the Absolute Idea unites life and cognition and the theoretical and practical ideas, cognition stands, at least initially, opposed to Life and to the practical idea.

These two oppositions are intertwined. So long as theory stands opposed to practice, cognition and its converse both lack the self-sustaining character of life, which produces an organic unity that is always already at hand, underlying its self-production. Theory opposes practice so long as the pursuit of Truth is not identical to the realization of the Good. This disunity of theory and practice signifies that the

conceptualization of the unity of concept and objectivity is something external to conceptually determinate objectivity or truth. Theory that is not practical confronts a given objectivity that is conceivable, that is conceptually determinate or theoretically corresponds with its concept. Theorizing then consists in a conceptual determining that makes itself accord with what it finds rather than produce what it knows to be true. Such cognition is finite insofar as it confronts a given object of knowledge that is outside knowing and represents the limit of cognition. Practice that is not at once theoretical is similarly finite since it confronts a given objectivity that is not in accord with its concept and must be modified to become Good. Such practice, however, is always just *striving* to overcome the difference between its activity and the objectivity it aims to make good, because achieving success would annul its own transformative activity, which only operates so long as objectivity is not yet in accord with its concept. If instead practice were to modify an objectivity already in accord with its concept, practice's volition would be identical to the self-sustaining process of true objectivity. Similarly, if theory were to make objectivity accord with its concept by altering its own conception to correspond with true objectivity, cognition would conceive a truth that corresponds with cognition's own process instead of opposing it as something beyond.

So long as theory remains distinct from practice, unable by theorizing to make true what it conceives, cognition can proceed only analytically or synthetically, not both at once. Confronting objectivity as something external, cognition can take what it finds and order it conceptually, analyzing the individuality of the given into whatever universal and particular determinations it may appear to contain. Alternatively, theory that opposes practice can operate synthetically: it can begin with some universality external to individuality and then define given individuals by connecting such universals with particular differentia, distinguish given individuals through divisions of selected universal terms, or prove theorems about such individuals by adding constructions.<sup>8</sup> Analysis cannot yield fundamentally new determinations that could be synthetically connected to that from which they arise. Rather, each product of analysis is merely a conceptualization of what is already contained in the given objectivity theory addresses. Because theorizing confronts an objectivity that is what it is apart from the conceptual determining of cognition, that determining can discover only what is already at hand. On the other hand, when theorizing makes synthetic connections, these remain external to the given objects that theory so combines. The unifications of different objects cannot be immanent to them because the

opposition of conceptualization to what is conceptualized renders any theoretical synthesis something that applies to its objects after the fact of their given being. Consequently, analysis and synthesis here remain distinct operations, just as the activity of achieving the good remains distinct from the being of the good.

Insofar as logic is a thinking of thinking, logic can arrive at its own concept only by overcoming the distinction between cognition and its object, true objectivity. That distinction remains in force so long as theory and practice stand opposed. This is so because uniting theory and practice equates the conceptualization of true objectivity with the making true of objectivity, rendering the conceiving of truth identical to the being of truth.

### **Uniting theory and practice and life and cognition**

If the opposition of theory and practice must be overcome to bring logic to the threshold of engendering its own determination, that unification must still arise immanently from the disunity of theory and practice. Otherwise, the conceptualization of logical science would depend upon some extrinsic intervention, violating its own unity of method and subject matter.

Hegel presents the immanent unification of theory and practice as a direct result of the working through of the practical Idea.<sup>9</sup> Although the practical idea operates in opposition to an untrue objectivity that must be transformed to become Good, the volition of practice expends itself by producing an objectivity that is what theory knows true objectivity to be: an objectivity in accord with conceptual determination. Consequently, by arriving at this result, practice has produced that with which theory begins: true objectivity as given. Moreover, the determining process of practice, which makes truth objective, turns out to be equivalent to the determining process of theory, which makes truth subjective. Practice, in taking objective truth to lie implicit in the end with which it sets out to transform given objectivity, conceives the same unity that theory makes its own in subjectively harmonizing with the true objectivity it confronts.

Theory and practice have thereby become indistinguishable to the extent that true conceptualization is the same as the process whereby what is true comes into being. Instead of confronting true objectivity as something given to it, for which its conceptualization plays no constitutive role, cognition at one with practice now *is* what it truly knows. This does not mean that logic has arrived at a static identity of knowing

and its object. Rather, both true conceptualization and the constitution of what is truly objective are developmental processes. Yet because true conceptualization arrives at the completed constitution of its true object as something at one with itself, cognition here achieves self-knowledge in knowing true objectivity. This self-knowledge is purely conceptual, for cognition does not confront anything foreign to which it must heteronomously conform. Instead, cognition can independently constitute its object only insofar as knowing has the autonomy of conceptual determination and true objectivity has the same self-standing independence. No longer confronting anything beyond itself, this knowing has ceased to be finite. Purely conceptual and purely self-knowing, cognition here has become manifestly logical in character, for now it is a thinking of thinking, in which conceptual determination unites concept and objectivity in a manner that is both conceptual and objective. What is thought is not, in function of being conceived, reduced to a posit determined by an independent determiner. Rather, conceptualization conceives a conceptually determined self-subsisting totality whose conceptual determination is its objective self-constitution.

This reflexive character of logical cognition fits Hegel's description of the Absolute Idea as a unity of cognition and life. Logical cognition begins and ends with itself and is a process that produces only what it has been implicitly all along. Life also sustains and reproduces itself, becoming what it already is as subject of the life process. Yet life lives by immediately immersing itself in its own life process, without having to know itself in order to be at one with itself. Logical cognition, by contrast, constitutively contains the self-reflection of knowing, conceptualizing and realizing its own conceptualization of what independently determines itself.

### **The absolute idea as method**

The Absolute Idea may consist in a conceptual cognition that knows itself to constitute its true object, but how does it make up the "method" of logic,<sup>10</sup> as Hegel maintains? In finite, prephilosophical knowing, method operates upon a given object, distinct from itself. As such, method orders a subject matter in an investigation that must take its method for granted. This is so because what is investigated is not the thinking of its object but an object distinct from the thinking of it. Method then figures as an instrument, externally applied to some topic, employing the analytic or synthetic procedures characteristic of finite cognition.

Logical method cannot be an instrument, determined prior to its application and directed upon a predetermined given subject matter. Because logic proceeds from the removal of all distinction between knowing and its object, logical method is the ordering of a self-ordering content. Logical method can therefore be termed "an absolute form."<sup>11</sup> It does not order something external to which it is relative, requiring some given content to which it can be applied as well as an external agency to take it and so apply it. Instead, logical method is a form pregnant with content, for its thinking is generative of what it knows, coming to know itself only in completely conceptualizing its self-conceptualizing subject matter.

Hegel can therefore describe method as the "consciousness of the form of the inner self-movement of the content of logic,"<sup>12</sup> a self-knowing that emerges only when the "self" of logic has finally constituted itself in its reflexive totality.<sup>13</sup> Before that consummation not only is the subject of logic not yet at hand but its self-knowing has not emerged either. That self-cognition cannot be present any earlier precisely because the self-ordering logical content cannot know itself until it has fully determined itself, including its own self-thinking.

If the unity of knowing and object, of method and content, is to be maintained, the self-knowledge of the Absolute Idea must be achieved only as the concluding determinacy of logic. Otherwise, the knowledge of logic will be given apart from its object, as either something prior to the completion of its subject matter or entirely external to it.

Moreover, the unity of logical form and content requires that the "method" of logic come to incorporate the entire development of self-determined determinacy that culminates in the Absolute Idea. If any thought determinations were to remain outside method, method would become finite and forfeit its logical character. Yet this all-inclusive logical incorporation is not just a restatement of what has preceded the method's emergence. Rather, it involves redetermining what has preceded *as* the self-development of the self whose identity as the Absolute Idea has finally been established.

Admittedly, from the moment the starting point from which logic and philosophy jointly begin passes over from indeterminacy or being to nothing and then to becoming, that initial immediacy becomes qualified *for us* who observe the development. Instead of just being indeterminacy about which nothing more can be said, we here observe it to have become a *beginning* from which something is under way determining itself. First, *for us* being or indeterminacy shows itself to be a starting point from which determinacy emerges. Then as further determinations



follow, indeterminacy comes to count *for us* as the starting point from which self-determined determinacy has arisen. Once self-determination becomes identified with the concept, each preceding determination has been revealed, once more *for us*, to be a concept determination; that is, a stage in the self-development of conceptuality. Since the determinacies are nothing but determinations in the self-constitution of the concept, they are, *for us*, not just concept determinations but pure concepts or categories, independent of experience or any other extraneous factor. Further, once objectivity arises from syllogism and the unification of concept and objectivity in the Idea emerges from the realization of teleology, being and every concept that follows become, again *for us*, way stations in the constitution of truth.

When, however, the development of categories arrives at the Absolute Idea, that Idea as method knows its own determinations to be what they have turned out to be composed of: the constitutive stages in the self-thinking of logical science. Now the logical development is *for itself* what it has determined itself to be. Only as such has the development become the completed logical investigation it knows itself to be by arriving at its own concept.

Hegel describes logical method's self-knowing of the categorial development as recapitulating it in terms of the three basic elements of the concept: universality, particularity, and individuality.<sup>14</sup> This is to be expected, for logic thinks thinking – that is, conceptualizes the development of its own categories, which compose the thinking to be thought. Accordingly, logical method presents the *conceiving* of logic's own unfolding, determining it in terms of the concept. In this self-thinking, indeterminacy passes over into nothing *as* a differentiation of conceptual development. Here the universal, the immediate determinacy of the concept, first gives itself new determinacy, particularizing itself in what stands distinguished as a second logical term. As something other to the category from which it emerges, this second term is its negation. Since, however, this new category is a differentiation of a subject under way developing itself, it consists in the particularization *of* the universal in which thought is at one with itself. In this respect, the second category is the *determinate* negation of the former, retaining an immanent connection to it. The development thereby takes on the character of individuality, of that which combines universality and particularity, and is thereby determined in and through itself. The otherness of the second category is here overcome, insofar as its new determinacy turns out to be incorporated in the self-development of the emergent subject matter of logic.

Hegel does not bother to reapply these three aspects of logical development in regard to any further categories. There is no need, for two reasons. First, since the development is throughout a conceptual process, it always exhibits the three constituents of the concept: universality, particularity, and individuality. Nonetheless, method cannot be limited to a rehearsal of these concept components, which would divide form from content. This proviso is not just an imperative but a logical necessity. Because the individuality of the development unites the differentiations with the universality pervading them all, the method secondly becomes the entire system of categories.<sup>15</sup> Thereby form and content get truly united, as logic and philosophy jointly require. If instead the Absolute Idea failed to encompass the whole, "logical method" would constitute an external formal scheme that recurs with indifference to the contents it repeatedly orders, reverting to a finite instrument relative to a given subject matter and a given "thinker."

By rather coalescing with the totality of logical thought thinking itself, logical method is, as Hegel puts it, analytic and synthetic at once.<sup>16</sup> The differentiation of categories is analytic insofar as they are contained in the unity of self-thinking thought. Yet because the categories develop from one another as stages in the self-determination of logic, their containment is equally synthetic. They cannot be picked out from any antecedent totality, in the manner of finite, external analysis that confronts something given. Rather, they are determinations of logical thought by involving new categories, which, rather than be contained in any prior factors, instead result in the self-knowing logical totality that contains them as its constituents. Although each successive category determinately negates its predecessor, the immanence of their otherness renders the synthesis of their combination equally analytically determinable within the unity of logical thought.

### With what must logic end?

Logic hereby achieves closure by completing its self-thinking conceptualized recapitulation of its own categorial development. Logic's thinking of thinking concludes itself by simultaneously constituting the totality of logical thought and knowing itself in its complete self-determination. Nothing else can bring logic to its end.

This conclusion is a simple imperative of truth. If truth did not contain the knowledge of itself, the knowing of truth would be without truth. That is, the knowing of truth would lie outside truth and be a conceptualizing devoid of objectivity. Consequently, the self-knowing

of the totality of determinacy must be its consummating determination. If the knowing of truth were not the last element of the true, aspects of the true would be given after true knowledge. Hence these would be unknowable, fail to be conceptually determined, and not be that in which conceptualization is at one with itself. Accordingly, the Absolute Idea or the consummating totality of determinacy must consist of the self-knowing of that totality.

Plato's idea of the Good foreshadows the consummation of the Absolute Idea by being what not only is the source of knowing and the object of knowing but what ensures their correspondence or truth and also reveals itself to true knowing.<sup>17</sup> Plato's Good, however, remains something transcendent, outside knowing and being. The consummating determination, however, cannot be a self-knowing of the totality that is distinct from its content. The identity of knowing and its object requires that method and content unite, and this unity, resting on nothing but itself, has the same immediacy into which Absolute Knowing at the end of the *Phenomenology* reverts, once the opposition of consciousness collapses.<sup>18</sup> Yet here the immediacy is that of the Absolute Idea, not just immediacy *per se*.

This result gives logic its identity as a conceptual knowing of conceptual knowing. In so doing, however, it also presents the totality of logical determinacy in the form of being.

Consequently, this end no less involves a new point of departure for the philosophical investigation of what is nonlogical. Logic completes itself as a discrete domain only insofar as it equally generates the boundary that must be crossed to arrive at what lies beyond self-thinking thought. This cannot occur thanks to anything external to logic, for appeal to anything independently given would reinstate the same foundational knowing, the same entrapment in the opposition of consciousness, whose overcoming provides the gateway to logic and philosophy at once.

Instead, logic's self-completion provides its own surpassing. By fully conceptualizing its own path from indeterminacy to self-conceptualization, the totality of logic has come to *be*. Determined as well as known in and through itself, this totality stands mediated by neither contrast to any coeval factor nor determination by any independent determiner. Consequently, the logical totality of self-thinking thought is without further qualification. In other words, the Absolute Idea immediately is in the form of being. This constitutes the most minimal determinacy of something more than mere logical determinacy. Since all logical determinacy is contained within the Absolute Idea, the application of being

to the Absolute Idea is not itself a logical category but something that falls beyond self-thinking thought. Yet it does so without depending upon anything more than logical totality. For this reason, Hegel can aptly describe this closing development as a “free release” of the Absolute Idea.<sup>19</sup>

Moreover, because this beyond of logic, this nonlogical determinacy, contains the totality of logical determinacy, adding only the form of being, it presents the Absolute Idea as external to itself.<sup>20</sup> For what confronts logic as nonlogical is nothing but the same logical totality of categories with the sole addition of being.<sup>21</sup> This forms the minimal threshold of nonlogical determinacy or what can broadly count as nature, not confronted as some arbitrarily invoked given but systematically emergent from the same presuppositionless development that guarantees its autonomous intelligibility.

With this result, logic and philosophy part company. Logic achieves closure and philosophy moves from its logical initiation to its nonlogical continuation. Philosophy may no longer operate as self-thinking thought, but it still faces a quest where no end can be in sight until philosophy conceives itself.



## **Part II**

# **Nature and Humanity**



# 8

## The Logic of Nature

### **The reigning denial of any philosophy of nature**

The philosophy of nature has become virtually an oxymoron for the prevailing philosophical consensus. Reason, we are told, is powerless to conceive what nature is in itself, but it must instead hand over all understanding of physical reality to empirical science. Philosophy may reflect upon how natural science models its data, scrutinizing the consistency of scientific theories and the way research projects are framed, but reason must never go beyond its frail limits to provide a priori ampliative, synthetic knowledge of what holds universally and necessarily of nature. Insofar as the problems of knowing nature a priori apply to any extension of a priori knowledge beyond reason's knowledge of itself, philosophy should have no aspirations beyond, on the one hand, developing the formal logic of a thinking incapable of generating contents of its own and, on the other, doing "philosophy of science," finding some regulative, methodological coherence in the endeavors of the empirical sciences.

The rejection of any philosophy of nature may today be rampant, but it is itself incoherent. It relies upon a reduction of reason to a formal thinking that may analyze what is contained in terms given by experience in general and linguistic usage in particular but is incapable of knowing universally necessary truths about itself or any other topic. Reason's knowledge of itself is no more analytic than knowledge of what is other than itself, for what reason is cannot be presupposed as something given but must be established. Hence any proscription to know nature a priori is just as inconsistent as the subjection of all thought to formal logic from which that prohibition stems.

The great philosophers of the past have had no such qualms about tackling nature with reason. They all, however, have recognized that nature



cannot be immediately addressed but must be followed from prior philosophical investigation, without which nature remains unthinkable.

### **The philosophical presuppositions of the philosophy of nature**

The pioneers of the three fundamental options for philosophical investigation, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel, may all agree that the philosophy of nature is not first philosophy, but they all characterize the philosophical presuppositions of the philosophy of nature differently, with important consequences for how nature gets conceived.

For Aristotle, nature is inconceivable without first thinking the categories of being in general, which determine every particular type of being insofar as any have being at all. According to the metaphysical approach that Aristotle pioneers, ontology comprises first philosophy insofar as philosophical investigation must begin with that privileged given that underlies all else by providing the most universal principles that determine each and every subject matter. Insofar as everything depends on being, nothing but being *per se* seems able to play that foundational role. Whereas ontology thereby must come first, the philosophy of nature comes next, preceding the account of the psyche, as well as that of ethics and politics and poetry. The philosophy of nature falls between ontology and these “human” sciences because nature provides the given existing condition for all the other domains involving living minds and their conventions and productions. Nonetheless, because the categories of being determine everything that is, they cannot distinguish nature from being or nature from the psyche and its realizations. This raises the question of how reason can advance from knowledge of being to knowledge of nature, given that the categories of ontology must be further supplemented to grasp what is specifically natural.

Ontology has something to offer to bridge the gap between being and nature, at least insofar as being as such is conceived by Aristotle to be grounded in a highest divine being, which plays a further determining role with regard to nature. That determining role, however, is necessarily highly restricted, given how the highest being ends up requiring a pure, unconditioned actuality that can only be an immaterial self-thinking thought. Since such a highest being only thinks itself, it cannot provide any form to nature, let alone any matter. Moreover, since self-thinking thought is directed solely upon its own self-contemplation, it cannot furnish any efficient causality to set nature in motion. Rather, the only way Aristotle can consider the highest being able to

affect nature is if nature moves itself in the way in which love moves the lover to make the beloved its end. In this way, nature makes the highest being its end. Yet since the highest being is a purely self-realizing activity of self-thinking thought that depends on nothing else, it is hard to see how nature can make the highest being its end. Insofar as the highest being can have no potentiality, it cannot be moved, either by itself or anything else, and therefore it must set nature into motion as an unmoved mover. Moreover, as Aristotle duly recognizes, the movement effected by the highest being must be just as changeless as its own eternal self-thinking. Some part of nature must thus exhibit an eternal self-equal change – namely, unceasing circular locomotion – which then can somehow impart upon other parts of nature variable locomotions that facilitate qualitative and quantitative alterations of preexisting material substances.

These material substances are available insofar as nature, as a type of being, will exhibit the universal categories that insure that what is natural will be individual substances, combining form and matter, and subject to determination by efficient and final causality, as well as formal and material causality. What distinguishes nature is what allows it to be determined by the highest being: namely, that it can move itself so as to be determined by final causality. Self-motion must come into play because the highest being lacks efficient causality. As Aristotle argues in the *Physics*, all motion and all change ultimately depends upon locomotion, since alteration in quality and magnitude depends upon locomotion, without which contact, compression, and expansion cannot occur.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, in nature, efficient, formal, and final causality coincide, signifying that the form of natural things is active and self-realizing, a soul rather than an externally imposed archetype, as an artifact embodies.<sup>2</sup>

It remains mysterious how natural substances can be self-moving yet brought into locomotion and other motion by a self-thinking thought figuring as an unmoved mover. How can locomotion of natural substances serve the end of the highest being when that being is restricted to self-contemplation and is in need of nothing else for its own absolute actuality?

Moreover, how can natural substances be self-moving while deriving locomotion from the highest being? This problem might be resolvable if the self-motion of natural substances involved some further motion determined by their own specific natures that they undergo upon the occasion of imparted locomotion.<sup>3</sup> In this way, for example, cats and swallows will respond in their own species-specific ways to communicated locomotion, such as being thrown out of a window.

In any event, the edicts of foundational ontology and the minimal natural feature of self-motion mandate that the most abstract features of nature, space and time, are determined from the outset in terms of place and place-related time. Since nothing can be without substance, and natural substance moves itself in virtue of what form it has, space becomes minimally characterized in terms of place, which designates the boundary that some natural substance may have.<sup>4</sup> Time, for its part, is characterized as the measure of the motion of a natural substance, just as the eternal circular locomotion of a natural substance provides the absolute measure and sustainer of time itself.<sup>5</sup>

Yet can space be defined in terms of place and can time be defined in respect of motion, or do place and motion, as well as natural substance, presuppose space and time? Moreover, how does reason move from the theory of being to the further specifications specific to nature without relying upon groundless stipulation? Or ontologically speaking, how does being as such provide for the being of nature? Even if the highest being be invoked as an unmoved mover, natural substance with the character of self-movement (i.e., of containing the principle of motion within itself) must be presupposed before specifically natural movements can be engendered.

More generally, so long as philosophy begins with some privileged given that serves as a first principle for everything else that is and can be known, the application of that principle requires the presupposition of independent factors to be subject to determination by it. Since the first principle of being has some given determinacy, it cannot owe its own primary character to its performance as ultimate foundation. Accordingly, it is not self-determining, so that further determinations are just its own development. Rather, it will determine what is other than itself. Consequently, the principles of ontology will have to be applied to some extraneously given factors in order to have anything to determine. *What* these are, as well as *that* they are, cannot be established by any first principle. Once the legitimacy of the description and presence of these factors is called into question, any move from ontology to the philosophy of nature gets stopped dead in its tracks.

An even more basic challenge confronting any philosophy of nature predicated upon ontology is whether philosophy can start by reading off the character of being without taking for granted the authority of its knowing. The attempt to overcome such assumption and the dogmatism it involves fuels a turn to investigate knowing in order to establish the authority of cognition so as to proceed next to a nondogmatic knowledge of what is, on the basis of which nature might then be known a

priori. Ontology now gives way to epistemology as first philosophy, with any philosophy of nature awaiting the success of the preliminary investigation of knowing. That investigation can establish the objectivity of knowledge without reverting to dogmatic direct appeal to what is only if the object of knowing is determined by the structure of knowing. Only then can the investigation of knowing itself shed light on what can be known about objects.

Although this foundational epistemology is undertaken to pave the way for a nondogmatic metaphysics providing knowledge of being and, subsequently, of special types of being, such as nature and the reality of freedom, what holds true universally and necessarily of objectivity must now be established within the erstwhile preliminary investigation of knowing. Because all knowable objectivity will have to be determined by the selfsame structure of knowing, objects will all be subject to determination from without by an external necessity that applies equally to them all, no matter what they are. Accordingly, objectivity will be a realm of mechanistic determination, in which objects will be subject to laws of matter applying to all irrespective of their form or import. Knowable objectivity will thereby be a domain of objects governed by material laws of efficient causality, in which all objective processes will amount to lawful locomotion of matter. Kant, who pioneers this transcendental approach of foundational epistemology, acknowledges that nature, to the extent that it can be known, is a law-governed physical reality of phenomena. Accordingly, what universal and necessary knowledge can be obtained about nature must lie in nothing but the mechanics of bodies in motion as they can appear to the knowing that determines the form in which they are given in experience. Although Kant still maintains the pretense of following the *Critique of Pure Reason* with a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of freedom, he acknowledges that these must largely consist in amplifications of what is already mandated about knowable objects in general within foundational epistemology. Not surprisingly, when Kant develops his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, the philosophy of nature that is there developed applies the categories that determine objects of experience in general to material bodies in general. Kant maintains that reference to matter adds an empirical element, insofar as the forms of space and time and the categories bear upon physical nature only when the material of tactile sensation comes into play.<sup>6</sup> Matter, however, is itself abstract, being just as much a universal and necessary ingredient of outer experience as space and time or the categories that connect representations in terms of the forms of judgment. Hence, matter has

an a priori character that can allow for a priori knowledge of physical nature.

Whereas Kant does not give the categories and the judgments from which they derive any order of successive constitution, his a priori account of matter in motion necessarily begins with an account of the formal nature of motion, where matter enters in only as a point in space-time, devoid of any qualitative dimensions. This so-called phoronomy comes first, because the forms of motion must be provided for before any dynamic constitution of matter can be considered, which itself must precede any account of mechanics.<sup>7</sup> The dynamic constitution of matter out of moving forces of repulsion and attraction depends upon the construction of motion in general, just as the relation of bodies in mechanical interrelation presupposes the dynamic construction of matter that first enables bodies to fill space and physically interact.

Significantly, Kant's treatment of physical nature does not begin with space and or time but with motion, which involves place.<sup>8</sup> From the outset, reference to matter is at hand, as is the employment of space and time and the categories that allegedly determine objects of experience in general. Although matter figures in a so-called quantitative manner only at the start, the a priori account of corporeal nature invokes all the above factors as resources that the philosophy of nature can employ without having to establish them on its own.

In his foundational epistemology, however, Kant introduces space and time, as well as the categories and the forms of judgment, by simply stipulating their given roles in cognition. Not only does he claim that no explanation can possibly be provided for why space and time are our pure forms of intuition,<sup>9</sup> but he introduces his tables of judgments and categories as gifts of tradition,<sup>10</sup> while claiming that the categories cannot even be defined since any definition employs judgments that take them for granted.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, Kant introduces space and time as independent givens devoid of any intrinsic connection, even though he will argue in his "Refutation of Idealism" that time cannot be objectively apprehended without experience of objects in space.<sup>12</sup>

All these stipulations would leave the philosophy of nature unimpeached if foundational epistemology were capable of doing what Kant does not achieve: namely, establishing nondogmatically the character and role of space and time, as well as of the categories determining objects in general. In that case, starting with a formal account of matter in motion would not strangle the philosophy of nature with arbitrary assumptions. Kant's inability to escape pointing to space and time and the categories as irreducible assumptions is not, however, a failing of

just his own implementation of foundational epistemology. It is instead symptomatic of how the transcendental turn to investigate knowing cannot but make dogmatic claims about cognition. Any attempt to supplant ontology with epistemology as first philosophy makes claims about knowing that are just as immediate as those that foundational ontologists make about what is. To turn to investigate knowing without making knowledge claims about the given automatically presupposes that cognition is distinct from its object, since otherwise knowing cannot be investigated on its own. This equally renders the knowing under investigation different from the knowing of the foundational epistemologist, who knows a knowing that is not a knowing of knowing but a knowing of an object distinct from itself. Accordingly, the foundational epistemologist must take his or her own cognition for granted since a different cognition is what is put under scrutiny. As a consequence, any subsequent construction of objects in general (and of material objects in particular) will be relative to these assumptions. Further, since foundational epistemology must leave objectivity determined by the structure of knowing, whatever is mandated about corporeal nature remains an account of appearances as the subjectivity of knowing allegedly experiences them.

These difficulties call into question two defining features of the philosophy of nature that issues from the transcendental turn: the starting point with formal motion and the reduction of a priori knowledge of nature to a pure mechanics of matter in motion.<sup>13</sup>

### **The move to a systematic conception of nature**

The philosophy of nature is placed on a completely different footing once ontology and foundational epistemology are supplanted by Hegel's pioneering attempt to do philosophy without taking for granted anything about what is or anything about knowing. Presuppositionless philosophy can be launched with a science of logic to the extent that logic's thinking of thinking operates with the removal of any opposition between the subject and object of knowing. Any investigation that addresses a topic different from its own thinking must take for granted the knowing it employs as well as the boundaries of its subject matter. To eliminate these dual relativizing conditions, philosophy must overcome the opposition of topic and method – and this is precisely what logic undertakes by endeavoring to validly think valid thinking. Since, however, logic cannot begin with any given method of thinking or any preconception of thinking without question begging, logic must set out

with no determinate subject or object; that is, with indeterminacy. To the extent that determinacies arise, their development can constitute a theory of determinacy as well as a self-determined thinking of thinking. A theory of determinacy can begin only from indeterminacy, since any determinate starting point would take some determinacy for granted instead of accounting for determinacy. To the extent that the science of logic provides the theory of determinacy, it considers determinacy as such, be it given, determined, or self-determined, without any further qualification. Consequently, the categories that arise in logical development will not be categories of nature or of the psychologically realized thinking of mind, even if these nonlogical domains were to embody determinacies in general.

The move beyond the totality of determinacy to whatever can be something more than determinacy as such cannot legitimately be made by introducing any alleged givens or employing any added procedures of construction. Doing so would only reintroduce the problems of foundationalism and its reliance upon arbitrary assumptions that plague fundamental ontology and foundational epistemology. What is other to the self-developed totality of determinacy cannot derive its otherness from any extraneous source. The only possible nondogmatic basis for the otherness of nonlogical determinacy must lie in the totality of determinacy itself.

Moreover, the totality of determinacy must not only provide the only resource for what is other to itself but engender that otherness in virtue of nothing other than the consummation of its own totality. In other words, nonlogical determinacy can minimally consist in nothing other than the self-othering or the self-externality of the totality of determinacy.

This self-externality will be in virtue of nothing but logical determinacy, and for this reason, it can constitute the first and minimal determinacy of nonlogical determinacy. If it is to prove itself to be the minimal specification of nature, it will have a dual provisional character.

On the one hand, the self-externality of the totality of determinacy will constitute the primary determination of nature in the sense that it will involve no other natural determinations and will instead be contained by and underlie all further specifications of nature.

On the other hand, this minimal determinacy of nature will be the most basic specification of not just nature but every other nonlogical domain that incorporates and presupposes natural determinacy. Although nature will no longer be conceivable as something founded on privileged ontological givens or determining structures of knowing,

it will still be intermediary, falling necessarily between the self-development of determinacy and the development of the life of the mind. This is so because the world of mind must still presuppose nature insofar as rational agency operates theoretically and practically in a mind-independent natural world providing the enabling condition for individuals who can think and will and together enact the conventions and cultures composing history.

Together, these provisos stamp any development beyond the self-externality of the totality of determinacy with a dual identity. As the minimal threshold of nature, this self-externality will prove to be the initial specification from which the entirety of nature will constitute itself. As the minimal threshold for *all* nonlogical determinacy, this self-externality will end up being the most basic constituent in the totality of a universe containing intelligent life and the productions of rational agency, which culminate in the worldly philosophical engagements that conceive logic, nature, and mind. These dual identifications have important ramifications for how the philosophy of nature develops.

### **With what must the philosophy of nature begin?**

Hegel himself presents the starting point of the philosophy of nature as the result of the science of logic and identifies the transition as a free release whereby the logical totality becomes external to itself.<sup>14</sup> This release is free insofar as it does not depend upon any independent ground but results simply from the achieved closure of logic. That closure occurs when the development of determinacy arrives at a category, the Absolute Idea, forming a self-knowing that is at the same time the entire development of determinacy that it consummates. This renders the preceding whole self-transparent without reinstating any opposition between knowing and its object. It does, however, give that whole an immediate being insofar as it stands on its own without being mediated by anything else. Accordingly, as Hegel points out, the self-developed totality of determinacy is thereby external to itself in that it has a being in addition to its self-knowing process. This is expressed in how the self-externality of the Absolute Idea, which provides the minimal threshold of nonlogical determinacy, could be said to consist in logical totality further qualified by the immediacy of being.<sup>15</sup>

This characterization might suggest that the development of nature will consist in an application to the Absolute Idea of each one of the logical determinacies in the same order in which they occur within the



logical development. Several problems rule out this approach, which Edward Halper and Graham Schuster have advocated.<sup>16</sup>

On the one hand, such "development" would require a third party to reach back to the sequence of categories in logic and apply them in the same order to the successive determinations of nature. At each juncture, one natural determinacy would be followed by another not in virtue of what it is but thanks to an external application of a specific logical category extracted from the logical development, in which each category's specification entails a self-transformation engendering its own logical successor. Bringing the logical sequence to bear upon nature would reinstate a separation of method and subject matter and prevent nature from being developed in virtue of its own constitution.

It might be countered that no *deus ex machina* need intervene precisely because the logical categories develop themselves. The being that applies to the Absolute Idea is just as much a nothing that applies to the Absolute Idea, resulting in a becoming that applies to the Absolute Idea, and so forth. Admittedly, being may be nothing and nothing may be being and together constitute becoming. Their development, however, does not involve anything else that they carry along with them, whereas the unfolding of nature is the self-constitution of a natural totality that encompasses the emergent subject of its whole development.

If nature is to be presented without taking for granted its character, each successive determination must provide all that is required to constitute what immediately follows in the conception of nature. The only principle that can be at work in linking these conceptual stages together is the unity of the whole that emerges as the outcome of the whole development. This unity is not logical totality or the totality of determinacy *per se* but rather the unity of nature itself, which will prove to be a constituent in the self-constitution of the totality of mind. Different determinacies will have to enter into the further qualification of the totality of determinacy *per se*. Nonetheless, how they enter will depend upon what that further qualification consists of in its entirety at each step along the way. This is not just a matter of the additional categories supervening upon logical totality. It rather involves the whole that is at hand thanks to the combination of both.

At various junctures in the *Philosophy of Nature*, Hegel points out how the development of the concept of nature diverges from any direct application of the logical sequence to the Absolute Idea. For example, he notes that the concept of nature begins with categories of quantity rather than of quality, which occupy the first sections of the science of logic.<sup>17</sup> Elsewhere he notes how nature involves orderings that go beyond the

threefold differentiation of the concept (universality, particularity, and individuality).<sup>18</sup> These divergences do not signify that the concept of nature must rely upon contents found outside of what develops immanently from the self-externality of the totality of determinacy per se. Rather, they illustrate how the development of nonlogical determinacy has an ordering connected to its own specific content.

Space can be the starting point of the conception and reality of nature insofar as it is nothing but the self-externality of the totality of determinacy. Space is a self-standing totality, containing each particular space entirely within itself. Every aspect of space, however, is self-external, having itself beyond itself. The immediate otherness of the totality of space, the nonbeing of space, both falls within space and has itself outside itself. Namely, the point is the spatial negation of space that has another point external to itself, which, subject to the same externality, becomes a line. Yet the line, the negation of the point, is itself external to itself insofar as the line is bounded by another line bounded by yet another, giving rise to a plane. For its part, the plane is immediately self-external, yielding planes stacking continuously upon another other, producing a three-dimensional space, whose boundary can only be another volume in continuity with others without end.

All these determinations arise simply from the self-externality of the totality of determinacy and enable space to have its rudimentary character without presupposing time, motion, or matter. They do not arise by applying in succession nothing, becoming, and determinacy to the Absolute Idea but instead involve determinations of homogeneous continuity that underlie quantity.

As Hegel notes, space in and of itself is devoid of any real differences, which only place, motion, and matter can together provide. For this reason, space as such is absolute in the meager sense of lacking any of the abiding spatial differences that first allow for relative space and the differentiation of "inertial frames of reference."<sup>19</sup> What sets the stage for the constitution of determinate place is none other than space's own self-externality. Just as every otherness in space is self-external, so the infinite extension of voluminous space is external to itself in the only way in which spatial totality can be. Namely, space as a whole is self-external in the negation afforded by time, which consists in nothing other than the differentiation of space from itself at one moment from the next. Since space cannot help but be self-external, the spatial totality is immediately distinguished from itself in such a way that the external being of space once more gives way to itself without end. Since each moment of this self-supplanting succession is subject to the same self-removal,

each differentiated self-externality of space is a now, poised to revert to the past and usher in the future. Although Kant introduced time and space as inexplicable facts of "human intuition" with no intrinsic connection, his argument in the "Refutation of Idealism" reflects how time is dependent upon space for its own constitution. Although Kant there bases the dependence of time upon space on a reflection upon the prerequisites for being conscious of any objective temporal sequence, his argument ultimately illustrates how the passage of time is bound up with the abiding persistence of space from moment to moment.

Insofar as time brings spatial totality into an ever-regenerating self-externality, the spatial here has become a here *and* now, a spatiotemporal location providing the most abstract place. Situating itself both spatially and temporally, this place allows a particular space to extend in time and have duration while enabling a now to extend in space and have a determinate locale. Nonetheless, the continuity of space and time render one enduring and extended spatiotemporal location otherwise indistinguishable from any other. Insofar as every moment in time is just as much a now, poised between past and future, as any other and insofar as every particular space is located on the same terms as every other, one place cannot be kept apart from what bounds it in space-time. Since any proximate spatiotemporal location is just as much a place, distinguished from others in just the same way, place becomes different from itself. Thereby place gives rise to motion, wherein location differentiates itself in time, marking the change from one place to another in the passage of time, just as much as time differentiates itself in space, distinguishing one moment from another in successively altering positions.

Hegel compares these complementary sides of motion to the coming to be and ceasing to be in which becoming consists.<sup>20</sup> He thereupon suggests that motion resolves itself similarly to how the two sides of becoming cease their respective "transitions,"<sup>21</sup> giving rise to a paralyzed unity of being and nothing constituting determinacy. Ceasing to be ceases insofar as the nothing it arrives at is immediately being, just as coming to be ceases insofar as the being it engenders is immediately nothing. Analogously, although both sides of motion involve continuous alterations of spatiotemporal location, the change of place no less carries along the selfsame place, insofar as nothing more is at hand to distinguish one from another. This place, which remains at one with itself through its own alteration, retains its own enduring extension. Insofar as this enduring extension is self-related and thereby excludes relation to other, it provides a minimal spatiotemporal reality.

This resolves the great puzzle of accounting for matter, a puzzle analogous to the more radical conundrum of accounting for determinacy. The daunting problem in both cases is that the factor in need of an account cannot be determined by employing anything sharing in its character without question begging. Just as determinacy cannot be accounted for by using any determinate factors, so matter cannot be constituted out of any material constituents. Hegel's account of determinacy as the immediate unity of being and nothing solves the problem by using only the meager resources of the indeterminacies of being and nothing. Similarly, the emergence of a self-related exclusive enduring extension enables matter to be composed of the immaterial factors of space, time, and motion. Matter, minimally speaking, is just that which exclusively occupies an enduring extension. To do so, it must enduringly both keep itself external to itself while retaining its continuity. That is, matter must minimally comprise an enduring circumscribed field of coextensive forces of repulsion and attraction. A force field that exists for just a moment is indistinguishable from empty space-time, just as is a force field that endures but does not extend beyond a point. Matter must both endure and have a determinate volume and do so as self-related and exclusive. The most elementary nonlogical realization of that self-related exclusivity is a determinate force field conjoining repulsion and attraction.

Repulsion and attraction are logically inseparable. Repulsion has nothing to repel without attraction and otherwise disperses to an empty infinity, whereas attraction has nothing to attract without repulsion and otherwise collapses into an empty point. Although Kant eventually admits that repulsion and attraction cannot operate apart from one another,<sup>22</sup> his similar dynamic account of matter still begins by introducing repulsion and attraction as separately given forces while describing them in mechanical terms, as if the forces constitutive of matter could be explained in terms of the repulsion and attraction of one body and another.<sup>23</sup> The proper account must keep to the demands of structural priority, ensuring that nothing in the dynamic account of matter includes any material factors. This proviso rules out any role for mechanical relations, which presuppose material bodies.

Insofar as the dynamic constitution of matter out of the immaterial constituents of space, time, place, and motion is not specific to any particular place and motion, the exclusive being of matter allows for an indefinite plurality of bodies in an otherwise undetermined dispersal in space and time. Insofar as each determinate matter consists in the same type of force field of repulsion and attraction, the stage is set for bodies

to interact in mechanical terms, as well as to exert gravitational forces that operate both with respect to each body's own center of gravity and with respect to centers of gravity lying outside each one.

Significantly, the emergence of matter does incorporate a slew of logical categories, including aspects of becoming, reality, continuity and discreteness, and repulsion and attraction. It should be evident, however, that these categories do not figure in any strict replication of the order of their own logical development, which would require inserting *all* the categories between determinacy and quantity. Instead, the categories that do enter in take their place in terms of the constitution of nature, where what determines the order of treatment is how the content at hand comes to be internally structured. Time must follow space because temporality consists in the self-externality of spatial totality. Place must follow time because place involves spatiotemporal determination. Motion must follow place because motion consists in the self-alteration of place in terms of its dual parameters of space and time. Finally, matter must follow motion because matter minimally contains the self-relatedness of place within motion. The role of logical categories in these determinations of nature depends on what is immanent in nature rather than what is independently immanent in logic.

# 9

## The Limits of Intersubjectivity in Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit

### **Foundational versus antifoundational intersubjectivity**

Intersubjectivity may have always played a key role in the life of the mind, but its philosophical appreciation has waxed and waned. Today, intersubjectivity has become an all-too-coveted philosophical talisman. Holding center stage under the promotion of linguistic turns and other socialities of reason, intersubjectivity gets privileged as a juridical foundation, determining what counts as true, right, and beautiful. This foundational use and abuse of intersubjectivity has often been laid at the door of Hegel, who famously attended to "the I that is we and the we that is I." Yet it is not Hegel but the lingering tradition of transcendental philosophy that so enlists intersubjectivity in a cause that continues to obscure the proper place of intersubjectivity in mind.

Kant, almost despite himself, provides the impetus to this apotheosis of intersubjectivity. Questioning any theorizing about what is that does not first investigate knowing, Kant recognizes that cognition can be validated before knowing any particular objects only if two conditions are met. On the one hand, the object of knowing must be determined by the structure of knowing, and on the other hand, cognition must not be construed in any objectlike, worldly fashion. Unless knowing constitutes its object, the preliminary investigation of knowing cannot bear upon the objectivity of knowledge without reintroducing dogmatic claims about what is. Conversely, if knowing is construed with any worldly character, it forfeits its objectivity-constituting role and becomes defined by objective contents presupposed rather than constituted by knowing. For these reasons, Kant describes knowing in the nonobjective terms of a disembodied conscious ego opposing the world whose lawful nature it constructs.

Although this seems to enable epistemology to supplant ontology as first philosophy, it has an immediate consequence that casts in doubt the transcendental turn's foundational epistemology. Insofar as the preliminary critique of knowing renders the conditions of knowing the *nonobjective* determiner of objectivity, these conditions cannot possibly be an object for the cognition they make possible. This leaves the knowing of knowing just as inexplicable and unexamined as dogmatic philosophy's contemplative knowing of being.

To escape this difficulty without reverting to dogmatism or abandoning foundational epistemology, legions of post-Kantians have followed a now prevailing common strategy. They have taken the conditions of knowing from their hidden concealment as "noumenal" subjectivity and reconfigured them as worldly practices of actual individuals engaging in linguistic interaction or some other intersubjective process of "social" cognition. By these means, the conditions of knowing become part of the objectivity they supposedly constitute, enabling them to be known by the same knowing they make possible. Yet if worldly cognition is to transcendently constitute objectivity without dogmatic reference to the given, everything knowable about that objectivity must be constructed by that cognitive activity. Every being in the world, however, whether the singular *Dasein* of embodied, needful, caring subjectivity or the interaction of living individuals, involves an independently given environment and a naturally given animal organism presupposed by any theoretical or practical engagement. If, then, the intersubjective process of knowing cannot occur apart from encompassing objective conditions, intersubjectivity can never perform the Archimedean constituting to which the transcendental turn is committed. What Husserl branded "psychologism" now recurs with an intersubjective vengeance: objective features must be presupposed to make up the epistemological foundation supposed to constitute objectivity.

Whether reverting to otherworldly "noumenal" subjectivity or holding fast to worldly conditions of knowing, foundational epistemology arrives at an impasse: it can no more account for its own knowing of knowing than it can legitimate the characterization it gives the alleged conditions of knowing.

No thinker is more acutely aware of these dilemmas than Hegel. He recognizes that any attempt to distinguish what confers normativity from what possesses normativity involves an appeal to foundations that undermines itself. However a foundation be characterized, so long as it imparts validity to what it founds, it cannot meet its own validation standard unless it founds itself. Yet precisely by grounding itself,

the erstwhile foundation removes the distinction between validator and validated, eliminating foundational justification and transforming normativity into self-determination.

This outcome haunts knowing so long as it is construed in terms of what Hegel describes as the opposition of consciousness, confronting a predetermined object, which then serves as the standard for judging the truth of knowledge. Consciousness psychologically exhibits the difference between knowing and its object by treating its mental content as the determination of something given that consciousness opposes. The polarity of this psychological configuration is held to be generic to cognition by foundational epistemology, for knowing can be preliminarily investigated only by itself, without making claims about objects, if knowing is distinct from its object. Then, however, the knowing of knowing by the foundational epistemologist cannot be equivalent to the knowing it investigates, for the latter cognition knows an object distinct from itself, whereas transcendental cognition has knowing as its object. Consequently, foundational epistemology cannot critique its own cognition in examining the knowing under preliminary investigation.

The thinking that operates on the basis of this opposition is what formal logic models, for formal logic regards thought as intrinsically empty, having nothing to think about other than independently given contents to which the same indifferent form of thought gets externally applied. Such thinking can never establish the truth of any content but only address given terms and analyze what they consistently contain. Under the assumption that knowing and its object are distinct, the assumption governing both foundational epistemology and formal logic, knowledge can have its validity conferred only by corresponding to the given it confronts. This leaves the legitimacy of its presupposed standard always in question until the difference between knowing and its object is overcome, removing the separation between what confers and what possesses truth. The dilemma of foundational justification, however, is not restricted to knowing but applies in every juridical sphere, which is why, as Hegel uncompromisingly shows, normativity in theory amounts to conceptual self-development, normativity in conduct consists in the reality of self-determination, and normativity in fine art consists in autonomously uniting meaning and configuration.

It is thus completely ludicrous how so many thinkers who treat intersubjectivity as a juridical foundation claim to draw their inspiration from Hegel, whose foundation-free systematic philosophy constitutes the greatest refutation of their entire enterprise. That Hegel does draw attention to intersubjectivity has nothing to do with treating it as a privileged



ground from which knowledge, conduct, or beauty gets juridically determined. Leaving truth, right, and beauty undetermined by any foundation, Hegel conceives intersubjectivity as a constitutive element in the psychological reality of mind, the different spheres of right composing ethics, and the cultural domains of fine art, religion, and philosophy. In this nonjuridical role, intersubjectivity remains indispensable to every normative domain without subverting all their respective autonomies, as would occur if intersubjectivity figured instead as a transcendental condition.

Intersubjectivity first becomes thematic in the philosophy of mind, where subjectivity obtains a nonlogical being as the actual centralized individuality of an animal organism that can interact with others. Nothing of epistemological significance can here lie at stake. Philosophical psychology may provide an account of the psychological enabling conditions of thought and philosophical investigation in general, but it cannot thereby distinguish between the true and false conceptions mind equally makes possible. Doing so would render aspects of mind epistemological foundations, plagued by the dilemmas subverting any foundational justification, whereas the reality of mind is completely neutral among all the possibilities of theorizing it commonly enables. Hegel, in contrast to those who conflate epistemology and the philosophy of mind, strictly conceives the psychological reality of intersubjectivity without imparting any juridical, transcendental role to it. Moreover, unlike those who take mind to be totally “socially” determined, Hegel shows how at each stage of mental activity, mind has aspects independent of other individuals, which enable intersubjective relationships through which mind then acquires further dimensions irreducible to the single self. This interplay between subjective and intersubjective endowments has important ramifications, which, if ignored, preclude comprehending how mind can become conscious and achieve linguistic intelligence.

### **Intersubjectivity and the psyche**

The most elementary mental domain in which subjects both relate to themselves and relate to one another is the preconscious sphere of the psyche. It arises once the living organism has supplanted the local sensitivity and responsiveness of plant tropisms with the centralized sentience and motility of animal irritability. The emergent psyche first feels its own feelings without distinguishing them from itself as determinations of an independent otherness from which mind has extricated itself as a

conscious ego confronting objectivity. Self-feeling must precede sensation of an other, for mind must relate to its own feelings before it can distinguish itself from them and thereby confront anything objective. Awake but not yet differentiating subject and object, the psyche can thus form the primary stage in the mental maturation of the newborn individual or in the phylogenic ascent of animal species from least to most completely endowed minds. Meanwhile, the psyche can also remain a background horizon of mood and feeling accompanying consciousness and intelligence once these mental shapes have emerged.

At the outset, where mind as psyche still communes just with itself while interacting with its biosphere, there might seem to be little opportunity for intersubjective relationships. Indeed, as Hegel conceives the psyche, its primary developments consist in habituation and expression, both products of the psyche's feeling of its own feelings.<sup>1</sup> Although mind first feels the immediately given mental modifications produced by internal and external sources, the occurrence of its own feeling activity further modifies its own subsequent activity as a psyche. Namely, mind's feeling of its own feelings gives rise to habituations to repeated feelings and movements whereby mind detaches itself from their happenings, opening that divide between mind and its mental content from which can arise the subject-object opposition of consciousness. Habituation allows mind to free its attention from current feelings and obtain a universal character consisting in self-engendered dispositions of recurrent self-feeling and self-movement. This generalizing detachment takes further root through the expression of feeling in bodily manifestations. Expression enables mind to make its body an instrument for manifesting its feeling self, setting the stage for communication to others.

Nonetheless, neither habituation nor expression involves in and of itself any relations between psyches. Although one conscious individual might become habituated to certain feelings and behavior under the influence of a parent or lawgiver wielding punishments and rewards, the habituation of the psyche simply arises from repeated feelings and motions, whatever their provenance. Similarly, as much as the expression of feeling can be directed to another individual of whom the expressing subject is aware, the psyche expresses its feeling without having to be conscious of anything.

Nonetheless, Hegel does refer to unconscious interactions between minds whereby the psychosomatic unity of one can influence that of another without any explicit mutual awareness of one another. He mentions, for example, how the mood and feelings of a pregnant woman can influence the psyche of her fetus,<sup>2</sup> just as a conscious individual put

into an unconscious trance can be subject to hypnotic suggestion, where the hypnotist affects the hypnotized subject.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, the psyche feels sexual urges, even if mind may not yet be conscious of any object of sexual desire. This may be true of an infant, whose mind has yet to organize its feelings as sensations of an other or achieve self-control of its own motility.

Underlying all these intimations of intersubjective relations of psyches is a more basic enduring interaction, on which the whole life of the mind seemingly depends. This interaction consists in the fundamental dependency of the newborn individual upon the deliberate care of some guardian. As Macmurray observes,<sup>4</sup> the human being is distinguished by an almost unparalleled inability to do anything at birth besides making loud and clear its need for a caregiver. Any further survival depends upon periodic encounters with some empathetic caregiver, relation with which will therefore play a primary role in subsequent psychological maturation. Consequently, the entire further development of the psyche, consciousness, and intelligence will proceed upon this original intersubjective relationship of dependent newborn and responsive caregiver.

One could question whether the radical dependency of newborn humans is a contingent peculiarity of *Homo sapiens* that need not apply to finite rational agents in general. After all, why could a potentially rational animal organism not be born self-sufficient enough to survive immediately on its own and mentally mature without the intersubjective necessities of human nurturing? Then could mental development proceed in a radically egological manner, with the individual solitarily acquiring not only habits and the ability for expression but consciousness and whatever aspects of intelligence can operate without the intersubjectivity of linguistic practice? And what mental facilities, if any, would be lacking if some such individual were to live in preverbal isolation?

## **Intersubjectivity and consciousness**

Hegel provides an important answer to these questions in his analysis of consciousness, where he shows how mind cannot achieve any abiding self-consciousness without engaging in a recognition process involving two conscious individuals. This famous investigation of reciprocal recognition has been fundamentally misunderstood by most commentators, who have ignored how Hegel conceives consciousness as something systematically preceding intelligence in the self-constitution of the reality of mind. Most modern theorists of consciousness have

followed Kant in presuming that consciousness is fundamentally discursive, insofar as representations can supposedly only convey something objective if they are necessarily connected by conceptual relationships. On this basis, consciousness becomes dependent on conceptualization, which has the further consequence, to the extent that thinking requires language for its expression, that consciousness cannot be had apart from linguistic interaction.

These conclusions have two implausible ramifications. First, preverbal children and dumb animals cannot be ascribed any consciousness, despite all behavioral evidence to the contrary. Second, language would have to be originally created and later acquired by individuals who can neither be conscious nor self-conscious prior to becoming linguistically competent. Yet how can individuals lacking consciousness either engage in the original formation of language or learn language from other linguistically competent individuals? With only a psyche, such individuals would be unable to distinguish anything objective from themselves. They therefore could not recognize other interlocutors or their verbal expressions or the common world of objects to which these expressions refer. For all these reasons, unless consciousness can be prelinguistic, the emergence of linguistic intelligence becomes inexplicable.

Hegel's account of consciousness overcomes this dilemma by showing how consciousness can have sense-certainty, perception, and understanding without having to think or say anything and how, on this basis, consciousness can then become self-conscious by engaging in a completely nonverbal reciprocal relation with another consciousness. This not only allows preverbal children and dumb animals to be conscious and, in some cases, to become self-conscious but makes intelligible how linguistic intelligence can arise. In so doing, Hegel's account also sets definite limits to what the nondiscursive psyche and consciousness can accomplish apart from intersubjective relations.

Sense-certainty, perception, and understanding all constitute shapes of consciousness that involve neither thinking nor intersubjectivity. In order for mind to develop from the psyche's self-communing feeling of its own feeling as psyche to conscious sensation of objectivity, mind must disengage itself from the mental content of the psyche and confront that same content as the determination of something other to itself. This disengagement minimally requires two correlative unifications: the unification of the subject in distinction from its own mental content and the independent unification of that content, allowing it to oppose the subject as something nonsubjective. Hegel's account of the development of the psyche through habituation and expression provides the

psychological bases for this dual disengagement and unification. With habituation enabling mind to distance itself from its own feeling as a generalized seat of dispositions and with the psychosomatic existence of the individual coming to express a self residing within, mind is ready to awaken from feeling its own psyche to sensing something confronting it.

When consciousness transforms the self-feeling of the psyche into the sensation of the given, it is certain that something objective confronts it, but otherwise consciousness has no resources for further distinguishing or describing what that given is. Although feeling has a manifold content resulting from the interaction of the individual's sentient organism with its biosphere, awareness of feeling as sensation does not discriminate what it thereby senses. Hence, sense-certainty is in no position to differentiate its manifold to relate therein to any other sensing consciousness, let alone to apprehend anything universal.<sup>5</sup>

When consciousness advances from sense-certainty of what is to perception of determinate things, mind does so merely by grouping together certain aspects of its manifold, which thereby encompass the properties of a thing, which itself consists in nothing more than being the substrate to which they belong. This does not involve conceiving any universals, engaging in any speech acts, or interacting with any other perceivers. Perception simply involves consciousness differentiating the content it senses in the most rudimentary way, separating and combining the manifold. Through this act, things are perceived through their properties, without being further determined in virtue of any relations of universality, particularity, or individuality.<sup>6</sup> Given this lack of discursive description, perception can be ascribed to preverbal children as well as to dumb animals.

The same is true of consciousness's understanding of the dynamic relations of things in terms of force and its expression. Once more, mind employs no concepts to understand how things and their properties are posited by some underlying power. Consciousness simply ascribes to the given the same movement that perceiving mind itself employs in tying properties to an underlying thing. Just as perception requires no discursive comprehension, so force can be experienced without having to think or say anything. In this regard, it is no accident that Hegel conceives the relations of thing and property, force and expression, and law within the *Logic of Essence*, where the two-tiered difference between determiner and determined has yet to be overcome.<sup>7</sup> Only when determiner and determined get equalized through reciprocity can self-determination arise and with it the conceptual relationships of

universality, particularity, and individuality on which discursive rationality depends. Consequently, preverbal children and dumb animals can understand the workings of force and employ force in their interaction with the world. All they need do is externalize the mental movement they already employ in perceiving things and become conscious of positing as an objective phenomenon.

Whereas consciousness can engage in sense-certainty, perception, and understanding without being discursive or partaking in any intersubjective relationship, Hegel's account of recognitive desire shows how mind cannot become conscious of itself in any enduring fashion without interacting with another consciousness.<sup>8</sup>

The problem with achieving self-consciousness is that consciousness, unlike the psyche, is constitutively aware of something opposing it. For this reason, mind cannot become self-conscious unless the self confronts it through something else from which consciousness is disengaged. Desire can exhibit the fleeting power of the self in the purely negative consumption of the independent objectivity of an object of appetite.<sup>9</sup> Yet this confrontation with subjectivity's nullification of the opposing being of its object leaves no abiding objective presence for the self. Unlike the realization by practical intelligence of some end in a positively transformed objectivity, appetitive desire achieves satisfaction by negating its object of appetite, leaving nothing behind but the same opposition where consciousness confronts an independent objectivity whose particular things can always become appetitively desired once more. Since thought and speech play no role in appetitive desire, preverbal children and dumb animals can each satisfy their appetites in this rudimentary form of a completely negative, transient self-consciousness.

Any more abiding self-consciousness, however, requires that consciousness become aware of the self as an enduring object that can confront consciousness as such only when consciousness relates to another conscious self. If, however, consciousness relates to another self as just an object of appetite, the achievement of satisfaction will obliterate the existence of that other, whose death will leave consciousness once more confronting a world of objects instead of another consciousness. To maintain the existence of the other and recognize it as *another* consciousness, consciousness must relate to that other self in a way that allows that other to reflect consciousness's own consciousness in an objective manner. That is, not only must consciousness confront another self, but the self it confronts must relate to it in explicit function of consciousness's own awareness. Only then will consciousness be aware of itself in being aware of that other. Moreover, that other will

only reflect consciousness to itself if the self confronting consciousness exhibits the same structure possessed by consciousness. Only then will consciousness be able to recognize that other as *another self-consciousness*, as like what it itself thereby becomes.

What is crucial to Hegel's account of the ensuing reciprocal recognition is that it does not involve intelligence or, more specifically, linguistic interaction. Instead, the relationship proceeds through mutual desire, whose means of expression and satisfaction are already provided by the preverbal, nondiscursive resources of the psyche and consciousness.

To become aware of one's own self-consciousness through the expression of desire of another, that desire must reflect one's own consciousness of self. This cannot occur if the other's desire is simply for oneself. In that case, one figures merely as an object of desire rather than a subject of desire. In order for the other's desire to reflect one's own desire, the other must desire one's desire. Moreover, in order for the other to thereby recognize the other's own desire, the desire for the other must be a desire for the desire of the other as well. Then, in the reciprocal expression of one's desire for the desire of the other, each party confronts another self whose consciousness reflects the consciousness of one another. By means of this interrelationship of cognitive desire, individuals become self-conscious.

Moreover, because each self-consciousness is tied to consciousness of another self-consciousness, self-consciousness is aware at one blow of the universality of its own awareness and the identity of itself and its object (another self-consciousness).

This does not require any verbal expression nor any thinking of any conceptual content. All that is needed is for the participants to give perceivable expression to their desire for one another's desire, something made possible by the psyche's ability to express feelings and consciousness's ability to perceive those expressions and comprehend them as such.

## **Intersubjectivity and intelligence**

The constitution of universal self-consciousness in reciprocal cognitive desire opens the door to intelligence by confronting conscious awareness with the identity of consciousness and its object. This does not overcome the opposition of consciousness because this identity confronts consciousness as its object. Nevertheless, it gives consciousness the shape of reason by rendering it aware of the correctness of its

object, which is known to be in accord with subjectivity. Consciousness now exhibits reason insofar as it has as its object the unity of subject and object, the unity that all rationality presupposes in setting out to observe a world inherently within its grasp.

Consciousness thereby paves the way for the emergence of intelligence. Mind attains intelligence once its mental contents no longer just relate it to its own subjectivity, as in psyche, nor simply constitute the determination of something objective from which it is disengaged, as in consciousness. Instead, mind becomes intelligence by relating to its own mental contents as determinations of both itself and an independent object, first as immediately given in intuition, then as reflected in representation, and finally as self-mediated in thought.

Significantly, Hegel nowhere introduces intersubjective relations in his accounts of these three stages of theoretical intelligence. Mind intuitively treats its mental content as both immediately given and in immediate relation to something objective, without thereby interacting with any other mind.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, when mind engages in representation, supplanting intuitions with images, it treats its mental content as its own product, as well as about something objective, without relating to another mind.<sup>11</sup> Finally, when mind reaches the threshold of thought by producing signs of general representations, Hegel still does not involve other selves in the activity of semiotic imagination that provides the medium for thinking.<sup>12</sup>

This absence of intersubjectivity might seem unproblematic when intuition is at stake, since the immediacy of intuition leaves little room for mind's direct relation to its object having to depend upon any relation to another self. Similarly, when mind advances from intuition to image, the reproductive imagination of representation has no need of bringing into play any intersubjective interaction.

When semiotic imagination is at stake, however, one must wonder whether Hegel's neglect of intersubjectivity leaves his account prey to the objections that Wittgenstein directs at any private language conception. Hegel seems content to explain the generation of signs as the work of an individual mind, which produces an intuitable content to which that mind associates a general representation without engaging in any interaction with others.<sup>13</sup> Yet how can any sign have a communicable meaning if all its maker correlates it with is an internal representation to which no one else has access? Does this not entail the dilemma to which Wittgenstein alludes in describing the predicament of individuals, each having a box in which no one else can gaze, each coining the same word to indicate what lies inside?<sup>14</sup> How can such a word have any



definite meaning when no intersubjective standard is available to fix its significance?

What compounds this problem is that Hegel's explanation of sign generation seems to conflate signs and names, rooting semiotic meaning in ostensive, demonstrative reference to independent things.<sup>15</sup> Because Hegel introduces signs as designating general representations that themselves abstract from intuitions, such signs refer to representations that ultimately have intuited things as their objects. This appears to resurrect Augustine's account of language, which treats words as naming objects, reducing sentences to combinations of names whose meaning is always some object to which each word immediately refers.<sup>16</sup> Wittgenstein duly lambastes this account in the opening of his *Philosophical Investigations*, showing how Augustine's exclusive reliance upon ostensive reference fatally ignores all context sensitivity and syntactical determination of linguistic meaning.<sup>17</sup>

These objections might have relevance if Hegel's account of sign formation were to amount to a theory of language. Yet they lose their force when one considers just what Hegel here is attempting to conceive. It turns out that Hegel's monological account of semiotic imagination conceives, not language formation, but rather a key psychological development without which linguistic interaction is impossible.

This development, whereby signs are produced for the first time, involves a conjunction of elements, mobilizing psychological resources provided by the psyche, consciousness, and the preverbal acts of intelligence exhibited in intuition and representation. To produce signs, mind must have at its disposal nothing more than what is already involved in pictorial representation. Mind must have generated images from intuitions, reproducing internally what it finds given both in its own mental content and as something objective. Having internalized images, abstracting them from the immediate context in which their intuitions of origin are immersed, mind can now associate these mental products and produce general representations that each present a content shared by a plurality of others to which they are thereby connected.

Signs arise when mind produces an intuitable factor to which it associates some general representation, whose content is otherwise indifferent to the factor that designates it. This indifference is what distinguishes signs from symbols, which still retain an element of pictorial representation, insofar as the content of the symbol is related to what it symbolizes – as, for example, the lion symbolizes courage.

What allows mind to produce an intuitable factor in the first place is the embodied subjectivity of the psyche, whose development of habit and

expression generally enables the individual to make something external an expression of an internal mental content. Consciousness enables mind to apprehend this intuitable factor as something it confronts, whereas the imagination of intelligence allows mind to generate general representations, abstracted from prior intuitions, and then to associate a general representation with the produced factor it intuits. This relation between general representation and intuited sign can then itself be reproduced as a semiotic memory, whereby intelligence internalizes the link between sign and its meaning. With this internalization, the semiotic relation can then itself be reproduced and recognized, formulating a word that designates some general representation for the individual who has internalized its sign. All this proceeds without any relationship with other minds.

Admittedly, these constituent elements of sign formation do not alone provide a communicable meaning, for all the reasons that Wittgenstein exposes in his private language argument. Nor do they compose an engagement in thinking, since the sign designates a general representation that is itself still pictorial in character. Yet without the prior emergence of signs, individuals are in no position to participate in linguistic interaction enabling them to conceptualize.

Already, Hegel's accounts of nondiscursive consciousness and cognitive desire have provided crucial prerequisites for any engagement in "language games," including the elementary "triangulation" by which communicable words might be ostensibly established. After all, unless individuals can be prelinguistically conscious of things, other selves, and themselves, they can hardly distinguish one another or recognize anything as the linguistic expression of anyone or confront a recognizably common world to which such expression refers. Now, the ability to produce and recognize signs without yet engaging in language provides the last prerequisite for linguistic interaction to get off the ground.

Those who deny the prelinguistic psychological realization of semiotic imagination cannot possibly make sense of the origin or actuality of language. In order for a sign to be given any meaning, some mind must intuit that sign and intend that it be about that to which it refers. This applies to the assignment of any name to some factor, as well as to the naming of any "natural kind." In either case, the content expressed by the sign is prefigured in the content of the mental state of the mind that associates the intuited sign with the general representation comprising its meaning. Otherwise, the sign cannot designate anything specific and figure as more than an intuited thing.

Admittedly, as Jerry Fodor points out,<sup>18</sup> a vicious circularity would arise if the meaning given the sign already consisted in a word. That would be

the case if, for example, the assignment of the word *water* to samples of water depended upon a prior comprehension that those samples exemplify the concept “water.” Then the attribution of meaning to the sign would require that that meaning be thought prior to the baptism of the sign, as if the thought could be represented without using any semiotic expression.

What escapes this dilemma is the salient feature of Hegel’s account of semiotic imagination: that the meaning of the sign is not a concept but a general representation. A general representation does not need language for its expression and indeed can be fully accessed only by imagination insofar as it remains a pictorial representation, still confined to the form of image. For this reason, semiotic imagination can be deployed by individuals who have yet to participate in linguistic interaction.

Accordingly, sign-making individuals can enter an intersubjective relationship in which mental contents they individually associate in semiotic imagination can be expressed to one another in relation to commonly observed objects, actions, and expressions. In this intersubjective context, semiotic imagination can overcome the limitations of “private language” and be a constituent of a shared practice in which communicable meanings become established.

Moreover, once mind exercises mechanical verbal memory, relating words to one another without connection to any general representations, individuals can engage in purely conceptual discourse, where terms no longer designate empirical things. The isolated engagement of mechanical memory may only associate words in rote indifference to their pictorial significance, but this sets the stage for individuals to participate in a linguistic interaction where words can express thoughts for which no image is adequate.

In this way, Hegel’s account of mind provides the psychological resources enabling its own realization in the intersubjectivity of discourse. How this occurs is something for us to determine, for we would be systematically mistaken in thinking that Hegel has provided an account of language and of the linguistic expression of reason.

# 10

## Economy and Ethical Community

One of the most pathbreaking achievements of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* is its conception of the economy as a system of needs belonging to civil society, which is one of three spheres of ethical community, intermediary between the family and the state. Nonetheless, Hegel's identification of the economy as an element of ethical community has been pervasively ignored or misinterpreted, leading Hegel to be commonly placed among the many who question the ethical standing of economic relations and thereby place modernity under suspicion.

To some degree this suspicion derives from a fundamental misunderstanding of the foundation-free character of ethics in general, which Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* seeks to realize without compromise. Hegel is the first to recognize that ethics can be neither a science of a highest good nor a procedural construction because what is normative cannot derive its legitimacy from any foundation, be it a privileged given content or a privileged determiner. If what is ethical has its normativity conferred upon it by something other than itself, the ground conferring validity upon it cannot have validity of its own unless it grounds itself. In that case, however, the foundation of normativity ceases to be a ground of something other than itself. This eliminates the ground/grounded distinction upon which foundational justification rests and supplants it with self-determination as the one and only possible bearer of normativity. For this reason, ethics must be a philosophy of the reality of self-determination; that is, a philosophy of right.

Moreover, ethics as a philosophy of right will simply specify the structures of self-determination in their totality without offering any derivation of these structures from any antecedently given end or procedure of construction. The absence of any such mainstays of foundational justification has misled many readers of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* to doubt

its status as an ethics at all. Hegel, however, recognizes that the only “derivation” of the concept of right can consist in the conceptualization of nature and the psychology of the psyche, consciousness, and intelligence, which together provide the enabling, normatively neutral conditions for engagement in self-determination.<sup>1</sup> These cannot determine what conduct is legitimate because they make equally possible all action, right or wrong.

### **The persisting doubts of the economy’s ethical standing**

Once this fundamental confusion is overcome by understanding why the philosophy of right has no juridical foundations, there still remain two seeming grounds for doubting the ethical standing of the economy.

The first lies in a persisting suspicion regarding the ethical standing of civil society. This suspicion is fueled by Hegel’s own remarks that civil society can be regarded as the *appearance* of ethical community insofar as individuals therein pursue their individual self-interest.<sup>2</sup> To many, this suggests that civil society is a field of the war of all against all, leading back to the starting point of social contract theory, which privileges the liberty of choice as if it could serve as a principle of ethical construction.

Needless to say, treating the individual will as a foundation of normativity contradicts the whole framework of ethical community. Ethical community constitutes that reality of freedom in which agents determine themselves in function of performing roles that can be engaged in only by acting within the existing normative association that these roles animate and sustain.

Ethical community has been misappropriated by communitarians who regard the contextual character of its agency as the only feasible vehicle for providing nonsubjective norms of conduct. Hegel conceives ethical community as a conceptually determinate association with a priori rights and duties. By contrast, communitarians treat ethical community as a formal framework whose rights and duties are contingently given but which still allows individuals to pursue ends that have an intersubjective validity insofar as they can be pursued only by participating in a community in which membership involves acting in recognition of commonly accepted norms. Communitarianism cannot overcome nihilism because the contingency of the content of every ethical community leaves its members subject to an order that is just an accident of history that might as well be overthrown and replaced with another just as arbitrary.

Hegel recognizes that ethical community cannot have any binding authority unless it is a system of associations concretely realizing self-determination, in which normativity resides. Whether civil society in general and the economy in particular are constitutive elements of ethical community must therefore be conceptually determined in terms of the Idea of freedom and not just supported by historical illustration.

In this connection, it is important to take seriously what Hegel argues concerning how civil society can be regarded as the "appearance" of ethical community. Indeed, civil society is the appearance of ethical community because its members act on the basis of ends of their own individual choosing. Nonetheless, in so doing, they realize an underlying ethical bond whose existence as a specific framework of interaction is the precondition of each member of civil society being in a position of acting in relation to others in function of self-selected particular ends.<sup>3</sup> This underlying ethical bond is not itself the end members of civil society consciously pursue. Rather, they each aim to realize particular ends of their own choosing but under the general condition of pursuing ends that can be realized only by enabling others to realize self-selected particular ends of their own in return. This can be achieved only under a very specific social condition where individuals are already recognized to be persons, moral subjects, and autonomous family members, free to pursue a particular interest as a right; that is, as an exercise of choice to which all members of civil society are entitled and which all members have a duty to respect. Indeed, the specific modality of civil freedom is one in which individuals can determine themselves in a civil way only by recognizing the civil freedom of others and enjoying their recognition in turn. For this reason, the all-sided pursuit of self-interest in civil society is not a war of all against all but rather an exercise of freedom in which each individual's efforts to realize particular ends are intrinsically connected to the like realizations of others. Far from representing an obstacle to the individual's pursuit, the pursuit of interest by others is precisely what makes it possible for one's own interest to be realized. That is why civil society is a structure of ethical community, enabling a freedom to be realized that can operate only on the basis of an existing framework of interdependence that makes possible exercising the right of pursuing particular interests, whose exercise animates and sustains that very framework. The interests in question are not equivalent to the ends of choice, of doing as one pleases. They rather are interests that are mediated by the civil freedom of others, which is to say that they have a content allowing them to be realized without conflicting with the civil interests of others.

If this allows civil society to qualify as a genuine sphere of civil society, the ethical standing of the economy is still held in suspicion insofar as, secondly, it is commonly doubted whether economic relations are compatible with proper civil association. Whether the economy can qualify as a duly ethical civil association has been widely questioned on the basis of none other than Hegel's own analysis of the system of needs.

Hegel, after all, does not accept Adam Smith's sanguine view that the market is a self-regulating mechanism that ensures the welfare of all. Hegel instead maintains that the conditions of market participation can never be counted on to enable individuals to satisfy their needs for the commodities of others and that poverty haunts the operations of the market so long as it is left to its own devices.<sup>4</sup> Poverty is a wrong, for it consists in a violation of the right of members of civil society to realize particular interests of their own choosing in reciprocity with others. Poverty here consists not in the deprivation of just the necessities of life, to which personhood entitles individuals, nor of the resources required for parents to care for their children and spouses to care for one another. Poverty violates social right as well insofar as it deprives individuals of the specifically economic resources they need to enjoy the equal opportunity to earn a conventional living in the market.

If the economy is incapable of freeing itself from the scourge of this socially specific poverty, does the economy not forfeit its standing as a compatible element of civil society? Moreover, if, as Hegel himself maintains, the economy finds itself compelled to engage in colonial and imperialist expansion to obtain the additional market demand and raw materials and cheap labor it needs,<sup>5</sup> does this not further highlight its subversion of the relations of right? In addition, does not the production, at home and abroad,<sup>6</sup> of an unemployed and underemployed rabble, alienated from the institutions in which it has no viable stake, jeopardize ethical community not only in society but in the family and the state, rendering the economy a threat to the entire system of freedom presided over by self-government?

Finally, does not the insecurity of economic welfare engendered by the market put family and political rights in direct jeopardy? The lack of economic equal opportunity threatens the welfare of the family and the ability of spouses to duly care for one another and for parents to duly care for their children. Just as poverty impairs the ability of citizens to participate in the political process on a par with others, so the concentration of wealth threatens to translate economic privilege into political privilege, undermining equal political opportunity by enabling the power of money to condition the political process.

Each of these violations of economic right, equal economic opportunity, and their associated threats to family and political freedom would call the ethical standing of the economy into question only if they could not be remedied without eliminating all exercise of economic self-determination. In that case alone would they signify that economic freedom is inherently contradictory and incapable of any abiding realization. If, instead, these violations can each be remedied by additional engagements in freedom, then the endemic possibility of violations of economic right is no different from the endemic possibility of violations of every other right. After all, because engagement in self-determination involves individuals who have a choosing will, individuals can always opt to ignore their duty to respect the rights of others and take malicious actions that intentionally overstep the lawful boundaries of the prerogatives to which they are entitled as self-determining persons, moral subjects, family member, civilians, and citizens. Wherever these possible violations occur, they ought to be countered. Although moral duty obliges individuals personally to take an initiative to right these wrongs, public measures will be required to insure that all the rights of individuals are upheld in an authoritative and lawful manner. Moreover, to the extent that the exercise of right involves personal initiatives that may be interpreted differently by others, every sphere of right allows for the possibility of nonmalicious wrongs, where individuals act in respect of right but still conflict with the exercise of right of others. Property rights exhibit these dual forms of violations in their most basic form. Persons can always maliciously violate the property of others or enter into nonmalicious property disputes,<sup>7</sup> and the private efforts of persons to right these wrongs may always be interpreted by others as a new wrong.<sup>8</sup> Accordingly, property rights cannot be upheld in and through their own exercise or with the supplement of personal moral intervention. Instead, their realization depends upon a public administration of justice, which itself ultimately depends upon constitutional self-government for its final authority and empowerment.

The situation need not be any different with economic right. The workings of the market may leave commodity owners with no guarantee of enjoying equal economic opportunity and escaping the scourges of poverty, unsafe and unhealthy employment, environmental degradation, and conditions of work that prevent them from exercising their family and political freedoms on a par with others. Nonetheless other exercises of freedom can forestall these social injustices, and Hegel outlines the basic parameters for this righting of social wrong in describing the tasks



that social interest groups ("corporations") and the public administration of welfare ("police") should address.<sup>9</sup>

Moreover, although the concentration of wealth and economic power may threaten equal political opportunity, public intervention to protect self-government from domination by economic privilege can seek to prevent the economy from undermining not only civil freedom and family welfare but the sovereign autonomy of political freedom. So long as these private and public efforts are not completely futile, the injustice of an unbridled market does not rob the economy of its ethical standing any more than the abiding possibility of theft and murder robs property rights of normative validity.

### **The common denials of any normativity to the economy**

These remedies will be irrelevant, however, if economic relations are themselves deprived of the very character that would allow them to figure as normative activities in the first place. Contrary to Hegel, many if not most theorists, both ancient and modern, have conceived economic activity in two ways that each render the economy a normatively neutral domain beyond good and evil.

On the one hand, the economy has been construed as a sphere of technique, of instrumental action, where a single agency imposes some preconceived form upon some given material, enabling it to serve some end. This technical framework applies to any action of a subject upon objects, with indifference to what end is imposed. Accordingly, it has nothing specifically economic about it and can just as well be employed in other domains of action wherever technical considerations come into play.<sup>10</sup> Provided ends, agents, and materials are given, questions of the efficient application of technique can be addressed. Yet since technical concerns take for granted the ends for whose realization the application of technique supplies the means, technique is in and of itself normatively neutral. Although family, society, and state all involve activities that can include applications of technique, it is one thing to recognize the employment of technology in their affairs and it is another to reduce their associations to engagements in technique. The latter, of course, amounts to ignoring the role of interaction in ethical community and treating its associations as if they consisted of monological relations of a single agency manipulating things or manipulating other individuals as if they were things.

Such reduction of association to instrumental action has been applied to the economy by viewing both the production and distribution of

goods as instrumental functions of a single agency. On the one hand, the production of commodities gets construed as if it were merely a monological engagement of an artificer who imposes form upon materials using tools. On the other hand, the distribution of goods is specified as if it were a technical allocation determined by a single distributor. These reductions have their counterpart in the psychological treatment of price formation, according to which the prices of commodities are determined by estimations of the individual's evaluation of the marginal utility of scarce goods. If economic relations were determined in this technical manner, they would all amount to relations of an agency to things, a relation lacking both the dialogical dimension in which rights and duties can enter and any consideration for what ends can be unconditionally valid.

A similar elimination of any ethical standing to the economy results from the alternative approach of treating the economy as if it were a sphere of natural metabolism, wherein human beings engage in the activities needed to satisfy their physiological survival needs. On these terms, to paraphrase Marx, the economy is a sphere of necessity, mandated by our species being, and only beyond which the realm of freedom can begin. Instead of being a sphere of rights and duties, the economy is governed by natural necessity. Any thought of making the economy what it ought to be ignores that economic matters constitute a given fate of the human condition whose basic parameters are defined by nature and cannot be otherwise.

Hegel challenges both of these reductions by showing how the economy is a system of needs that consists in a specific interaction of right, wherein individuals interrelate by determining themselves in pursuit of self-selected particular ends that can be realized only in reciprocity with others doing the same. Insofar as economic relations constitute such an intersubjective convention of freedom, they can be given neither by nature nor as a function of the single agent. Instead, the economy can come into being in history only as a normative institution with its own specific rights and duties.

Economic relations are relations of right because they are all rooted in the basic situation of commodity exchange, where, as Hegel shows,<sup>11</sup> individuals act upon a socially specific need for the commodities of others that can be juridically satisfied only by offering them in return for some commodity that they need. This context becomes the general framework for production and consumption only as a result of specific historical transformations. First, individuals must no longer be able to satisfy a significant portion of their needs by dealing directly

with nature or through the autarchy of their own household and its possessions. This entails that a principal range of the objects of need satisfaction must have come to fall under the legitimate control of others. This includes both goods to be consumed and goods required to produce objects of consumption. Second, individuals must all have been liberated from traditions and authorities requiring them to engage in occupations and consumptions determined independently of their will. Thirdly, individuals must have achieved recognition as property owners so that they can freely dispose of alienable factors that can be brought to market as commodities that their owners can exchange.<sup>12</sup>

These conditions indicate that the universal realization of property relations constitutes a necessary condition for the economy to emerge as an independent sphere in which all individuals participate. Nonetheless, it is fundamentally mistaken to conflate economic rights with property rights. This has been the common mistake of traditional social contract theorists and their contemporary followers, who generally treat right as limited to the enforcement of property entitlements, predicating political authority upon contract and restricting government to an administration of civil law. On this basis, any entitlements to equal economic opportunity become swept aside by the claim that any redistributions of property or restrictions upon its use violate right if they go beyond protecting the person and property of individuals.

This is symptomatic of how the social contract argument, which treats the choosing will as a foundational principle of ethical construction, cannot comprehend ethical community of any sort. The family gets treated as some peculiar amalgam of property relations,<sup>13</sup> even though marriage is an agreement that establishes a union within which contractual relations no longer properly apply and where parental duties go beyond mere respect for person and property. The state gets reduced to an adjudicator and enforcer of property rights, with no recognition of how political freedom involves a form of self-determination that cannot be exercised apart from participation in institutions of self-government and that involves universal ends of an entirely different character from those at stake in dispositions over property.

Economic right may contain recognition of property, but it cannot be reduced to property right precisely because the economy is an ethical community, with rights and duties specific to the freedoms at play in market participation. Whenever individuals engage in economic activity, they do something more than merely dispose of property and enter into a relation of contract.

The difference does not involve engaging in an interaction with other agents as opposed to a unilateral action. As Hegel emphasizes, the two forms of self-determination that do not involve ethical community – namely property right and morality – both consist in interrelations of agents. One cannot determine oneself as an owner without having the presence of one's will in a factor recognized by others who are equally recognized to have embodied their will in other factors.<sup>14</sup> Property ownership can occur only as a mutual engagement, which is why no one can have property in complete isolation from other owners. This reciprocity of property is emblematic of the intersubjective character of right in general. Right is not a privilege but a universal entitlement insofar as exercising a right involves being respected by others whose similar prerogative one equally respects. The self-determination of right always thus involves relating to others whose self-determination is a condition for the realization of one's own freedom. This is true of morality as well, for exercising moral responsibility always comprises acting in respect to the right and moral accountability of other conscientious subjects.<sup>15</sup> What distinguishes the interaction of property right and moral accountability from ethical community is that individuals determine themselves as owners and as moral subjects irrespective of being members of an association that already realizes the ends they pursue. Individuals determine themselves as owners simply by recognizing one another as disposing exclusively over their own bodies and then over factors in which they recognizably lay their wills. Similarly, individuals act with moral accountability not in and through membership in a community already embodying the moral good but precisely by seeking to realize a good that is *not yet* at hand and whose content and fulfillment must both be personally determined by the moral individual.

By contrast, economic self-determination is a form of ethical community because one can engage in commodity relations only by participating in an existing market in whose interdependent nexus of self-seeking individuals find themselves already embroiled. Unless the pursuit of interdependent self-selected particular ends is already realized in an ongoing production and circulation of commodities, individuals have nowhere to exercise their economic freedom. Supply and demand must already be available, and this requires the context of a sphere of interaction in which individuals relate to one another solely in terms of chosen needs for what others have on the condition of supplying them in turn with something they have chosen to need.

This context does require that its participating individuals recognize one another as property owners and as conscientious individuals who are capable of being held accountable for what they do on purpose and for consequences of their actions that they intend. To engage in economic activity, however, property owners and moral subjects must further act in pursuit of self-selected particular ends whose satisfaction takes on the form of right. Each participant employs alienable property to this end, bringing something to market in order to obtain means of satisfying his or her own need for what others have and are willing to exchange in return. In this context of reciprocated need and alienation of property, the pursuit of particular interest becomes an entitled exercise of freedom insofar as it proceeds such that it can be realized only through facilitating the realization of the same sort of pursuit by others. On these terms, each market participant recognizes the legitimacy of the self-seeking of others while having his or her self-seeking respected as well.

As Hegel points out, because self-seeking here takes on a lawful, universalized character, the needs and objects of satisfaction at play are set free from any natural or traditional limitations and can permissibly include any factor that does not violate the property, moral, household or economic rights of individuals.<sup>16</sup> Individuals may satisfy their biological and psychological needs through economic activity, provided the objects meeting those needs are offered for exchange. They can, however, just as well seek any objects they choose to need so long as other economic agents have chosen to produce and market such goods on affordable terms without violating the rights of others. Within the ethical community of the market economy of the system of needs, needs and commodities both obtain a universal character, standing as they do in interrelation to the needs for commodities and to the commodity ownerships of all participants in market interaction. Market need, commodities, and the activities providing for the production and marketing of commodities are thereby subject to a discrimination and multiplication conditioned not by natural necessity or psychological calculation but by the entitled scope of choice within the interdependent economic self-determination of market agents.<sup>17</sup> In this nexus of interdependent self-seeking, individuals are able to exercise not just their property rights but the rights to satisfy self-selected needs in reciprocity with others and to engage in earning activities of their choosing in reciprocity with others. The ethical community of the market provides individuals with the continually reproduced context within which they can engage in the socially specific roles by which they can exercise the *right* to realize particular

ends of their own choosing. Neither property rights nor morality nor household or political association can realize this specific form of self-determination.

Like all other rights, these economic rights constitute a specific type of equal opportunity. In this case, the equal opportunity can be enjoyed only if individuals have access to market participation on a par with others. As Hegel well knows, although every exercise of economic opportunity requires engagement in the reciprocal relations of commodity exchange, the working of the market guarantees neither that all individuals can find others willing to purchase what they have to offer or to sell what they want to buy on affordable terms nor that the outcome of market transactions will not generate new imbalances of commodity ownerships that leave the less fortunate with greater impediments to participating in market activity.<sup>18</sup> Only because the system of needs is an ethical community with economic rights and duties extending beyond those of property relations, moral accountability, and family association can there be a legitimate claim to equal economic opportunity. This claim mandates both private and public correctives to the specifically economic injustices perennially generated by the self-regulation of the market.

These imperatives include, as Hegel duly recognizes, a civil administration of law that can uphold the property entitlements on which market activity depends.<sup>19</sup> This undertaking is not just a matter of upholding property rights in the manner of the administration of law to which social contract theory restricts public institutions. Civil legality is itself a relationship of ethical community within civil society, serving the exercise of social freedom. This is because one cannot exercise one's rights as a legal subject without belonging to an existing legal framework in which civil laws, as well as the authority of civil courts and penal institutions, are already recognized. That standing institutional recognition is crucial to the very existence of legality, which is why desuetude undermines law.

Moreover, civil legality has no field of social application unless it proceeds within an ethical community in which market relations have already established an ongoing network of interdependent activity operating with the universality and reciprocity commensurate with legalization. This is why Hegel, in the *Philosophy of Right*, introduces civil legality after the system of needs.<sup>20</sup> He properly recognizes that unless a market system has emerged, the material activities of individuals will remain caught in particular conventions that lack the universalization of conduct compatible with legalization. Precisely

because the system of needs is a prerequisite for the emergence of civil legality, markets can emerge before an administration of civil law has been fully established. Nonetheless, until civil legality has been established, market relations remain hobbled by the insecurity of property relations. Without an ongoing civil formalization and enforcement of property entitlements, property cannot be fully mobilized as an instrument of market activity. As Hernando de Soto has powerfully argued in *The Mystery of Capital*,<sup>21</sup> one of the greatest obstacles to fostering equal economic opportunity in “developing” countries is the lack of an effective civil legality to certify property relations, leaving economic resources with an uncertain ownership and preventing their optimal utilization in the market.

Civil legality, however, is only the beginning of the civil enforcement of equal economic opportunity. The members of civil society have the right to join together in common pursuit of shared particular interests so long as they do so without violating the economic opportunity of others. Hegel misconstrues this private intervention in the market by conceiving it in terms of corporations, whose vestiges of feudal and guild traditions restrict the very exercise of economic freedom that private intervention should be trying to make truly accessible to all.<sup>22</sup> If he had more properly identified social interest groups as trade unions, consumer groups, tenant associations, business associations, and the like, the limitations of private remedies to economic injustice would be more easily apparent. Although such groups may succeed in advancing the particular interest of their members in the marketplace, their dependence upon other economic agents always leaves their efforts subject to failure. It also always leaves open the possibility that the success of one interest group will diminish the economic fortunes of other groups or lead all to bankruptcy. Moreover, because social interest groups unite civilians in pursuit of shared but particular aims, they do not serve to mediate between the particularity of social freedom and the universality of political self-determination, which always wills to order the whole body politic in behalf of the entire citizenry. Hegel pretends that corporations can bridge the alleged gap between civil society and the state, but his claims rest upon subverting political freedom by allowing corporations to have special political privileges in an estate assembly.<sup>23</sup> This imposes a feudal subjection of rule to social divisions based at least in part upon natural differences of birth. Instead, the exercise of political freedom mediates itself with all subsidiary forms of freedom by upholding them in conformity with equal political opportunity. In the case of economic freedom,

this involves a distinctly political regulation of the economy, insuring that citizens have equal access to the resources to run for office and to support political campaigns while preventing concentrations of economic power from becoming sources of privileged political influence.

What social interest groups cannot achieve in behalf of equal economic opportunity calls for further public interventions to enforce economic justice. Hegel's identification of the system of needs as a form of ethical community is of key importance in deflecting the criticisms of such public intervention that social contract theorists commonly make by invoking the exclusive sanctity of property rights. The failure to acknowledge that markets involve any more than contractual entitlements underlies Hayek's critique of the welfare state in *The Constitution of Liberty*,<sup>24</sup> which fuels conservative objections to social security, publicly guaranteed access to health care, graduated income taxes, public works employment, and public protections of labor organization. As a structure of ethical community, markets involve not just property rights but economic rights that can be exercised only in and through commodity relations. These economic rights involve the genuine right to work. This is not a right to escape paying union dues after a majority of employees have voted for unionization. The true right to work rather consists in the publicly guaranteed entitlement to employment at a wage sufficient and at hours so limited as to enable individuals to exercise all their rights without prejudice. As Hegel points out, putting the under- or unemployed on the public dole does not remedy the real injustice of poverty, which consists in depriving individuals of the opportunity to exercise their economic freedoms of occupation and need in the market.<sup>25</sup> What does remedy the injustice is providing real job opportunities, enabling those able to work to support themselves through exercising their own social autonomy. Since the market can never be counted upon to provide universal employment, public authority must step in with sufficient public works to rescue all able and willing individuals from the injustice of under- and unemployment. The funding for such public works employment can be obtained in harmony with equal economic opportunity by highly graduated income and wealth taxes that put the financial burden on those most able to pay. This is no more a violation of property rights than any other taxation that takes a portion of private wealth for the sake of upholding the freedom of all. Insofar as the institutions of freedom form a system, where nonpolitical freedoms depend upon the state to uphold their exercise while political freedom must incorporate them under certain limitations to maintain



equal political opportunity, the partial restrictions on property rights are enabling conditions for the freedom of owners rather than violations of it.

Hegel may not have conceived what the economy should be and how it should be regulated in complete or entirely consistent detail, but his fundamental identification of the system of needs as a form of ethical community anchors the challenge to remake “capitalism with a human face.”

# 11

## The Challenge of Political Right

For politics to measure up to reason, two requirements have long been acknowledged: first, that the ends of political action be universal, and second, that the pursuit of such universal ends consist in political self-determination; that is, in self-government.

Aristotle set the stage for all further political inquiry by distinguishing political association through the universality of its end or good while identifying the end of politics with political activity itself, an activity in which citizens rule over one another while presiding over all other associations, which fall under political dominion owing to the particularity of their pursuits. Aristotle joined the universality of politics with the activity of self-rule by recognizing political activity to be an end in itself that is also a master end for the sake of which all other conduct is to be pursued. As such, politics was itself the highest good, making ethics possible by overcoming the hegemony of instrumental action, whose every end is devoid of intrinsic value, leaving conduct ultimately pointless.<sup>1</sup>

Two corollary difficulties, however, undermine Aristotle's enterprise. On the one hand, he is unable to give the universal end of political association a nonarbitrary content. Politics may claim universality by being both an end in itself and a master end, but this is just a recipe for might makes right, where any prevailing rule would be identical with the highest good. Appeal to a distinctly human function or to forms of rule that pursue the common good rather than the particular interests of some ruler can provide no remedy. Invoking a human function to reason and act reasonably only raises anew the task of determining what political action must be to accord with reason, whereas invoking a politics devoted to the common good leaves undetermined what that common good can be besides engagement in sovereign politics.

Aristotle's difficulty in providing an adequate content for the universal ends of politics is tied to his inability to conceive political self-determination. Although he recognizes that political action is a master end in itself, undetermined by any other factor, he lacks the conceptual resources to delineate how citizens can exercise an autonomous sovereign activity and rule themselves. Instead of conceiving how citizens exercise the fully reflexive activity of self-rule, where ruler and ruled coincide, he instead substitutes a governance where citizens alternate in ruling over other citizens rather than ever ruling over themselves. This reflects an inability to grasp the identity of determiner and determined that surfaces throughout Aristotle's philosophy, as well as throughout that of his teacher, Plato. Just as Aristotle conceives of the soul as divided into an active and passive intellect,<sup>2</sup> where one part rules over the other rather than determine itself, so he conceives of the "self-movement" of animals as depending upon one part moving another, with the moving part receiving its impetus from the animal's metabolism with its environment.<sup>3</sup> This follows the solution Socrates offers in the *Republic* to the "paradox" of self-rule: because how the same factor can be agent and patient at once seems unintelligible, the polis and the soul must be divided into ruling and ruled parts, rendering rule an activity of craft, where an agent imposes form upon a matter different from itself.<sup>4</sup> The inability to conceive self-determination in biology, psychology, and politics is grounded in the ancient Greek's tendency to conceive the universal as an essence whose "particularization" consists in secondary appearances, as well as in terms of other categories of essence such as form and matter. In all these cases, the universal determines something other than itself, giving rise to problems of "participation." Since the universal as essence is only reflected in the appearances in which it is manifest, the latter involve some given content extraneous to universality.

These difficulties are implicitly recognized by Rousseau, who seeks to connect the universality of genuine politics directly with the reflexivity of self-rule. His starting point is the acknowledgment that so long as the state acts for particular ends, one part of the body politic imposes its good upon that of all others, turning rule into factional domination. Factional domination can be overcome and the universality of political action achieved only if what is willed by the state is willed by all citizens as action that applies to all. In other words, the state can pursue universal ends only if it realizes political self-determination, which requires that citizens codetermine laws that emanate from all and apply to all. What undermines Rousseau's solution is the same formality that plagues Kantian ethics: the universality of politics is identified with

legality, and political self-determination is identified with self-legislation. Legality and self-legislation have no particular content intrinsic to them, and for this reason, any specific content that distinguishes particular laws or differentiates officeholders from civilians or otherwise distinguishes groups of individuals raises the specter of factional domination. This adherence to the formalism of self-legislation is an invitation to what Hegel would describe as the reign of Absolute Freedom and Terror. By directly identifying the universal will of the state with the self-determination of the individual, Rousseau is compelled to reject all intermediary bodies and sources of difference. Not only does he exclude political parties, parliamentary representation, political debate, and any market activity that would give play to particular interests, but he eliminates all political plurality by consistently maintaining that the only way the will of the state can immediately be the will of each citizen is if all citizens always will with unanimity. Otherwise, the will of the state is the will of a particular group, which, whether a majority or not, constitutes a particular faction imposing its will upon the rest. By depriving universality of any intrinsic particularization and identifying freedom with formal self-legislation, Rousseau has no choice but to collapse politics into a monolithic unity of clones, incapable of achieving any real self-determination.

Hegel first provides the resources for enabling the universality of politics to coincide with self-government while overcoming the dilemmas plaguing Aristotle and Rousseau. The solution rests upon Hegel's fundamental logical breakthrough, which consists in developing the logic of the concept as the logic of self-determination. Unlike the ancients, Hegel does not conceive universality in terms of categories of the logic of essence, such as essence and appearance or form and matter. Instead, he conceives universality, particularity, and individuality as self-determinacy determinacy. This is why, when Hegel discusses the self-determination of the will in the opening sections (5–7) of the *Philosophy of Right*,<sup>5</sup> he does so in terms of the basic categories of the concept: universality, particularity, and individuality. By thinking through universality, particularity, and individuality as self-determination, Hegel provides the logical basis for the autonomy of reason and the ability of philosophy to obtain new knowledge a priori. Insofar as the universal is self-differentiating, with particularity constituting the universal's own self-determination, thought is not empty, as Kant presumed. Instead, thought is pregnant with content and the autonomy of reason comprises a liberation from bondage to particular contingencies, allowing the universal determination of conceptualization to lay hold of what is independently

determined in its own right. Modern philosophy through Kant considered objects to be conditioned (as mandated by the Principle of Sufficient Reason), precluding any knowledge of more than contingent appearances, not to speak of life or freedom.<sup>6</sup> Hegel's rethinking of universality allows the unconditioned totality of objectivity to be thought and individuality to be conceivable. Above all, Hegel's reconception of the logic of the concept enables self-determination and universality to be thinkable without undercutting particularity and the plurality of free individuals.

Hegel exhibits this most adequately in his treatment of property and moral rights in the first two divisions of *Philosophy of Right*. In each of these divisions, Hegel shows how individuals succeed in determining themselves by reciprocally interacting with other agents. This reciprocity manifests how the reality of freedom consists in structures of right, where individuals determine not just what they will but what agency they exercise. Socrates may well be correct in insisting that the individual cannot alone be both agent and patient at once. After all, every action of an isolated individual always involves exercising the given faculty of choice that is the precondition rather than the result of any volition. The atomistic individual may choose among given alternatives, but neither the faculty of choice nor those options are determined by that willing. By contrast, as Hegel shows at length, when individuals reciprocally lay their wills in a recognizable way in different factors, they both will something to be their property and determine themselves to be owners. Similarly, when individuals interact by laying claim to responsibility only for what they do on purpose and for those consequences of their deed that they intended, they not only determine what counts as the sphere of their moral responsibility but also determine themselves as moral subjects who hold one another morally accountable.

In a similar vein, individuals determine themselves as autonomous citizens by engaging in the political interaction in which they codetermine the operations of the institutions of self-government. In so doing, they do not act as clones but rather participate as differentiated citizens whose coordinated plural political decisions make up the workings of the emancipated state. Although each citizen is free to disagree with the political decisions of others, the reciprocity of right and duty ensures that when individuals engage in constitutional political activity, their doing so does not prevent other citizens from exercising their correlative political opportunities.

What makes the ends of political freedom universal is that what citizens will in their political engagements is the determination of the whole

order of the body politic, which itself presides over the other spheres of freedom so as to uphold the rights of owners, moral subjects, family members, and members of civil society while ensuring that these other spheres do not impede political freedom. Hegel is adamant in distinguishing the universality of political action from the particularity of household affairs and activity in civil society. Although family members act in behalf of the joint interest of their household, their common end is still particular in comparison to the encompassing good of the body politic. Similarly, even the pursuit of shared interest by members of social interest groups in civil society is still limited to a particular welfare distinct from the universal end of the state, which upholds the totality of the reality of freedom.

This fundamental difference between political self-determination and the nonpolitical engagements of the emancipated family and civil society is precisely what allows politics to pursue its own universal end without having to eliminate the particular affairs of household and social freedom. Because political practice is distinct from family and market activities, it can function without any necessary conflict with these other domains so long as the household and civil society do not impede their members from also participating in politics on a par with others. Indeed, unless the household has been emancipated and a civil society has arisen, individuals will be bound to kinship and social relationships of servitude that are incompatible with self-government.

Reason in politics, as David Levine indicates,<sup>7</sup> thus depends upon two corollary imperatives. On the one hand, citizens must act in pursuit of properly universal aims in the political sphere and not fall prey to "mythologies" that deny the possibility of duly universal political engagement. On the other hand, household and civil institutions must be prevented from obstructing the political freedom of all citizens, either by limiting their political participation or imposing particular interests upon the state. Only when these conditions are met can politics be rational and self-government be realized.

Although Hegel largely succeeds in developing property rights and moral interaction, he fails to conceive the household, civil society, and the state in consistent conformity with the connection of universality and self-determination that he has otherwise established. Broadly speaking, Hegel does properly demarcate the general boundaries of the three spheres of ethical community, defining the emancipated family as a joint private domain whose members consolidate their property and care and exercise the right and duty of codetermining the commonweal of their household. Civil society, by contrast, is properly delineated as

the ethical sphere whose members interact in pursuit of self-selected particular interests that are rightful insofar as they can be realized only in acting towards others so that they can achieve self-selected particular interests of their own. The state then stands as the encompassing ethical community whose members will the universal end of determining and upholding the entire framework of freedom, thereby exercising self-government.

Hegel violates the defining mission of each of these domains of right by specifying them in terms of natural distinctions reflecting the vestiges of premodern traditions that remained in his day and continued to distort his thought. First, Hegel defines the roles of spouses in terms of a heterosexual relationship, thereby allowing naturally given sexual differences to restrict the freedom of marriage. He then further distinguishes family roles in terms of gender differences, privileging the husband as household head under whose dominion the wife is restricted to household chores, preventing her from participating equally in civil society or in self-government. On this basis, every relation of civil society and the state is tainted by the subordinate status accorded women in the household. Moreover, Hegel allows estate groupings instead of economic classes to figure in the system of needs. This allows occupations determined by birth (e.g., those of nobles and peasant serfs) rather than civil self-determination to intrude in the economy and restrict the freedoms of commodity relations. Estates then become the basis of corporations, which further restrict market activity by taking on the character of feudal guilds. Instead of conceiving corporations as social interest groups pursuing shared particular ends specific to civil society, Hegel retains groups whose common welfare is at odds with social freedom. Although Hegel maintains that the corporations provide a common basis through which the universal end of politics can be connected to the particular interests of civil society, he subverts the distinction between state and civil society by treating the shared particular ends of corporations as if they could be equated with the universality of political action.

This deformation is carried over into Hegel's specification of the powers of government. By characterizing the legislative branch of government as an estate assembly, Hegel subordinates legislation to the pursuit of social interests, which themselves are deformed by being predicated upon naturally determined groupings that are antithetical to the freedoms of civil society. This leaves legislation prey to factions, subverting the reflexivity, universality, and autonomy of parliamentary action. Similarly, Hegel determines the head of state as a constitutional

monarch, allowing the natural factor of birthright to deprive citizens of their right to codetermine the authorizing power of government.

In *The Just Family*,<sup>8</sup> I have reconceived the emancipated household to remedy the shortcomings of Hegel's account, removing the restriction of marriage to a heterosexual union and eliminating any differentiations of family rights and duties by gender. In *The Just Economy*<sup>9</sup> and *Law in Civil Society*,<sup>10</sup> I have similarly reconceived civil society, removing all the premodern vestiges that mar Hegel's account, rethinking commodity relations and capital in their proper universality, substituting class for estate differences, and accordingly rethinking the nature of social interest group activity and the public administration of welfare. In *The Just State*<sup>11</sup> I have completed the critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* by eliminating all trace of estate representation and hereditary roles and redeeming the universality of political freedom by giving due place to political parties while rethinking the nature of legislative representation and the division of powers into legislative, authorizing, and executive branches.

Traditional political thought from Aristotle through Hegel and beyond has completely neglected the role of parties and, in so doing, has failed to comprehend how political difference need not subvert the universality of political freedom. Particular political groups have perennially been treated as factions, as if political differences are equivalent to differences of interest. This reflects an inability to conceive how the universality of political freedom can be concrete and escape the immediate identification of the will of each citizen with the will of the state, an identification that eliminates political plurality. From Rousseau to Carl Schmitt, thinkers have failed to recognize how genuine political groups are distinguished not by particular interests but by different political programs. If political groups pursue particular interests, then politics becomes a competition between factions to control the state and impose their interest upon all others. Thereby the reflexivity of self-government is destroyed, since rule becomes domination of one group over another. This equally subverts the universality of politics by transforming rule into the hegemony of one particular interest. Thus, at one blow politics loses its universality and the freedom of self-government. What saves politics from factionalism is the differentiation of political groups by differences in political program rather than interest. Properly political programs are all universal insofar as they comprise differing *political* views on how to realize the totality of freedom. Political parties can escape being factions by differentiating themselves not in terms of religious affiliation, social interest, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation,



or any other particular factor but rather by a distinct program for governing the nation so as best to uphold the rights of all. When individuals participate in self-government by joining parties that have this properly political character, there can be reason in politics.

The fulfillment of the universality and self-determination of self-government equally depends upon legislative representation being emancipated from both bondage to particular interests and the immediate identity of citizen and state. On the one hand, legislators cannot function as representing the interests of particular groups (as in a corporate assembly) or even of geographically defined districts. If legislators acted just to promote the interests of their particular constituents, the legislature would become the battleground of competing factions, and legislation would constitute the victory of one faction or bloc of factions over the rest. As a result, law would no longer emanate from all and be universal in end. To avoid this outcome, legislators must instead represent the common good; namely, the upholding of the rights of all in face of the contingent conditions that call for new legislation. For this reason, legislators can engage in meaningful legislative debate about what laws best realize the totality of freedom in the present conjuncture. Instead of devoting themselves to pork barrel legislation in behalf of regional interest, they can legislate in accord with the universality and reflexivity of self-government, aiming to make laws that are good for the nation.

Exercising these legitimate prerogatives of legislative autonomy depends upon legislators being liberated from binding mandates, the specter of recall and referenda, and any other device to assure an immediate identity between the will of the legislator and the will of the electorate. All such impositions upon legislative autonomy rest upon the Rousseauian conflation of the reflexivity of self-rule with the immediate identity of the will of each citizen and that of the state. None of these measures serve their purpose of uniting self-rule and the universality of political action unless political plurality is canceled. Binding mandate, which requires legislative representatives to do in parliament exclusively what their constituents expected in electing them, can secure self-rule only if all representatives have identical mandates. If there is any diversity among representatives or their constituencies, the law becomes a factional rule, serving only the wills of the parliamentary majority. Or alternatively, if no group of representatives with the same original mandate is sufficiently large to pass its legislation, laws will be products of compromise, leaving every constituent at odds with the resulting legislation. Of course, if legislators are bound to electoral mandates,

parliamentary deliberation and debate become a charade, where no representative can succeed in persuading others to adopt a new position or change their political view. The same problems afflict recall initiatives and referenda. Recalling representatives only renews the same discrepancy between the will of each citizen and their representatives unless a unanimity prevails that eliminates political plurality. Referenda cannot circumvent the alleged problem of representation, since so long as all citizens do not vote as one, whatever referenda are adopted remain the initiative of some faction, which succeeds in dominating everyone else, doing so without any intervening deliberative process that could determine what measure is put up for a vote.

The solution to these conundrums lies in how the autonomy of representatives is tied to the universality of their legislative aims. Insofar as representatives make law not in behalf of particular interests but in function of a specific political view on how to uphold the rights of all, what they legislate is the freely deliberated and debated expression of what their constituencies have chosen in electing them. To exercise self-rule, citizens elect representatives not to conform to their particular interests but to pursue a debatable political program that, as such, is always intended to realize the freedoms of every citizen.

They can do this only by electing representatives who are free of all binding mandates and corporate identifications. For this reason, every elected representative legislates in behalf of all citizens, just as all citizens who vote codetermine the resulting legislation by selecting those representatives. They can do so only in this way, since any other more parochial or binding arrangement undermines the reflexivity and universality of legislative action and substitutes legislation by faction.

If these features of political representation provide a genuine mediation between the will of citizens and the will of the state, they do so only on the basis of political action that succeeds in maintaining the conditions for equal political opportunity by regulating the relation between state and civil society so as to uphold the rights of owners, moral subjects, family members, and social agents in conformity with self-government.

One of the daunting mythologies thwarting reason in politics is the dogma that citizens cannot succeed in maintaining the supremacy of self-government over the interests of civil society. Hegel, of course, fought this dogma, which Marx and his followers have made an article of faith for generations who hold politics in contempt, dreaming of a withering away of the state. Carl Rapp is right to point to the extent to which the power of money has overwhelmed the American political

process, subordinating democracy to domination by privileged interests in civil society.<sup>12</sup> His remedy of lottery selection of government officials is, however, tantamount to a denial that equal political opportunity can be upheld in face of the accumulation of capital without sacrificing the ability to codetermine government policy. Certainly selection by lottery eliminates the chance for electoral outcomes to be unduly influenced by privileged economic powers, be they wealthy individuals or corporations with widely dispersed ownership. In barring such domination of politics by the power of wealth, however, recourse to lottery substitutes blind chance for political self-determination. Lottery selection of officials deprives citizens of their right to codetermine who acts in their behalf in the legislature, in the authorizing power, and in the executive branch of government. Rapp may describe this situation as one of opting for the call of public service,<sup>13</sup> but submitting to a lottery for selective service is not an engagement in political decision making. Although the opportunity to elect officials may appear to be an empty formality for those who subscribe to Rousseau's immediate identification of individual wills with the will of the state, it is an essential component of self-government. When the selection of government officials is no longer mediated by the will of every citizen, state functions are exercised upon the citizenry without their participation. Rule ceases to be self-rule.

If lottery selection were the only alternative to oligarchy or "bourgeois democracy," self-government would be an unrealizable ideal. How, then, can oligarchy be prevented without sacrificing political freedom to the blind fate of chance?

One essential *part* of securing equal political opportunity from the clutches of oligarchy is the state's empowerment of the public administration of welfare, which intervenes in the market so as to provide the conditions for equal economic opportunity in consonance with the upholding of family welfare. The market's continual generation of differences of wealth must be publically regulated to prevent such differences from reaching the point of fostering economic domination that impedes not only the social and household rights of individuals but their ability to engage in self-government on a par with others. Moreover, public authority must insure that public goods are sufficiently provided, that the "externalities" of commercial activity and general market failures do not jeopardize family and economic welfare, and that individuals are provided with the affordable health care, shelter, education, security, and environmental protections that enable them to exercise all their rights. Above all, it involves guaranteeing all willing and able individuals viable employment, be it through public

works when needed. These efforts involve partial restrictions upon property rights, the favoritism of family relations, and market activity, all of which can be applied to differing degrees and with different balances of public and private engagement. As Robert Berman observes, this variability raises the question of whether such adjustments can be prescribed in any *a priori* fashion.<sup>14</sup> Admittedly, if these measures were susceptible of a fully *a priori* specification, they would fall within that part of the constitution mandating the necessary features, which are determined by reason, of the nonnegotiable edifice of right. That political freedom cannot exist unless citizens also enjoy their rights as persons, moral subjects, family members, and members of civil society is indicative of how there can be no intractable conflict between the claims of the different spheres of right. Conversely, only the state can secure the nonpolitical freedoms upon whose exercise the possibility of equal political opportunity itself depends, and only self-government can achieve this as an exercise of self-determination. For this reason, whatever partial adjustments of nonpolitical freedoms are required for self-government are themselves necessary for the normative realization of these same nonpolitical freedoms. Consequently, reason does mandate the general principle that the freedoms of civil society should be subject to partial adjustment for the sake of upholding equal political opportunity. Moreover, since equal economic opportunity is a precondition for equal political opportunity, it is equally *a priori* certain that property and family rights should be subject to whatever partial adjustments are required to ensure that individuals are all able to exercise their economic rights. In this regard, parents do not have the right to deprive their children of the education and health care they need to achieve autonomy and enjoy equal social and political opportunity. Indeed, without access to such resources, children will be disadvantaged with regard to securing their own future family's autonomous welfare.

Public regulation of civil society thus does not involve political prerogatives "trumping" those of society, household, and ownership. In every case, the adjustments must be partial precisely because self-government cannot operate without citizens' enjoying the other forms of self-determination and because these adjustments serve to uphold in general the very freedoms that are impinged upon.

This is ignored by Hayek in his critique of the welfare state, which rests on presupposing the lexical primacy of property rights in line with the logic of social contract theory.<sup>15</sup> Social security, graduated income taxes, and publicly guaranteed health care are all rejected on

the grounds that they go beyond the basic provision of the survival needs of property owners. Hayek is willing to grant that property rights entitle owners to the basic security and livelihood that allows them to function as owners. What he denies is that individuals can have a right to any greater degree of welfare, such as would secure equal economic and political opportunity. Private insurance may spread risks, but it does so through voluntary payments by the insured, unlike the disbursements of social security and public health care, which serve individuals whether or not they have contributed and are in desperate need. Similarly, graduated income taxes apply a rule that appropriates an unequal proportion of wealth in supposed violation of the fundamental principle that persons should be subject to equal treatment. Yet insofar as differences of wealth do affect social and political opportunity, as well as family welfare, a flat tax has very different consequences for those who are affluent and those who are not. The affluent are not disadvantaged by progressive taxation that levels the playing field of the less-well-off, whereas the latter are disadvantaged by uniform tax rates that disproportionately constrain their opportunities. If what matters is upholding the totality of self-determination, adjustments of property in behalf of equal opportunity in society and state are not restrictions upon but rather enabling realizations of freedom. This consideration is what decides whether an "opportunity cost" is a disadvantage violating equal opportunity.

Admittedly, what precise measures need to be taken by the public administration of welfare are conditioned by the given present conjuncture of domestic and international affairs. Moreover, the outcome of any measures taken remains equally contingent upon what individuals choose to do socially and politically at home and abroad, as well as upon natural events. For all these reasons, the mandates for adjustments in behalf of equal opportunity are matters for positive legislation and executive judgment rather than measures that reason can exclusively determine. For example, it is always debatable whether the best way of insuring affordable health care in given circumstances is to generalize the system of the US veterans hospitals and create something like the British National Health Service, where patients pay nothing, health care providers are public employees, and hospitals and clinics are largely owned by the state, or to generalize the system of US Medicare and Medicaid and create a single-payer system, where the state insures all individuals, leaving the provision of health care in private hands, or to generalize the system of private insurance so that all individuals are required to purchase private health insurance,

with subsidies provided for those who cannot afford to pay, as done in Germany and many other countries. Similarly, it is equally debatable whether social security can best be provided by a centralized government agency as opposed to private insurance plans that are sufficiently regulated and subsidized as to be protected from market fluctuations and available to all. Finally, it is open to question whether enlarging the public debt, raising taxes on those who spend comparatively less of their income and wealth, or printing money in some "sovereign currency" can best fund increased government spending to overcome economic crises due to insufficient effective demand. A "minimal state" may be precluded, but how big the just state must be hangs on considerations such as these.

All the above initiatives are inherently corrigible and therefore deserving of political debate. Even at their most successful, however, they cannot entirely resolve the problem of oligarchy haunting self-government. There are two challenges that remain to be addressed.

First, achieving equal economic opportunity may reduce some of the sources of the commercial domination of politics, but diminishing differences in personal wealth does not prevent economic organizations, such as publicly held corporations or groups of individuals in politically influential occupations from disproportionately affecting political debate and electoral outcomes. Stock ownership may be widely distributed, allowing for diminished inequality of private wealth, without preventing corporations from wielding huge economic concentrations that, if allowed, can buy publicity, fund campaigns, and otherwise influence the citizenry to a degree that undercuts equal political opportunity. The same can be said of owners and employees of the media and other fields of special use in politics. Hence, the state must intervene to prevent such social factors from fostering political privilege.

On the other hand, the state must take measures to provide citizens with access to the resources they need to run for office and to get their message to the public, independently of their own private wealth and in consonance with the operations of properly constituted political parties. How this is achieved depends upon the contingent circumstances that affect how self-government operates and how the electoral process unfolds. Once more, the measures to be taken cannot be prescribed by reason in any full detail. What can be said, however, is that public authority must provide the conditions for citizens to have equal opportunity to enter the political process and affect its outcome. Public subsidies to cover campaign expenses, public requirements that media offer sufficient access to all significant political forces, and restrictions on

campaign spending and media ownership to prevent private interests from dominating political life are some of the basic options that warrant consideration.

It is these efforts that can counter the mythology that politics cannot reign supreme, that self-government cannot prevail over oligarchy, that political choice cannot triumph over the spin of the wheel of chance.

*The Just State* aims to point towards how and why self-government is an ongoing challenge for which political vigilance can never rest.<sup>16</sup>

# 12

## The Normativity of Globalization

### The problem of globalization

Since Hegel, it has been increasingly evident that modern times have witnessed the weaving of the different strands of history into a unified globalization, producing a unitary world history for the first time. This globalized process does not just set all cultural developments in a reciprocal influence, from which no corner of the globe can long escape. Besides removing all barriers that allowed New and Old World civilizations to rise and fall in parallel isolation, the modern era has unshackled a form of community that is inherently global as none before. This form of community is modern civilization, characterized by a normative drive to make itself world encompassing, as well as by a social and political dynamic that makes that imperative a realizable enterprise.

Globalization cannot be understood without confronting this normative element basic to its rise and continued progress. Without that element, globalization could not be a proper theme of philosophical investigation. Instead, it would be a contingent fact of history, subject only to empirical description and modeling, with all the uncertainties afflicting any theorizing dependent upon observation. Because globalization has a normative core, it involves a process that has a prescriptive necessity, subject to pure a priori conceptualization. It does so as the consummation of the normative history of freedom, which investigates not what happens but rather what must occur in order for the institutions of freedom to arise.

The prescriptive genesis of right – that is, the genesis of the reality of freedom – is the one and only subject matter of any philosophical investigation of history due to the impossibility of any a priori description of the rise and fall of conventions and the exclusive normativity of the institutions of self-determination.



To begin with, philosophy cannot say anything merely descriptive about what conventions exist. Since conventions are products of convergent volitions, they can always be other than they are. This is true not only because what individuals will is always arbitrary, leaving every convention prey to abandonment and replacement. It is equally true because the very conditions for rational agency rest upon natural contingencies, as well as human decisions that may pave a road to self-destruction. Whether thousand-year Reichs endure hangs just as much upon asteroid orbits, climate change, volcanic eruptions, and viral mutations as upon the concerted decisions of opponents. Accordingly, what if any conventions exist is always an empirical matter. Reason can never determine what must happen in history, and any descriptive philosophy of history is an intellectual fraud.

This is recognized by all the great philosophers, who never describe what conventions are but always prescribe what the just family, society, and state should be and, on that basis, conceive what would be involved in their rise and fall. Marx may claim to uncover necessary dynamics of historical change, but anyone who seriously examines the schemes he presents in the *German Ideology* or the *Grundrisse* knows full well that he has not delivered what is impossible in principle. Indeed, the very revolutionary change he advocates involves an admission that free political initiative is required to overthrow and replace what no economic dynamic can independently supplant. Even the transition from socialism to capitalism with a human face may be forestalled by the unforeseeable vagaries of human or, for that matter, extraterrestrial political animals.

Hegel has been roundly misunderstood by adherents and detractors alike who regard his philosophy of history as a descriptive account of what necessarily comes to be in the affairs of rational agents. Contrary to this gross misconception, Hegel pointedly introduces an account of the genesis of the institutions of freedom only *after* the *Philosophy of Right* has completed conceiving all the different spheres of self-determination that constitute the self-ordered totality of the institutions of freedom.<sup>1</sup> Hegel properly recognizes that one can conceive what must occur for the reality of self-determination to come into being only after the institutions of right have been fully comprehended, for only then does one know what makes up the terminus of this prescriptive development. The resulting normative philosophy of history takes as its starting point the conditions of convention, namely nature and the plurality of individuals, that are systematically accounted for in the philosophies of nature and of subjective spirit, respectively. What thereupon must be

comprehended is how the structure of the reality of self-determination mandates what must occur for its essentially political totality to come into being. The totality of right is encompassed by the self-governing state because only political freedom allows the institutions of right to have a self-ordered unity, liberating their convention from the hold of agencies external to self-determination. Political self-determination necessarily upholds all the spheres of self-determination because self-government cannot take place unless citizens equally exercise their rights as property owners, moral subjects, members of an emancipated family, and members of civil society. Any deficit in these different forms of equal opportunity prevents citizens from enjoying equal political opportunity and the reflexivity of self-rule. Moreover, all the cultural obstacles that thwart self-determination must equally be overcome if political autonomy and its normative prerequisites are to arise. This applies especially to those religious orthodoxies that refuse to recognize the sovereignty of secular freedom. They must undergo a due reformation, privatizing religion so that religious faith can be both a voluntary undertaking and one in which individuals relate to the divine not as force of oppression but as a facilitator of the freedom in which the true essence of humanity resides.

These imperatives are brought to bear in Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, where Hegel begins by explicitly *observing* that in modern times, with the rise of capitalism, the French Revolution, and the Reformation, all the institutions of freedom have begun to make their appearance. On the basis of this nonphilosophical, empirical assurance, Hegel proposes that we can look back over the empirical historical record and interpret it as a history of the genesis of right, informing this empirically interpretive enterprise with thoughts of what must occur for the institutions of freedom to arise.<sup>2</sup> The resulting mixed investigation, interpreting the historical evidence in light of the prescriptive genesis of right, can then avoid the metaphysical blunder of any attempted a priori description of what must occur in history.

Prescriptive history, which alone can be pursued a priori, must concern itself exclusively with the genesis of freedom because only self-determination overcomes the problems that beset any endeavor that seeks to legitimate itself by appeal to some foundation. This problem of foundationalism applies to theory, practice, and fine art equally, for in every normative sphere, whenever justification is conferred upon something by some privileged factor, the legitimacy of the validating factor can never be secured on its own terms unless it validates itself. Once the foundation of normativity meets its own standard of justification by deriving

validity from itself, however, the constitutive difference between foundation and founded, between what confers and what possesses legitimacy, is eliminated. Heteronomous (i.e., foundational) justification is thus immanently compelled to give way to self-determination as what alone can constitute normativity without self-referential inconsistency. This is why genuine normative conventions consist of nothing other than the self-ordered totality of the institutions of freedom, which comprises the self-governing state together with the prepolitical relations of right over which it presides and which it must uphold in order to sustain self-rule. Consequently, the prescriptive philosophy of history is none other than the history of freedom, a history ultimately concerning the rise of political freedom, including the emancipated household, civil society, and privatized religious culture on which it rests.

Modernity therefore has a normative character once it is understood to be the epoch characterized by the emergence of all the structures of right. Instead of just consisting of some empirically given moment in history, modernity realizes the very contested normative agenda advancing a civilization that recognizes the exclusive normativity of self-determination in theory and practice. Modern civilization thereby uniquely consists in a form of life without foundations. Although modernity may have *enabling* conditions, including a specific heritage from which it happens to first emerge, in its self-determined actuality modernity embodies a project of civilization without *juridical* roots. For this very reason, modernity is not limited by any particular conditions but is universalizable in principle. Accordingly, modernity is inherently globalizable. Indeed, because modernity embodies the only type of community that can escape the problems of foundational justification, it represents a civilization whose validity can be equaled by no other. As such, modernity *should* make itself global and, if ever possible, intergalactic in reach. Moreover, because modernity understands itself to have a normativity without equal, it cannot fail to recognize that its globalization is a normative imperative.

### **The opposition of modernity to pre- and postmodernity**

To understand the nature of this imperative, it is necessary to take into account the inevitable opponents to the project of modernity. These consist of the two other fundamental options for civilization: premodernity and postmodernity. Together with modernity, these fundamental options exhaust the possible normative projects that civilization can take, on earth or anywhere else in the universe where intelligent

life may emerge. This is because premodernity, modernity, and post-modernity are defined by the three possible attitudes a civilization can take to normativity: normativity can be held to be rooted in a foundation; normativity can be understood to be foundation ridden, but every possible foundation can be regarded as arbitrary; and normativity can be understood to be foundation free by residing in self-determination.

Premodernity is characterized by rooting the normative validity of its way of life in some foundation. This comprises some given tradition whose privileged ends or forms of activity confer legitimacy on whatever conventions that derive from or embody them. Because premodernity roots its civilizational project in some given, that project is ineluctably particular in nature and local in scope. Premodernity has its roots, and these roots give its civilization an orientation that is not susceptible of any consistent globalization.

This is true even of a premodern religious tradition like Islam, which seeks world hegemony through the subordination of all nonbelievers under its sway through either conversion or extermination. The Islamist quest for an all-inclusive caliphate, where rule and religious authority are conjoined under theocratic tyranny, may seek unlimited jurisdiction for divine law, but this requires eliminating all other traditions rather than engendering a form of civilization that can incorporate all by duly privatizing every faith in a civil society realizing ecumenical toleration and religious freedom. For this reason, the Islamic civilization that finds its roots in divine revelation of holy law cannot achieve a rootless expanse but remains ever oriented to Mecca and its particular religious narrative. Unless one happens to accept this narrative, the caliphate has no compelling attraction.

This reflects how premodernity, by founding its way of life on some foundation, is always prey to legitimation problems once that privileged given is called into question. One tradition can always be supplanted by another whose roots enjoy just as much particular immediacy as those they replace. For this reason, however premodernity may fix the norms of life in some tradition, every tradition confronts possible challenges to which no adequately rational defense can be directed.

The foundational predicament of premodern civilization precedes modernity to the extent that modernity calls into question the hold of privileged givens and comes to identify normativity and self-determination in virtue of the self-referential dilemmas of foundational justification. For this reason, modernity arises *from* some particular premodern civilization. Because premodern civilization is particular and inherently local in scope, the emergence of modernity is not something that can

occur globally, overcoming every foundational civilization at one blow. Instead, the very nature of premodernity entails that modernity can arise only from within a particular cultural context, clothed with the baggage of its origins. On our lonely planet, this is exhibited by how the rise of modernity occurs in the West, producing inherently universal institutions of freedom that emerge with the trappings of a particularly Western tradition, even if modernity can just as easily be clothed in the Eastern fashions of Asian tigers.

The antimodern project of postmodernity draws succor from this appearance of an identity between modernization and westernization or more generally between the advent of modernity and the particular tradition within which it occurs. Postmodernity rejects the foundation-free claims of modernity's embrace of rational autonomy by presuming that all normative endeavors distinguishing rationality rest upon arbitrary foundations. Unlike premodernity, postmodernity does not privilege any one foundation as the given basis for a legitimate civilization. Instead, postmodernity regards all attempts at justification as bound to an appeal to privileged givens, which occupy their foundational role because their advocates have decided to privilege them. Accordingly, supposedly autonomous rationality is really an exercise of a will to power, where norms are advanced as if they had universal validity when actually they result from particular volitions by advocates who thereby impose their will upon all. Repudiating the globalizable universality to which the unconditioned character of self-determination aspires, postmodernity instead unmasks the allegedly conditioned character of all norms. What allows this deconstructive activity to become the basis of a civilizational project of its own is that it gives license to the one assertion of norms that seems to escape the hypocrisy of those who assert values as if they were universally valid when instead they are just an exercise of a will to power. This consistent use of a will to power advances particular values without any universal pretensions, engaging instead in a self-assertion that does not hide its quest thereby to dominate others. Such is the civilizational project of fascism, which asserts some arbitrary particular ethos in opposition to the groundless and thereby supposedly bogus universal pretensions of modern rights.

The stumbling block of postmodernism is its global claim that all normativity must rest on foundations. This claim undermines itself, for the postmodern diagnosis of rationality as will to power is incapable of justifying its own truth, which either violates the conditioned character it ascribes to rationality or shares in that relativity, leaving it no better than any competing exercise of the will to power.

Nonetheless, neither theoretical shortcomings nor practical defeats can prevent recurring postmodern or, for that matter, premodern reactions to modernity. The normative project of modern civilization always finds itself potentially contested by the two possible ways of embracing foundations: the premodern path of privileging some foundation to the exclusion of all others and the postmodern path of recognizing the arbitrariness of all foundations while affirming their supposed inescapability with a particularizing vengeance. Both alternatives confront modernity with normatively unacceptable challenges to the globalization of self-determination. Whether premodern or postmodern, both foundational civilizational projects violate right. This is true no matter how popular premodern and postmodern regimes may be. Willing acceptance of oppression is certainly an exercise of choice, as is any voluntary action, including the submission of slaves to their master. Yet choice is not equivalent to exercising self-determination, which requires participation in practices of rights in which individuals enjoy their equal opportunities as entitled property owners, moral subjects, spouses and parents, members of civil society, and self-governing citizens. For this reason, the popularity of premodern and postmodern oppressors can not mitigate their normative unacceptability to the modern project.

### **The normative logic of modernization**

Yet the opposition confronting the globalization of modernity has a more specific form proceeding from the normative world-historical situation that emerges the moment modernity arises from some premodern civilization. Wherever modernity first emerges, it does so through an autonomous modernization, in which some premodern civilization modernizes itself. Once this occurs, the first modern civilization confronts all other premodern civilizations with a novel dual challenge. In face of the first autonomously modernized community, premodern civilizations can hasten their own independent modernization, such as Japan and the fading Ottoman Empire attempted with varying degrees of success in response to Western development. Alternatively, premodern civilizations may find themselves subject to an external modernization, where the independently modernized civilization brings its own power to bear so as to undermine premodern foundations and foster some form of modernizing emancipation.

It might be wondered how an external modernization could be possible from a normative point of view. After all, if modernization comprises liberation from the heteronomy of foundations and the

establishment of institutions of freedom, any external modernization would seem to involve forcing a premodern civilization to become free. As Kant observed, one might be able to promote the happiness of others by helping to realize their ends, but one can never make others moral, since that requires individuals to will autonomously, in the sense of choosing to act with the right purposes and intentions.<sup>3</sup> Would the same difficulty apply to any external attempt to free a civilization of oppression and bring about its emancipation? Since emancipation consists in the formation of the institutions of right and these consist in individuals engaging in the different modes of self-determination, how can any external intervention foster something that depends on the free involvement of the erstwhile oppressed? Admittedly, an external intervention could overthrow despotic rulers and prohibit social and household oppression. But can outside help possibly do more than remove barriers to freedom? Can intervention in any way establish the institutions of freedom, whose enactment allows liberation from oppression to be succeeded by the capstone of genuine revolution, the founding of self-government, accompanied by the free society, free household, and religious reformation on which political emancipation depends?

The examples of postwar Japan and Germany, and even that of Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, show some of the positive possibilities. In the aftermath of atomic warfare and unconditional surrender, General MacArthur could give Japan a new democratic constitution, and after relatively brief American occupation, imperial military autocracy could be replaced by the most fully modern, emancipated condition that East Asia had ever enjoyed. Similarly, under allied occupation, the denazification of western Germany could quickly usher in the most democratic emancipated condition that a German state had ever experienced. Admittedly, in both Japan and Germany abiding household organization, social relations, and religious practice were not so antithetical to modern freedom as to make the institution of a new political constitution an empty gesture. Hegel had rightly pointed out that new constitutions cannot simply be imposed upon a conquered people, as Napoleon had attempted in Spain, for political emancipation depends upon the existence of compatible family, social, and cultural conventions that cannot themselves be produced immediately by political fiat.<sup>4</sup> Germany, Japan, and to a certain degree Baathist Iraq were postmodern tyrannies grafted upon communities that had already undergone significant modernization. In this respect, their forced democratizations exemplify an external emancipation less

radical than that at stake when the first modern civilization intervenes to modernize premodern communities.

It may be easy to conquer another nation, overthrow its rulers, and impose a new constitution and form of government, manned, if necessary, by administrators from the conquering metropole. Harder is to overthrow traditional forms of social oppression and replace slavery, caste, and serfdom with the autonomous social interdependence of a civil society. Harder still is to penetrate the privacy of the household and transform traditional family hierarchies, replacing heterosexual patriarchy and clan rule with codetermining spouses and parents of any gender and sexual orientation. And even harder might seem to be the challenge of penetrating the inwardness of religious faith and effecting the religious reformation that can privatize religion, establishing space for secular freedom in the household, society, and the state.

As it turns out, political conquest can crucially contribute to reconfiguring cultural and nonpolitical relationships. When, for example, the autonomously modernized colonial powers of Europe conquered the Islamic world from Morocco to Indonesia, the imposition of colonial rule immediately achieved a fundamental step in the privatization of Islam, against which Islamists are still rebelling. European colonialism did so by freeing government in Muslim lands from bondage to holy law, eliminating the union of rule and religious authority that had so hampered the Muslim world from undergoing autonomous modernization. The same religious privatization was autonomously effected by Mustafa Kemal, who saved Turkey from colonial domination by abolishing the caliphate and imposing a secular regime modeled on not just modern but specifically Western designs.<sup>5</sup>

Similarly, political conquest can transform economic formations, removing traditional conventions that block commodity exchange from having any scope other than in the most limited interstices of premodern communities. Where consumption, production, and occupation are predominantly determined by kinship relations, hereditary rank, and other factors given independently of the choice of individuals, mere trade with autonomously modernized economies can hardly make a dent on social relations. For this reason the external social transformation of premodern civilization cannot occur through market force alone but requires a political intervention, such as direct colonialization, the establishment of concessions by gunboat diplomacy, or the fostering of social revolution, as engineered by the Comintern, whose communist insurgencies eventually replaced premodern social bondage with a universal proletarianization under state capitalism.



All these external interventions exhibit the same political intervention so essential to the rise of civil commodity relations in the autonomous modernization that England achieved. Marx describes this political overturning of premodern economic formations in his account of the primitive accumulation of capital.<sup>6</sup> This account contradicts his own doctrine of economic determinism by graphically recounting how the capital-worker relation arose as a dominant form only through such state initiatives as the expulsion of herders and peasants from lands to be devoted to capitalist agriculture and the outlawing of vagrancy, compelling the dispossessed to seek employment in the developing market economy.

These examples all indicate how both autonomous and external modernizations involve forced transformations that cannot possibly conform to right. This reflects two fundamental features of the genesis of the institutions of self-determination.

On the one hand, because self-determination does not owe its character to any foundation, the genesis of the institutions of freedom plays no role whatsoever in their legitimation. What makes them legitimate is not how they arise but what they are; namely, conventions of self-determination rather than heteronomously determined institutions resting on juridical foundations.

On the other hand, the *genesis* of right is essentially different from the *actuality* of right, because founding any institutions of freedom is an instrumental activity that extinguishes itself by resulting in the establishment of self-determination. Any action that gives rise to right is not for its own sake nor a self-determination. Comprising an act of production, of making, it serves to establish something different from itself. For example, no founding of a constitution can occur constitutionally, for constitutional action can take place only in the context of an existing constitutional order, which first emerges from the concluded process of constitution making. Constitutional self-government may arise from a constitutional convention, peacefully convened by preexisting communities, but it can just as easily result from a violent revolution, foreign conquest, or the decision of a tyrant to impose a new order of freedom. Similarly, the dismantlement of premodern social organizations cannot consist in an exercise of civil freedom, for social self-determination can fully proceed only in the context of a preexisting market, governed by institutions of civil law, intervened in by social interest groups, and regulated by a public administration of welfare. Once more, the genesis of social freedom is distinct from its actuality and necessarily involves a forceful dissolution of premodern conventions compelling individuals

to seek their livelihood in the mutual interdependence of a civil society. The situation of the household is no different. Premodern family structure cannot be overcome by individuals suddenly freely marrying and becoming codetermining spouses. The traditional bonds that obstruct such choices must first be overcome, and their dissolution is part and parcel of the general transformation of modernization whereby kinship relations are extricated from commerce and rule, and society and state become demarcated from one another as well as from the chains of nepotism.

For all these reasons, external modernization, like the autonomous modernization that precedes it, necessarily involves distinctly *moral* quandaries. *Ethical* (*sittliche*) conduct performs a role that reproduces structures of freedom that must already be at hand in order for that role to be exercised in the first place. For example, the ethical freedom of self-government can be engaged in only within the context of institutions of self-rule that such freedom sustains. By contrast, *moral* action always involves bringing about a good that does not already exist and whose actualization depends upon personal initiative. Such is the revolutionary situation confronting modernization of any form, where what lies at stake is instituting conventions of freedom in a community where they have yet to be actualized.

### **The social and political dynamic underlying external modernization**

What importantly underlies the specific normative predicament of external modernization is how the social and political dynamic of an autonomously modernized nation empowers it in its opposition to premodern civilization. The emergence of a first civil society unleashes the economic dynamic of a disengaged market economy, where commodity relations are no longer confined to the periphery of traditional conventions that fix occupations, production, and consumption in ways that prevent individuals from exercising the social right to choose their occupation and what to produce and consume in equal opportunity with others. Once the traditional barriers to market participation have been removed with the abolition of slavery, the end of confinement of women to the household, the elimination of caste and other hereditary employment, and the separation of production and consumption from the household, individuals confront the social necessity of having to satisfy self-selected needs for what only others can supply in return for satisfying their similarly self-selected needs. On the

basis of this civil interaction where economic activity takes on the form of right, need and production are liberated from any natural limitations and undergo, as Hegel describes in his account of the System of Needs, a completely conventional refinement and multiplication.<sup>7</sup> Market engagement renders production of new commodities and new needs as much an economic necessity as constant revolutions in technology that allow for increasing productivity and product differentiation, as well as continual expansion in market penetration. As such, the conventional framework in which commodity owners exchange and produce so as to satisfy one another's self-selected needs has no inherent boundary but extends as far as market participants can be found who are willing and able to so interact. In this respect, the economic system of conventional needs and productions is inherently global in expanse. Moreover, that global extension applies equally to the private and public interventions upon the market that civil society must pursue in order to uphold equal economic opportunity, as well as family welfare and person and property. The contingencies of market interaction always leave employment, need satisfaction, and family and public welfare at risk, not only during economic crises but during the most extended prosperity. This is why pursuing "free market" laissez-faire policies either domestically or internationally is a criminal violation of household, social, and political right. Nonetheless, the proper private and public intervention upon the market by social interest groups and the public administration of welfare can enable economic expansion to proceed such that the continual innovation of technology gives the emergent civil society a crushing advantage in wealth and military resources over any premodern opponent.

Furthermore, modernity establishes a free body politic that cannot consistently limit membership on the basis of any factor extraneous to a commitment to uphold a common constitution mandating the enforcement of all rights. Just as civil society is inherently global in reach, so modern political association is capable of transcending the parochial boundaries of the nation-state and forging a political unity extending "from sea to shining sea." This need not and may not practically involve the political unification of the entire globe, but it allows states to extend themselves in ways that permit not only "European Unions" but "British Commonwealths" and "French Republics" to incorporate territories at any geographical remove, provided full equal rights are extended to all inhabitants.

These social and political features of emergent modernity frame the normative challenges that external modernization now brings to bear in making globalization the final combat in the history of freedom.

## **The normative dilemmas of colonialism and imperialism and the end of the history of freedom**

Two distinct situations characterize the fundamental options confronting external modernization.

First, external modernization may proceed through colonization of sparsely populated regions where inhabitants of a modern metropole emigrate to premodern regions and build a modern civil society, displacing and/or absorbing the indigenous people. If the colonists form emancipated households and a civil society, there can be no legitimate reason to prevent them from exercising self-government, either by integrating the colony as a full-fledged province of the colonizing state or by granting it independence. As for the indigenes, the right of modernity mandates that they should face no obstacles to exercising their full array of rights as equal participants in the civil and political associations that are established, as well as to receiving compensation or restitution for whatever property has been stolen from them. On the other hand, any continuation of premodern relations by the indigenes that violate household, social, and political freedom poses a problem for the new regime. Even if these conventions are enthusiastically favored by the native inhabitants, they cannot be accorded legitimacy when normativity exclusively resides in self-determination. Yet if the indigenous people are unwilling to relinquish these conventions and exercise the household, social, and political rights to which they are entitled, the encompassing state faces the quandary of depriving them of their premodern shackles without being able to get them to participate in functioning institutions of freedom. At most, traditional practices can tolerably be confined to a "privatized" "sanitized" continuance, where they are retained so long as they do not egregiously violate the overarching framework of household, social, and political equal opportunity.

These quandaries get further compounded when external modernization takes the alternative form of full-fledged imperial domination, where a modernized state conquers a premodern community and rules over it without integrating the conquered peoples as full-fledged members of its own state and society. Admittedly, rule by foreign conquerors may not be any more oppressive than rule by domestic despots, and if the foreign conquerors begin to implement modernizing reforms, their rule may be far less oppressive than that of the local leaders it displaces. Nevertheless, any imperial domination poses a normative problem for a modern state, whose engagement in external modernization can be justified only as an emancipatory practice.

On the one hand, the modern state cannot regard premodern regimes as worthy of recognition if their oppressions can be removed and replaced by more emancipated conventions in which the local population will participate. If the modern state disposes of the economic and military might making its intervention a feasible option, a failure to act can be regarded as a renunciation of historical responsibility, just as egregious as a failure to intervene to end the domestic crimes of post-modern tyrannies.

On the other hand, the modern state cannot remain true to its own principles and lord over subject premodern communities unless doing so is indispensable to their emancipation. An imperial power may ban oppressive family practices, such as self-immolation of widows, patriarchal polygamy, and child marriage, just as it may outlaw slavery, caste discrimination, and other forms of peonage, introduce free public education, rule by law, and an administration of public welfare. Such measures may help enable the local population to form more emancipated households and participate in a nascent civil society. Yet so long as imperial rule is retained, it deprives its subjects of the final capstone of modernization, participation in self-government. There can be no excuse for depriving a population of this opportunity, and an imperial power is obliged by its own modern principles as soon as possible to either integrate the imperial possession into its own body politic as a fully empowered province or to grant it independence under a constitution mandating property, moral, family, social, and political rights.

In this way, the normativity of modernity drives external modernization to a postcolonial solution, where formerly premodern communities are finally political emancipated. Only then does globalization reach its normative conclusion. What lies at stake is not simply the creation of a world market or a world market internationally regulated for the sake of household and social opportunity. Rather, modernity has actually globalized itself only when all corners of the globe enjoy self-government, with enforcement of the full complement of prepolitical rights that make political freedom possible.

The interconnected heritage of premodern tradition and colonial domination may together leave postcolonial nations in a precarious situation, burdened with a relative impoverishment and underdevelopment of modern institutions. This situation may encourage the view that political independence is an empty formality, where the superior might of autonomously modernized nations allows them to impose an indirect neocolonial domination through the global reach of their private corporations, their control of international economic institutions, and

the general cultural and military predominance accorded by their prior modernization. Yet as Hegel properly recognizes, the sovereign state must lord over civil society so as to keep domestic and foreign economic powers from replacing self-rule with oligarchy. Hence, the achievement of political independence does give every postcolonial nation a crucial fulcrum for wielding control over its cultural and economic affairs that no drive for "open markets" should undermine. What never can be guaranteed is whether any modernizing nation can succeed in fending off the challenges of premodern traditionalists and postmodern fascists or the very modern challenge of shielding family and state from domination by civil society. These struggles remain abiding features of the normative history of freedom, whose final act perennially consists in securing global political emancipation. That is the end of the prescriptive philosophy of history, and it is what we confront today and tomorrow.

# 13

## Literary Form and Civilization

### **Epic, lyric, and drama as fundamental literary genres**

Epic, lyric, and drama have perennially figured as the fundamental genres of literature. Since each can be characterized in terms of a distinctive form of speech, of which wordsmiths can always avail, literary art seems inveterately to have them all at its disposal, whatever be the worldview seeking expression.

Epic at the very least involves a narrator, presiding over exposition of the encompassing world, the particular situations, and the events and characters animating the saga it unfolds. Epic protagonists may have their monologues overheard, just as dramatic dialogues may be described, but these relative departures from third-person narration always proceed within the epic as objects of the voice depicting the objective course of events. Even when the narrator is a character and indeed, the protagonist of the described events, narration retains its epic character by recounting the narrator's own thoughts and actions as objectively immersed within the observed occurrences.

Lyric, by contrast, gives voice to its own voice, a first-person meditation on the contents of its mind. These contents may range over the widest array of topics, from psychological feelings to landscapes or dramatic conflicts or epic histories, but in every case, the lyric voice expresses its personal reflection on the object of its own musings.

Drama, for its part, presents the voices of interacting agents directly by themselves, without the encompassing speech of a third-party spectator. Admittedly, these voices may lapse into their own epic, third-person narrations of happenings, just as each may meditate on its own reflections in lyric monologue. Nonetheless, these remain part of drama only insofar as they transpire within the context of the direct encounter of

different voices, where every subjective expression is part and parcel of an objective course of action.

Significantly, distinguishing epic, lyric, and drama in terms of the different narrative options they embody says nothing of the meanings they configure, besides acknowledging the objectivity of epic narration, the subjectivity of lyric expression, and the combination of objectivity and subjectivity in drama's presentation of different voices directly venting their thoughts and feelings in actual interaction with one another. Moreover, since the objective and subjective dimensions of intelligent life are universal to culture, be it terrestrial or extraterrestrial, these three fundamental literary forms constitute viable options for any civilization, no matter what it preponderantly takes to be of essential importance.

This indifference to meaning need not violate the unity of shape and significance basic to aesthetic worth. Although epic, lyric, and drama may be forms in which any self-understanding may seek artistic expression, each genre must meet the challenge of shaping itself to fit the meaning it creatively construes. Civilizations can be distinguished by the type of fundamental values that predominate in each, giving cultural unity to their religious practice, ethical life, and artistic production. Since literature always gains actuality within some determinate culture, the perennial literary forms will never appear in just their universality but will always be successfully realized with further characteristic modifications best suited to give literary expression to the type of self-understanding defining the culture or, for that matter, subcultures to which the literary work belongs.

If the options of fundamental self-understanding can be conceptually differentiated, then literary theory will be in a position to conceive the particular forms that epic, lyric, and drama will take in order to achieve due aesthetic construal for each of the principal types of civilization. Epic, for example, can be understood to take the particular shapes of the Indian epics, the Homeric epics, the sagas of chivalry, and the modern novel in order to give appropriate literary expression to the distinctive worldviews distinguishing ancient India, classical Greece, medieval Europe, and the modern world. Similarly, lyric poetry will exhibit stylistic variances tied to the divergent values of distinct civilizations, just as drama will develop into the type of specific forms distinguishing, for example, ancient tragedy and comedy from its modern counterparts. Although prospective writers may well fail to wed meaning and configuration, works that command aesthetic worth will do so by finding a fitting literary shape for some view of what is of fundamental



significance. Similarly, although any culture may contain dissidents whose productions deviate from the prevailing norm, the very possibility of dissidence presupposes a predominant value consensus, without which no culture can retain identity. For this reason, to the degree that a civilization achieves some coherent unity and produces true artists, its distinctive worldview will express itself in an equally distinctive artistic style, no matter what individual arts it fosters.

Yet can a civilization be simply incommensurate with one of the basic literary genres, leaving no place for enlisting it in the artistic expression by which that culture gazes upon itself?

### **Hegel's challenge to ancient indian drama**

To even consider this question, let alone any other that concerns artistic form and cultural difference, aesthetics must liberate itself from the two approaches that have kept a stranglehold on most thinking about art: the mimetic theory pioneered by Plato and Aristotle and the transcendental theory of reception pioneered by Hume and Kant. Each roots aesthetic value in determining foundations given independently of the particulars distinguishing individual arts, art forms, and different civilizations. Just as the mimetic approach conceives all art works in respect of the same mirroring of reality, so transcendental aesthetics constructs every aesthetic experience and production from the same structure of reception. Both approaches thereby leave aesthetic phenomena founded upon some antecedent common ground. This underlying foundationalism renders aesthetics incapable of saying anything beyond what applies to works of art in general, for if aesthetic value is determined by some privileged factor that operates ubiquitously, irrespective of differences in media, style, and cultural significance, all these dimensions fall outside the grasp of aesthetic theory. Moreover, by rendering the art work a derivative of an antecedent ground determining each and every work of art, the foundationalism of mimesis and transcendental reception renders inscrutable anything autonomous and individual in art, leaving unaccountable the creativity and uniqueness pervading fine art, as well as the unity of meaning and configuration, which allows stylistic differences to be tied to differences of content.<sup>1</sup>

Differences of artistic media, style, and worldview become due themes of aesthetic investigation when aesthetic value is understood to reside neither in mirroring independent givens nor in being determined by some privileged process of reception but in creating a unique appearance

in which fundamental meaning and imaginative configuration are indissolubly connected.

The great pioneer of this approach, Hegel, is, not surprisingly, unparalleled in his efforts to grasp the artistic possibilities of the different types of civilization. Hegel does take pains to distinguish between how individual arts are differentiated in respect of their defining media and how the artistic construal of form and content gets differentiated into stylistic modes in function of the types of content at stake. Nevertheless, at various junctures Hegel ties individual arts to specific styles, as if a particular artistic medium were incapable of giving equal due to every stylistic option.

In the case of literature, the linkage pertains to genres, and Hegel makes the specific claim that the civilization of the ancient East cannot utilize drama as an adequate genre for its artistic self-expression.

Insofar as ancient India constitutes the great wellspring for all Oriental civilizations, Hegel's challenge to Eastern drama is essentially directed at the literary options available to prototypic Hindu culture. The entire Eastern outlook, with its Indian roots, Hegel maintains, is inimical to a proper development of drama.<sup>2</sup> The crux of the problem lies in the alleged truth that both tragedy and comedy require a valuing of individuality that is incompatible with a Hindu self-understanding.

Truly tragic action, Hegel claims, presupposes either a vital inclusion of *individual* freedom and independence or at least an admission of agents' resolve to take independent responsibility for their acts and their consequences.<sup>3</sup> If instead individual initiative and responsibility are treated as superfluous to the significance of the action, any ensuing misfortune of individuals forfeits its tragic dimension.

Similarly, in order for comedy to achieve a dramatic worth transcending merely prosaic laughter, the right of subjective personality must be recognized to have its dominion.<sup>4</sup> Insofar as comedy revolves around exposing the nullity of passions and actions to which individuals set an illusory importance, the comic edge is subverted if agents are not acknowledged to be masters of their own projects, for better or worse. In that case, the nullification of pursuits is wholly external to the agents, who blamelessly lose nothing of their own in the ensuing complications.

Whether tragic or comic, dramatic art requires some vindication of what is particular and self-imposed in individual action and of the personality grappling with its own inner resolves.<sup>5</sup> Unless the initiative and responsibility of the protagonists can retain importance for both the audience and the characters themselves, action, to which drama properly confines itself, has no compelling ground for aesthetic display.

Although ancient Indian civilization can no more ignore the phenomena of personal independence than can any other community of rational agents, it can devalue that phenomena as a function of culturally constitutive beliefs about the true essence of divinity and human life. Hegel maintains that just such a course is basic to the defining worldview that Hinduism brings to humanity. Two complementary features set the essential parameters. One is the understanding of the divine as an ultimately indeterminate absolute that can find no adequate realization in anything finite, even if everything finite is but an expression of the divine, devoid of independent significance. On the other hand, humanity is considered to be bound to particular groupings by birth, imposing specific duties concerning all realms of life, which themselves have affirmative value only as a way station to achieving final release from finite existence and selfless union with the indeterminate divine. In order for all individuals to find their ultimate essence in the divine, caste divisions must be tied to a doctrine of reincarnation and a ladder of dharma, where fulfillment of caste duties advances individuals one step closer to release with each rebirth. Because the divine is regarded as being both essentially indeterminate and yet as manifest in the full panoply of finite existence, individual subjectivity can have no independent affirmative value but can exhibit truth only in pursuing its own elimination. This can take the form of giving an immediate expression to the divine, as god incarnate, or by pursuing eventual self-overcoming through submission to caste rules or disciplining mind and body to become impervious to their particular strivings or empty of any individual content. All spheres of existence can be molded in accord with this self-understanding. Whatever one's station in life, one can follow the Bhagavad Gītā's injunction to stay the course without concern for consequences, not to exercise a deontological self-legislating autonomy but to uphold caste duty, ignore the pull of self-imposed aims, and remain in line for self-annulling salvation.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, one can just as readily stifle sexual gratification by trying to remain unaroused by sexual temptations, as a Gandhi lying beside his naked nubile "walking sticks," as to indulge in tantric orgies so as to attain complete indifference while copulating.

Religious imagery can find an equally wide-ranging field, for even if the divine is ultimately indeterminate, its immediate presence in everything finite encourages a profusion of fantastical distortions of what is given in nature to make manifest an absolute that has no adequate shape in anything finite.

These convictions have obvious implications for prosaic undertakings, such as the pursuit of history. If human existence is regarded as

an epiphenomenal manifestation of an indeterminate divine, devoid of independent importance, the chronicling of events in purely secular, finite terms would only falsify their true character. Hence, even if, as Hegel notes, the great Indian epics, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, have clear roots in actual historical conflicts among ancient kingdoms, their fantastical portrayal as sagas rife with divine incarnations better fits a Hindu self-understanding than any prosaic history, which makes sense only when the finite concerns of secular events are accorded an independent significance.<sup>7</sup>

Insofar as fine art must create imagined configurations that suit the fundamental truths that warrant expression, the focal self-understandings of ancient Hindu civilization cannot fail to shape whatever literary genre its artists coherently pursue.

The ramifications for epic literature are duly registered by Hegel in distinguishing the great Hindu epics from their Homeric counterparts. Admittedly, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata share signal features with the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* that separate both from the modern novel. Contrary to the novel's focus upon an individual's pursuit of self-selected private aims in a prosaic world full of external contingencies, the ancient Indian and Greek epics both portray national sagas, revealing the whole life of a people, and both mingle human and divine action. Yet the nations and their animating heroes and gods are starkly different, entailing very different types of action. In the vast Indian epics, divine incarnations play principal roles, not as mundane protagonists, personifying purely human concerns, but as fantastical figures, engendering correspondingly stupendous exploits of dimension and shape distending all limits of human and natural order. The course of action can therefore unfold in ways completely fortuitous, at least as measured by the finite connections of prosaic existence. Although humans are portrayed in struggles easily deriving from historical conflicts of competing empires, they are caught up in the magical exploits of divine incarnations while contending with the demands of caste duty, self-abnegation, and ultimate union with the divine that they recognize as the central pillars of meaning in life. Instead of exhibiting a free worth of its own, human action here appears, as Hegel observes, either as a direct materialization of the gods, as a mere accessory of divine deeds, or as ascetically withdrawn into oneness with divine power.<sup>8</sup>

By contrast, the Homeric heroes are strictly focused on upholding the ethical community to which they belong, be it by asserting its honor in war against contending nations or by enduring misfortune to save a ruling household and its kingdom from the corrupt suitors of a forsaken

queen. Although various gods compete in aiding the protagonists to achieve their ends, these gods are concerned with the same issues as their human counterparts, whose actions remain within the boundaries of finite agency even when granted divine assistance. The Homeric heroes may give little importance to inward struggles of conscience divorced from the field of public deeds, but their pursuit of communal ends has an independence that is never reached when all action becomes entangled in the fabulous adventures of incarnate gods, supernaturally and inhumanly endowed.<sup>9</sup>

Such contrasts have their counterparts in lyric, which Hegel duly highlights in thinking through the connections of form and content that occur when the prototypical Hindu worldview seeks consistent expression in lyric poetry.<sup>10</sup> If neither the public individual freedom and independence of classical self-understanding nor the romantic inwardization of modernity are accorded fundamental value, the generic subjectivity of lyric content must find another focus to be worthy of artistic expression. Although the lyric must still voice the content of the poet's own mind, that content can express a devaluation of the poet's own subjective life and a devotion to a divine with whom one can unite only by canceling the illusory strivings of one's own individual existence.

By meditating on the insubstantiality of oneself and the attempt to unite with what is the true substance, ancient Oriental lyric poetry will accordingly strike a tone more objective than its modern romantic counterpart, emphasizing not what is particular and personal in the poet's heart but rather the poet's own self-effacement in relation to outer circumstances, a self-effacement liberating the poet from himself and every finite attachment.<sup>11</sup> Because lyric poetry here gives inner testimony to the ultimate truth of an absolute to whom no adequate shape can be given, its appropriate form will be, Hegel notes, a hymnlike exaltation in which metaphors and similes must be abundantly and freely used to indicate a sublime divinity beyond all definite form.<sup>12</sup>

These ground rules for how a prototypical Hindu worldview can mold epic and lyric literature for its own self-expression would seem to call into question any blanket denial of a corresponding development of drama. This is especially true since the specific factor on which Hegel rests his challenge, the divergent evaluations of individual freedom, are precisely what he himself admits distinguish ancient Indian epic and lyric from the classical and modern forms of these genres. After all, if the ancient Indian epics and lyric poetry can proceed without granting personal agency the prominence on which classical and modern epic and lyric depend, why should drama not have equal opportunities?

## The aesthetic limits of sanskrit drama

Although Hegel dismisses drama as a viable medium for the artistic self-examination of ancient Indian civilization, he does acknowledge the existence of Sanskrit theater by going so far as to briefly analyze a prime example, Kālidāsa's play *Śakuntalā*.<sup>13</sup> Hegel's critical evaluation turns on an unfavorable comparison with the achievements of Indian lyric. Whereas we moderns, Hegel observes, can easily appreciate the grace, tenderness, and sweet charm of much ancient Indian lyric poetry without encountering any repugnant strangeness, the case is very different with Kālidāsa's drama. Although Hegel commends the various merits of its "wonderfully attractive composition,"<sup>14</sup> he claims that the crux of the drama cannot hold our interest. The central collision on which the action hinges consists, as Hegel accurately notes, in the curse a great sage, Durvāsa, angrily places upon Śakuntalā because she passes him by unnoticed, without the expected show of veneration. This curse makes the king, Dushyanta, forget the entire preceding episode in which he met, fell enamored with, and arranged to wed Śakuntalā, leaving him shamelessly ignorant of who the young woman is who arrives at his palace as his prospective bride. By chance, a fisherman finds the lost ring that the king had given Śakuntalā, and then, just as fortuitously, this fisherman gets arrested for possession of the royal ring, which then gets presented to the king, breaking the curse, and allowing the play to reach its happy reconciliation, where bride and regent seal their marriage. What deprives all this of any dramatic power for us moderns, Hegel claims, is that the source of conflict precipitating the whole action, the sage's curse, appears utterly absurd.<sup>15</sup>

The absurdity of the collision might not seem so aesthetically debilitating if it were the sort of happenstance that sets in motion opposing forces having enough substance to command the unqualified interest required for aesthetic worth. After all, any number of classical and modern tragedies and comedies revolve around contrived coincidences that redeem themselves by precipitating a clash of contending passions possessing sufficiently universal significance to touch any audience. In the case of *Śakuntalā*, however, there are no abiding obstacles that would otherwise forestall the happy resolution. Śakuntalā and the king are almost immediately attracted to one another, and although Śakuntalā's upbringing by a Brahmin ascetic might suggest an irreconcilable caste difference, Śakuntalā turns out to be an adopted girl whose origins pose no obstacle to her betrothal. Finally, the fact that the king already has a wife presents no problem, given the acceptance of polygamy by all

concerned. In every respect, the only thing producing any conflict is the sage's curse, which comes from a purely contingent, personal annoyance. Consequently, although the action and its protagonists may all be depicted in an entertaining, lively, eloquently evocative manner, the drama is much ado about nothing.

To object that the complete absurdity of the collision deprives the play of value to us moderns is not an aesthetically valid criticism if this is merely a liability for a contemporary audience. What appeals only to a particular culture and is otherwise bereft of interest cannot have a positive value, aesthetically speaking. Even if worldviews conflict, depicting the problems endemic to a civilization when it holds to its fundamental norms cannot fail to retain a universal interest just because it concerns ultimate values and their essential ramifications. Consequently, what we moderns find *artistically* dissatisfactory must also be aesthetically problematic for the culture in which the art work originates, as well as for any other possible audience. In the case of *Śakuntalā*, the absurdity of the collision should also be a liability for Kālidāsa himself and his contemporaries. The drama of the play is inherently deficient if the action turns on nothing of genuine significance for its own characters and the worldview to which they give expression.

If, however, the dramatic deficiency of *Śakuntalā* is to illustrate the limitations of drama for ancient Indian civilization, a much more general claim must be upheld – that the self-conception of such civilization cannot extend fundamental importance to any genuinely dramatic collision.

Although Hegel does not refer to other Sanskrit dramas to give evidence of the general problem, he does make similar observations regarding the limitations of the occasions for collision in the ancient Indian epics. Generally speaking, because these epics are dominated by actions of incarnate gods whose conduct is fantastically enlarged beyond any human measure, whatever conflicts and resolutions ensue are too incommensurate with the prosaic problems of ethical life and freedom to be taken seriously by a modern outlook.<sup>16</sup> If human individuals do not figure as appendages of these divine adventures, they hold fast to caste duties or pursue ascetic penances that signal an eventual withdrawal from all activity. In each case, the significance of action is rendered problematic.<sup>17</sup> Although Hegel describes this as a problem for the aesthetic appreciation of a contemporary Western audience,<sup>18</sup> it would no less diminish the importance of such epic portrayal for the culture of its authors.

Despite this limitation, Hegel must admit that collisions here remain possible. The divisions of caste may engender conflicts between the position individuals are assigned by birth and their personal passions and strivings.<sup>19</sup> As the *Śakuntalā* suggests but does not develop, love can cross caste boundaries and set enamored individuals in collision with their communal duties. So, too, might conflict break out between personal ambitions for power, wealth, artistic achievement, or education and caste restrictions and ascetic removal from worldly attachments. Indeed, whole caste communities could come into opposition over the boundaries of their respective obligations, just as members of the same caste could compete for leadership, lovers, marriage partners, or other desired goods within their respective sphere. Why should not any of these fields for conflict and resolution provide a viable avenue for drama, either tragic or comedic?

In considering this question, one should consider how the possible collisions can be construed from within the ancient Indian perspective and only then how the resulting treatment would strike any other audience. It is an entirely different matter to consider how such collisions would be evaluated and artistically portrayed by a worldview already transgressing orthodox Hindu values and acknowledging the independent value of romantic love, social and political rights, and other ends prized by modern aspirations for emancipation. Then one would be addressing the very different possibilities of literature in a world of colonial or postcolonial transition, where a traditional society is undergoing an external modernization and two discordant value systems are each vying for allegiance.

Conflicts revolving around challenges to caste divisions and ascetic withdrawal would offer little dramatic possibilities for an ancient Indian perspective, not because such challenges could not be countenanced but because of how little significance they could be accorded. In order for tragic conflicts to have any compelling force, the opposing sides must both have an acknowledged value. Otherwise, the struggle is a one-sided affair of little abiding interest. Consequently, genuine tragic drama is offered no occasion by situations where other worldly attachments run afoul of caste and ascetic duties and these attachments are granted no equivalent legitimacy.

Comic possibility might seem provided by the very nullity of such competing attachments if the unfolding of their coming to grief could retain some redeeming positive interest. If, however, neither the illicit worldly aspirations nor the very initiative of the protagonists can claim any abiding value, the whole play of failed intrigue becomes a prosaic lesson in the peremptory triumph over illusory attachments.



This leaves one avenue in which conflicting parties can command sufficient worth to make the contest worth portraying: situations where protagonists compete over mutually sanctioned aims, such as power or a marriage partner, without stepping outside the boundaries of dharma. Significantly, rivalries of this sort are precisely the source of collision in such renowned Sanskrit dramas as Viśākhadatta's *Rākshasa's Ring* and Bhavabhūti's *Mālāṇī and Mādhava*, and these examples illustrate just what can be achieved.

*Rākshasa's Ring* is paradigmatic of how political rivalries can be enlisted in Sanskrit drama in no small part because it portrays the masterful schemings of Kautilya, who puts into practice the counsels for retaining political power that constitute the historical Kautilya's own *Arthaśāstra*, the paramount political treatise of ancient India. *Rākshasa's Ring* is about not a conflict of opposing visions of political association but a contest for power between political rivals. Rule, as confined within the boundaries of caste community, can never exercise the truly sovereign power of determining the total fabric of conduct. Instead, the rulers are bound to fulfill their own caste obligations to sustain the whole caste framework, which is eternally given by the divine nature of existence, whose order can never be challenged by human endeavor. For this reason, the spirit of ancient India leaves no place for political philosophy in the true normative sense. Instead of inquiring into what ends the political community should pursue, the *Arthaśāstra* duly recognizes that all that can be at issue governing in an orthodox Hindu world is finding the best means for fulfilling ends that are not determinable by human agency. In other words, political thinking is relegated to providing pragmatic counsels for how to retain power and use it efficiently to sustain the natural order of caste relationships. This means that politics becomes a purely Machiavellian<sup>20</sup> contest where the shrewdest councillor reigns supreme. There may be differences in regime between, as we hear repeatedly in *Rākshasa's Ring*, monarchic, monarchic and ministerial, and ministerial rule, but these differences all operate within the caste guidelines where dynastic rulers may allow greater or lesser authority to their ministers without otherwise disturbing the perennial ends of governance. Under these circumstances, where form of rule and political program can not be fundamentally in question, any dramatic conflict between contending political factions will be of interest solely because of the striking character of the competing protagonists. *Rākshasa's Ring* illustrates this in sterling fashion, placing Kautilya as the relentless master weaver of the political fate of all other characters, who either go to their destruction or bend to his plans, no matter how loyal and upright they seek

to remain. Viśākhadatta succeeds in bringing to life the full power and supreme cunning of Kautilya by setting him against as noble a figure as Rākshasa, who retains his full dignity even when finally capitulating to the power he had defied by accepting appointment as chief minister to King Chandra Gupta.

The striking force of personality of Kautilya and the resolute resistance of Rākshasa almost seem to bring Sanskrit drama to the precincts of Shakespearean tragedy. Unlike classical tragedy, which revolves around the conflict of different ethical powers, such as paradigmatically oppose Antigone and Creon, Shakespearean tragedy exhibits the modern privileging of self-imposed aims and the clashes they produce both within the individual and in opposition to others. In this respect, the conflicts bringing the likes of Macbeth, Hamlet, and Lear to their tragic destruction are not oppositions of equally legitimate ethical spheres but personal resolves that generate oppositions of their own. Here, as in *Rākshasa's Ring*, it is the force of personality that is the focal point of interest. Yet whereas the Shakespearean tragic figures are torn apart from within and the drama advances towards its resolution through the development of inner conflicts, neither Kautilya nor Rākshasa is tormented by any such inward demons. Kautilya remains unflinchingly resolute from beginning to end, and although Rākshasa may lament the unstoppable entanglements of his adversary, his conflict is with the net being cast over him. This absence of inner turmoil is decisive, for if it were the focal point, that would signify that particular personal commitments warrant artistic treatment. If, however, personal attachments are regarded as inherently illusory, the development of character has a diminished importance. Then, however, the only remaining focus for dramas of Hindu political rivalry, the personality of the political opponents, becomes at best a source of entertainment and rhetorical dazzle.

Analogous dramatic limitations apply to rivalry over love and/or marriage prospects, as Bhavabhūti's *Mālafī and Mādhava* illustrates. Once more, where the colliding sides both have legitimacy in terms of caste affiliation and observance, the interest must derive from the personal qualities of the protagonists, the charm of the story, and the decoration of its telling, since nothing more universal is in contention. Yet if worldly attachments can command only a very qualified significance, the passions and personality of the characters have no more essential appeal than overcoming the obstacles to their romantic fulfillment.

Bhavabhūti fills his play with enraptured infatuations that come to an interlocking fruition only after a wild tiger has been battled, human sacrifice has been interrupted, the king has suspended the marriage

arrangement he has promised, and a magically endowed ascetic has saved the heroine from the final clutches of a Karālā devotee. All of the enamored parties, Mālatī and Mādhava, Mādhava's friend Makaranda and Mālatī's friend Madayantikā, and Mādhava's servant Kalahamsaka and the servant girl Mandārikā have completely untroubled infatuations, where only external obstacles prevent their eventual pairings. When these obstacles appear to be insurmountable, the aggrieved parties waste away and their supporters prepare to gain release from their worldly sufferings by killing themselves. The obstacles themselves are all purely contingent – the king's decision to marry off Mālatī to his minister Nandana is just as arbitrary as Mālatī's fortuitous seizure for sacrifice by two worshippers of Karālā. Moreover, although both Mādhava and his friend Makaranda take action to save their loves from danger, these deeds are occasioned by extraneous circumstances and still leave the final resolution hanging upon both the manipulations of the mendicant nun Kāmandakī, who arranges the key meetings between Mālatī and Mādhava, and the sudden rescue of Mālatī by Kāmandakī's former pupil, Saudāmanī, who appears out of nowhere to secure the happy conclusion.

These machinations may appear to drain the play of any indwelling dramatic logic, but they fit a self-understanding where human destiny is at the prey of miraculous interventions and the striving of worldly attachment is not itself sufficient to engender significant conflicts or bring them to a meaningful resolution. To tie the collision and its resolution to the inner resolves of the protagonists would entail treating the self-engendered action of independent personalities as something of universal validity, worthy of aesthetical exploration. This option cannot be consistently available to the orthodox Hindu vision of dharma and release. For these to be appropriately realized on stage, the vagaries of human attachment must be supplemented by the very undramatic serendipities so colorfully enlisted by Bhavabhūti.

Therefore Hegel's challenge to ancient Indian drama must be rethought in recognition of how drama, like the other fundamental literary genres, can be created from any worldview but only subject to modifications that may restrict the scope of its dramatic possibilities. Hegel is not wrong to question whether the prototypical Hindu worldview can take seriously the worldly self-assertions that drive both tragedy and comedy on their most dramatically inexorable paths. Yet the examples of Sanskrit literature demonstrate how ancient Indian culture can use theater to express its own self-understanding, albeit at the expense of undramatic plots and univocal characters. As Hegel would surely agree, such failings are

not entirely unique to Eastern drama. Because ancient Greek civilization privileges the public life of ethical community without acknowledging the significance of individual reflection, it may create dramas whose collisions arise purely out of the essential interests of different ethical spheres, but its characters will stand in conflict with representatives of opposing forces more than stand conflicted in themselves. By contrast, because the modern world recognizes the value of moral freedom and private inwardness, its drama will be less able to locate conflicts in substantial, objective powers and will instead portray the inner turmoil of complex characters in the face of contingent collisions devoid of exclusively public significance. These familiar distinctions testify once more to two parallel truths of literary theory: whereas the fundamental genres of epic, lyric, and drama are perennial options of literary expression, the forms each will take reflect the self-understandings of the civilization to which they belong.

# Notes

## 1 Is Phenomenology Necessary as Introduction to Philosophy?

1. "It is for this reason that an exposition of how knowledge makes its appearance will here be undertaken." G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 49.
2. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraph 82, pp. 52–3.
3. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraphs 84–5, pp. 53–4.
4. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraph 85, p. 54.
5. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraph 85, p. 54.
6. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraph 78, p. 49.
7. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraph 87, p. 55.
8. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraph 88, p. 56.
9. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraph 78, p. 50.
10. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraph 89, p. 57.
11. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraph 80, p. 51.
12. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraph 79, pp. 50–1.
13. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraph 165, pp. 102–3.
14. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraph 230, pp. 137–8.
15. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraphs 238–9, pp. 144–5.
16. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraphs 391–3, pp. 234–5.
17. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraph 418, pp. 251–2.
18. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraphs 476, 481–3, pp. 289, 292–4.
19. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraph 787, pp. 477–8.
20. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraph 808, p. 493.
21. G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), "Introduction: General Notion of Logic," pp. 43–59.
22. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 43.
23. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 43.
24. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 48–9.
25. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 67–78.
26. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 72–3.
27. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 68–9.
28. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 43, 59.
29. William Maker, *Philosophy without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 67–82.
30. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraphs 90–1, pp. 58–9.
31. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 73–4.

## 2 Negation and Truth

1. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1011 b26–7.
2. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1005 b19–20.

3. Hegel discusses these confusions in "Remark 1: The Opposition of Being and Nothing in Ordinary Thinking," in *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1976), pp. 83–90.
4. Hence, as Eva Brann points out, "Nothing is not Nonbeing. For the latter is, even as its opposite, a relative to Being, while Nothing is beyond both Being and Nonbeing, just a blank." See Eva Brann, *The Ways of Naysaying: No, Not, Nothing, and Nonbeing* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), p. 189. Properly speaking, the being that stands in contrast to nonbeing is either a determinate being confronting its negation or the being and nothing that are united within the stable unity of determinate being.
5. For this reason, R. G. Collingwood proclaims that there can be "no science of pure being," as he titles ch. II of *An Essay on Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 11) and that metaphysics must abandon ontology. "A science of being is a contradiction in terms" (p. 13), he writes, for "the science of pure being would have a subject-matter entirely devoid of particularities; a subject-matter, therefore, containing nothing to differentiate it from anything else, or from nothing at all" (p. 14).
6. Peirce shows this same outcome regarding the idea of the absolutely First, which must be purely immediate. "The idea of the absolutely First must be entirely separated from all conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is itself a second to that second. ... The First ... cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else." See Charles S. Peirce, *Writings of Charles S. Peirce*, vol. 6, 1886–1890, ed. Christian J. W. Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), p. 170.
7. Hegel makes all these points in his analysis of Being, Nothing, and Becoming in *Science of Logic*, pp. 82–108.
8. This "sublation of becoming" is delineated by Hegel in *Science of Logic*, pp. 106–8.
9. Hegel has pioneered this account of determinacy in his *Science of Logic* (pp. 109–14), an account which escapes all thinkers who presuppose some ultimate determinacy or first principle of being or knowing.
10. See, for example, Descartes's use of reality in the third of his *Meditations*.
11. See Plato, *Sophist*, in Plato, *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), where the "Visitor" states: "So it has to be possible for *that which is not* to be, in the case of change and also as applied to all the kinds. That's because as applied to all of them the nature of *the different* makes each of them not be, by making it different from that which is. And we're going to be right if we say that all of them *are not* in this same way. And on the other hand, we're also going to be right if we call them beings, because they have a share in that which is" (256d–e, p. 280).
12. Spinoza, Letter 50 to Jelles, in Spinoza, *Complete Works*, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), p. 892.
13. Derrida presents his classic statement of this view in the essay "La Différance." See Jacques Derrida, *Marges de la Philosophie* (Paris: Les éditions de minuit, 1972), pp. 1–29.
14. The identity of the One and self-relation, which Hegel develops in the *Science of Logic* (pp. 157–64), is misunderstood by Plato and Peirce, who both have difficulty conceiving self-relation without transforming it into a relation

between different parts of the same whole. This is exemplified in the *Republic*, book IV, 430e–1a, when Socrates points to the incomprehensibility of self-control, where one and the same entity is to figure as patient and agent and thereupon divides both the soul and the polis into separate ruling and ruled parts, precluding self-rule and self-determination generally. It is equally evident when Peirce writes that “relations of reason” and “self-relations are alike in this: that they arise from the mind setting one part of a notion into relation to another” (Peirce, *Writings*, vol. 6, p. 177).

15. Hegel identifies this categorical domain as the sphere of the Logic of Essence (*Science of Logic*, pp. 389–571), but since essence is itself a particular category within this domain, it is perhaps more appropriate to describe this sphere generically as that of determined determinacy, minimally involving a determiner and what the determiner determines.
16. Although Peirce ascribes Firstness to determinate factors in all spheres of reality, he does admittedly acknowledge that the absolute immediacy of Firstness leaves it indeterminate. See Peirce, *Writings*, vol. 6, 1886–1890, p. 170.
17. “Thus *illusory being* is the phenomenon of skepticism, and the Appearance of idealism, too, is such an *immediacy*, which is not a something or a thing, in general, not an indifferent being that would still be, apart from its determinateness and connexion with the subject...the illusory being of skepticism was supposed to lack any foundation of being,...but at the same time skepticism admitted a multitude of determinations of its illusory being...this content, therefore, may well have no being, no thing or thing-in-itself at its base; it remains on its own account as it is; the content has only been transferred from being into an illusory being” (Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 396).
18. Hegel thus writes, “Essence is *sublated being*. It is simple equality with itself, but only in so far as it is the *negation* of the sphere of being in general” (Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 394).
19. As we shall see, if this difference is removed, determined determinacy becomes self-determined determinacy, where determiner and determined are one and the same.
20. In this respect, essence is, as Hegel puts it, “being itself, but not determined only as an other, but being that has sublated itself both as immediate being and also as immediate negation, as negation that is infected with otherness” (Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 395).
21. Hegel accordingly characterizes essence as “Being coming into mediation with itself through the negativity of itself...firstly, essence, as simple self-relation, is Being, and secondly as regards its one-sided characteristic of immediacy, Being is deposed to a mere negative, to a seeming or reflected light.” See G. W. F. Hegel, *Logic*, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), §112, p. 162. In this respect, the determiner has a being comprising “the negation of a nothing” (Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 400), standing in contrast with what it posits and thereby robs of independent being.
22. Hegel delineates this transition from determined determinacy to self-determination in *Science of Logic*, pp. 569–71.
23. “The first negative, or the *determination*, is not a limitation for the universal, which, on the contrary, *maintains itself therein* and is positively identical with itself” (Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 602).

24. "It does not merely *show*, or have an *illusory being*, in its other, like the determination of reflection; ... the *universal*, on the contrary, is posited as the *essential being* of its determination, as the latter's *own positive nature*... The determinateness, therefore, is not introduced from outside when we speak of it in connexion with the universal. As negativity in general or in accordance with the *first, immediate* negation, the universal contains determinateness generally as *particularity*; as the *second* negation, that is, as negation of the negation, it is *absolute determinateness* or *individuality*" (Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 603).
25. Whether Plato himself is such a Platonist is debatable given the critique of the theory of forms presented in the *Parmenides*, 130b–5b.
26. This is manifest in Leibniz's *Monadology*, which treats objectivity as a first principle, rendering each fundamental entity a totality completely unaffected by any relation to other. Such relations are instead rendered internal to the monad, contained within the monad's representation.
27. Hans Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press: 2001), p. 175.
28. This must be acknowledged to vindicate Jonas when he writes, "And since the power of negation is a part of freedom, indeed a defining ingredient of it, the proposition is that freedom is a prerequisite of truth, and that the experience of truth itself is the evidence and exercise of a certain kind of freedom" (Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life*, p. 175).

### 3 How Should Essence Be Determined? Reflections on Hegel's Two Divergent Accounts

1. See ¶114 in G. W. F. Hegel, *Werke* 8 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 236; G. W. F. Hegel, *Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 166.
2. This common dogma of pre-Hegelian metaphysics is perhaps most succinctly stated in Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason, according to which everything has a ground.
3. This is exhibited by how the pioneer of transcendental philosophy, Kant, ascribes necessary empirical reality to Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason. See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A201/B246, p. 311, where he writes, "the principle of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience."
4. Significantly, Hegel's logic of essence achieves closure when what determines and what is determined cease to be distinguishable. This occurs when cause and effect revert to reciprocity. Because the cause is a cause only in virtue of having an effect, the effect operates as a cause of its cause's own efficacy, whereas the cause figures as an effect of its own effect. The resulting reciprocity, where each term is both determined and determiner, both cause and effect of its counterpart, brings logic to the threshold of the Logic of the Concept, where self-determination is at play, that is, where what determines and what is determined are one and the same. For this transition, see §C, ch. 3, book 2, *Science of Logic*.



5. G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990), p. 33; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 49.
6. All these crucial points are made with incisive brevity in the opening paragraphs of the introduction to the *Science of Logic*. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 25; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 43–4.
7. See, for example, David Kolb's "The Necessities of Hegel's Logics," 2011 in *Hegel and the Analytic Tradition*, ed. Angelica Nuzzo.
8. John M. E. McTaggart argues for this view in his *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic* (Bristol: Thoemmes Antiquarian Books, 1990), p. 99.
9. Hegel distinguishes these three forms of logical advance in his *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 71; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1992), pp. 4–5; *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1994), pp. 28–30; *Science of Logic*, pp. 81, 390–1, 596–7.
10. These moves are detailed by Hegel in his analysis of "the Measureless" and "the Becoming of Essence." See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), pp. 416–31; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 371–85.
11. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 8; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 394.
12. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 8; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 394.
13. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 10; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 396.
14. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 8; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 394.
15. This suggests why identity will be ushered in by determining reflection.
16. Hegel, *Werke* 8, ¶114, p. 235; Hegel's *Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), p. 165.
17. G. W. F. Hegel, *Werke* 8 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), ¶¶114–15, p. 235–6; Hegel's *Logic*, pp. 165–7.
18. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), pp. 9, 13; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 395, 399.
19. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 9; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 395.
20. McTaggart ignores this fundamental difference in suggesting that Essence and its posit, which he construes as the Substratum and its Surface, are merely different sides of the same reality, thereby standing on a par. See McTaggart, *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, p. 99. This mistake is the basis of his rejection of the *Science of Logic's* development of Essence and his privileging of the *Encyclopedia Logic's* version.
21. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 9; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 395.
22. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 10; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 396.
23. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 12; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 398.
24. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 12; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 398.

25. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 13; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 399.
26. As Hegel observes, "reflection-into-self is essentially the presupposing of that from which it is the return." See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 16; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 401.
27. As Hegel points out, external reflection removes the externality of itself over and against the immediate it presupposes by positing it, thereby uniting itself with its negative and becoming determinate. In so doing, reflection shows itself to be immanent to the immediacy it presupposed. Essence is here "in and for itself" because it relates to itself in the content it posits, encountering only what is inherent in its own movement of return to self. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 19; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 404.
28. Because reflection now determines the content of that which it presupposed, Hegel can observe that determining reflection is "the positing of the immediate in accord with its true being." See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 20; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 405. That true being is now inherent in essence and thereby provides essence with the internal self-related differentiation comprising identity.
29. This allows determining reflection to be characterized as "the unity of positing and external reflection." Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 21; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 405. The content that essence posits, as determining reflection, belongs to both the term it mediates and its own determining movement. "Positedness is thus a *determination of reflection*," belonging to reflection by owing its content to its movement. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 22; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 406.
30. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 24; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 409.
31. As Hegel puts it, here "the determinateness of reflection is *the relation to its otherness within itself*." Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 23; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 408.
32. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 24; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 409.
33. See ch. 3, §1, of the *Science of Logic*'s Logic of Being for a detailed development of these moves, esp. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 163–9; Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), pp. 166–73.
34. As Hegel points out, the determinations of reflection neither attract nor repel one another, but rather comprise essentialities that are internally self-reflected, without relation to other. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 22; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 407. Nonetheless, as distinct categories of identity, difference, and opposition, they become "*determinate against one another*" in virtue of their successive transformations. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 26; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 411.
35. It should be noted that identity is not a specific identity but identity as such. Although essence here has an internal differentiation, that determinacy is not further qualified in any way. This is why Hegel can characterize it as "at first, simple self-relation, pure identity," whose self-reflection

is “the absence of any determination” in any other respect. By contrast, the one may involve simple self-relation, but it lacks self-reflection. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 24; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 409. The one is a restoration of itself from an other, which it excludes, whereas identity’s self-equality, achieved by determining reflection, is “pure origination from and within itself, *essential identity*.” Because this self-equality is produced through the internal differentiation of self-reflection, identity is not abstract but entails difference. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), p. 27; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 411.

## 5 Being and Idea

1. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A299/B356, p. 387, A323/B379, p. 400.
2. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A300/B357, p. 388.
3. This externality gets removed only through the ultimate form of syllogism, disjunctive syllogism, where each term ends up having the same determination. Since this eliminates their subjective extrinsic character, it paves the way for objectivity, whose determinations are completely and thoroughly intrinsic, even if such wholly intrinsically determined objects must immediately confront one another in a completely external way, as constitutive of mechanism.
4. In this vein, Kant maintains that we can have no concept of an object corresponding to an Idea, for we have no acquaintance with any object that corresponds to an Idea, although we can have a “problematic” concept of it. The waffling in the use of “concept” reflects how Kant roots concepts in the Understanding, with its dependence upon Sensibility for material content. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A339/B397, p. 409.
5. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A340/B398, p. 410.

## 6 Truth, the Good, and the Unity of Theory and Practice

1. Plato, *Republic*, book VI, 505a.
2. Michael B. Foster brings out these points in his examination of the *Republic* in *The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 1–71.
3. Plato, *Republic*, book IV, 430e–1a.
4. Plato, *Meno*, 98a.
5. Plato, *Republic*, book VI, 508b–9b.
6. Plato, *Republic*, 508e.
7. Plato, *Republic*, 511b.
8. Plato, *Republic*, book VII, 519c–20d.
9. Kant, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, in Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 114, 130.
10. G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 775–823.

## 7 The End of Logic

1. Plato shows his awareness of the dilemma, explaining the gist of the “third man” problem as follows in his dialogue *Parmenides*: “But if like things are like by partaking of something, won’t that be the form itself?” “Undoubtedly.” “Therefore nothing can be like the form, nor can the form be like anything else. Otherwise, alongside the form another form will always make its appearance, and if that form is like anything, yet another; and if the form proves to be like what partakes of it, a fresh form will never cease emerging” (132e–3a). See Plato, *Complete Works*, ed. by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), p. 367.
2. The disjunctive syllogism can be represented as follows: the Universal is A or B or C or D, the Universal is not B or C or D, hence the Universal is A. Once the disjunctive syllogism infers its conclusion, that conclusion’s content becomes identical to that of the major and minor premises. For further discussion of this move, see Richard Dien Winfield, *From Concept to Objectivity: Thinking Through Hegel’s Subjective Logic* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 122–8.
3. This is why the account of determinate being leads to being-for-self and the One. Hegel describes this conceptual development in the *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1976), pp. 109–64.
4. Admittedly, the concept, judgment, and syllogism are all subjective in the sense that their self-determinations involve external mediations (the concept insofar as it issues from the reciprocity of determiner and determined in the logic of Essence, judgment insofar as subject and predicate are united by a copula, and syllogism insofar as the extremes are connected by a middle term). Nonetheless, self-determination remains in play, even if in conjunction with given determinacies and determined determinacies.
5. See Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 711–54.
6. Hegel, *Logic*, trans. William Wallace (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), addition to §236; *Science of Logic*, p. 824.
7. Hegel, *Logic*, addition to §236; *Science of Logic*, p. 824.
8. See Hegel, *Logic*, addition to §228.
9. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 822–3.
10. Hegel, *Logic*, §237; *Science of Logic*, p. 825.
11. Hegel, *Logic*, addition to §237.
12. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 53.
13. Or as Hegel puts it, “the method has emerged as the *self-knowing Notion that has itself*, as the absolute, both subjective and objective, *for its subject matter*” (*Science of Logic*, p. 826).
14. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 834–8.
15. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 838–40.
16. Hegel, *Logic*, addition to §238; *Science of Logic*, p. 830.
17. See Plato, *Republic*, 508d–9b, in *Complete Works*, pp. 1129–30.
18. See Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 48–9, 69–70.
19. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 843.
20. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 843.
21. Hegel, *Logic*, addition to §244; *Science of Logic*, p. 843.

## 8 The Logic of Nature

1. Aristotle, *Physics*, book VIII, ch. 7.
2. Michael B. Foster argues this point in "Christian Theology and Modern Science of Nature," part I, *Mind*, vol. XLIV, no. 176 (October 1935), pp. 439–66.
3. Although Aristotle distinguishes natural entities as having a principle of motion within themselves (*Physics*, book II, ch. 1), Aristotle rejects the very possibility of self-motion. On the one hand, the unmoved mover does not exhibit self-motion since it invariably thinks itself and does not move in imparting motion to nature. On the other hand, natural things do not move themselves insofar as movable physical things are continuous and have parts, where one part cannot be moved without the others being in motion. Since anything whose motion depends on the motion of something else cannot be self-moving, no physical entity can be self-moving. See Aristotle, *Physics*, book VII, ch. 1.
4. Aristotle, *Physics*, book IV, ch. 4.
5. Aristotle, *Physics*, book IV, chs 10–11.
6. Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, ed. Michael Friedman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 5 [470].
7. Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, p. 15ff. [480ff.].
8. Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, p. 15 [480].
9. Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 177, A27/B43; p. 185, A43/B60; p. 191, B72.
10. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 212–13, A80/B106–A81/B107.
11. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 344, A245/B302.
12. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 326–9, B274–79.
13. Kant's reduction of the philosophy of nature to pure mechanics is only a partial account of mechanics since he fails to provide any distinct treatment of gravitation as it applies to either the fall of bodies to a center of gravity (as exhibited in terrestrial motion) or to the self-moving gravitational system of bodies (as exhibited in solar systems and galaxies).
14. G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), p. 843.
15. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 842–3.
16. See Edward Halper, "The Logic of Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature*," in *Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature*, ed. by Stephen Houlgate (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), pp. 29–49; and Graham Schuster, "The Logic of *Realphilosophie* – the End of the Science of Logic, Objectivity, and Objective Spirit" (unpublished).
17. Hegel writes, "Space is simply pure Quantity, only no longer as a logical determination, but as existing immediately and externally. Nature, consequently, does not begin with the qualitative but with the quantitative, because its determination is not, like Being in Logic, the abstractly First and immediate, but a Being already essentially *mediated* within itself, an external- and other-being." G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), remark to §254, p. 29.
18. Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, addition to §248, p.19.
19. Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, addition to §254, p. 30.
20. Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, §261 and remark to §261, pp. 41–2.

21. Properly speaking, ceasing to be and coming to be do not involve any transitions from being to nothing and nothing to being since being is *immediately* nothing and nothing is *immediately* being. There is no passage *between* one and the other.
22. Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, p. 46 [508–9].
23. Kant does this explicitly in Explication 2 of his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, writing, “Attractive force is that moving force by which a matter can be the cause of the approach of others to it (or what is the same, by which it resists the removal of others from it). Repulsive force is that by which a matter can be the cause of others removing themselves from it (or what is the same, by which it resists the approach of others to it).” See Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, p. 35 [498].

## 9 The Limits of Intersubjectivity in Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit

1. G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind, Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), trans. William Wallace and A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), §409–11, pp. 139–51; Hegel, *Werke 10: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1830), *Dritter Teil: Die Philosophie des Geistes mit den mündlichen Zusätzen* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), §409–11, pp. 182–97.
2. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §405, pp. 99–100; Hegel, *Werke 10*, addition to §405, pp. 130–1.
3. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §406, p. 101 ff.; Hegel, *Werke 10*, §406, p. 132 ff.
4. John Macmurray, *Persons in Relation* (New York: Humanity Books, 1999), p. 48.
5. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §418, pp. 158–60; Hegel, *Werke 10*, addition to §418, pp. 206–8.
6. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §420, pp. 161–2; Hegel, *Werke 10*, addition to §420, pp. 209–10. Although Hegel does loosely mention universality, particularity, and individuality in connection with perception, the perceptual object is specifically determined in terms of the categories of thing, properties, and matters from the Logic of Essence.
7. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 484–9, 500–5, 518–23.
8. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §430–5, pp. 170–6; Hegel, *Werke 10*, §430–5, pp. 219–26.
9. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §426–9, pp. 167–70; Hegel, *Werke 10*, §426–9, pp. 215–19.
10. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §446–9, pp. 192–200; Hegel, *Werke 10*, §446–9, pp. 246–56.
11. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §451–4, pp. 201–6; Hegel, *Werke 10*, §451–4, pp. 257–62.
12. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to §457, pp. 210–12; Hegel, *Werke 10*, addition to §457, p. 269.
13. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §457–8, pp. 210–13; Hegel, *Werke 10*, §457–8, pp. 267–71.

14. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 3rd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1968), §293, p. 100e.
15. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §459–60, pp. 213–18; Hegel, *Werke* 10, §405, pp. 130–1.
16. Admittedly, Augustine offers his account in describing the intersubjective situation of learning language from others, where one individual observes another naming some object; as Augustine writes, “I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shown by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires” (quoted by Wittgenstein, §1, p. 2e, *Philosophical Investigations*).
17. As Wittgenstein points out, Augustine’s concept of meaning can have its place in a primitive form of language, restricted to pointing out things, but not as a general depiction of how meaning figures in any developed language (see §2, p. 3e, *Philosophical Investigations*). Wittgenstein suggests that children use such primitive forms of language in first learning to talk, “when the child cannot yet ask what the name is” (§5, p. 4e, *Philosophical Investigations*). As Wittgenstein observes, “this ostensive teaching of words can be said to establish an association between the word and the thing” but leaves undetermined what that association might further signify (§5, p. 4e, *Philosophical Investigations*). Hegel’s account of sense-certainty in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* indicates how demonstrative reference can hardly suffice to fix any individual meaning, since “this,” “here,” “now” and “I” have no exclusive reference but apply universally to any “this,” “here,” “now,” and “I.”
18. As Fodor observes, in this case, two fatal consequences are entailed: first, since one can’t use a term unless one possesses the concept it expresses, you need the concept “water” to baptize the word *water*; secondly, no word can be introduced into a language unless that language already possesses words that mean what the word expresses. In other words, the baptism of the word is no baptism at all but presupposes what it attempts to introduce. See Jerry Fodor, “What Is Universally Quantified and Necessary and A Posteriori and It Flies South in the Winter?,” *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, vol. 80, no. 2 (November 2006), pp. 14–15.

## 10 Economy and Ethical Community

1. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §2, p. 26.
2. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §184, p. 221.
3. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §183, p. 221.
4. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §241, p. 265.
5. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §246, pp. 267–8; §248, p. 269.
6. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §244, p. 266.

7. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §84–96, pp. 117–23.
8. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §102, p. 130.
9. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §230–56, pp. 259–74.
10. David P. Levine characterizes this approach to economics as “economic calculation” and succinctly outlines these ramifications. As Levine points out, Max Weber, who sees the general prevalence of economic calculation and instrumental rationality as “the hallmark of the modern age,” has extended this approach to characterize modernity as a whole. See James A. Caporaso and David P. Levine, *Theories of Political Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 21–4. The Weberian view has been embraced by Heidegger and his students, including Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, and Herbert Marcuse, as well as by Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Michael Oakeshott, and Jürgen Habermas.
11. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §189, p. 227.
12. In “The Secret of Primitive Accumulation,” Marx describes the historical process of expropriation and liberation from serfdom and guild controls that provides for these conditions. See Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. I, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (New York: Random House, 1906), pp. 784–7.
13. See, for example, Kant’s account of family relations under the strained rubric of “On Rights to Persons Akin to Rights to Things” in §III, paragraphs 22–30, of *The Metaphysics of Morals*. See Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 426–32.
14. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §51, p. 81.
15. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §113, p. 140.
16. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §190–1, pp. 228–9.
17. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §190–1, pp. 228–9.
18. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §200, p. 233; §207, p. 239; §241, p. 265.
19. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §208, p. 239.
20. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §209, p. 240.
21. Hernando de Soto, *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
22. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §250–6, pp. 270–4.
23. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §255, pp. 272–3; §300–11, pp. 339–51.
24. Friedrich A. Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); see pp. 253–323.
25. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §245, p. 267.

## 11 The Challenge of Political Right

1. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. J. Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), vol. II, 1729–30; *Nicomachean Ethics*, book I, ch. 2, 1094a18–1094b12.
2. *Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. I, 684, *De Anima*, book III, ch. 5, 430a10–26.
3. *Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. I, 422–3, 425; *Physics*, book VIII, ch. 2, 253a11–18, ch. 4, 254b30–32.



4. Plato, *Republic*, in *Complete Works*, ed. by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 1062; *Republic*, book IV, 430e–1a.
5. G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 37–42.
6. Although rationalists such as Descartes and empiricists such as Locke both maintain that there can be certain knowledge of one's own self and of God, Kant exposes the doubtfulness of these claims.
7. David P. Levine, "Reason in Politics," *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*, no. 65 (Spring/Summer 2012): 1–17.
8. Richard Dien Winfield, *The Just Family* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998).
9. Richard Dien Winfield, *The Just Economy* (London: Routledge, 1988).
10. Richard Dien Winfield, *Law in Civil Society* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995).
11. Richard Dien Winfield, *The Just State: Rethinking Self-Government* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2005).
12. Carl Rapp, "Celebrity Election versus Lottery Selection: A Reconsideration," *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*, no. 65 (Spring/Summer 2012): 39.
13. Rapp, "Celebrity Election versus Lottery Selection," 41.
14. Robert Berman, "Normativity, Equal Opportunity, and the Adjustment Problem in *The Just State*," *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*, no. 65 (Spring/Summer 2012): 51ff.
15. Friedrich A. Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 253–323.
16. I wish to thank David Merrill for organizing the special issue of the *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain* in which this essay originally appeared.

## 12 The Normativity of Globalization

1. G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §341–60, pp. 372–80.
2. This is what lies at the core of Hegel's "hypothesis" that there is reason in history. See Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956), p. 9.
3. Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 191.
4. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, addition to §274, pp. 312–13.
5. For an analysis of the limitations of Kemal's secularization of Turkey, see Richard Dien Winfield, *Modernity, Religion, and the War on Terror* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 111–20.
6. Karl Marx, *Capital* – vol. I, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (New York: International, 1967), p. 713 ff.
7. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §190–1, pp. 228–9.

## 13 Literary Form and Civilization

1. For a more sustained critique of the foundationalism of the mimetic and transcendental approaches to aesthetics, see Richard Dien Winfield, *Systematic Aesthetics* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995), pp. 15–57.

2. G. W. F. Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 1205.
3. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, p. 1205.
4. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, p. 1205.
5. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, p. 1205.
6. Hegel discusses these points in *On the Episode of the Mahābhārat Known by the name Bhagavad-Gītā by Wilhelm von Humboldt*, ed. and trans. Herbert Herring (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1995), pp. 46 ff.
7. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, pp. 987, 1058.
8. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, p. 1072.
9. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, p. 339.
10. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, pp. 1147–8.
11. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, p. 1149.
12. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, p. 1149.
13. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, p. 1176.
14. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, p. 1176.
15. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, p. 1176.
16. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, p. 1095.
17. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, p. 1072.
18. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, p. 1095.
19. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, p. 209.
20. For a helpful discussion on how the respective political pragmatisms of Kautilya and Machiavelli rest on very different bases, see B. N. Ray's *Tradition and Innovation in Indian Political Thought* (Delhi: Ajanta Books International, 1998), pp. 94–105.

# Works Cited

- Aristotle, *De Anima, Nicomachean Ethics, Metaphysics, Physics*, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. J. Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
- Berman, Robert, "Normativity, Equal Opportunity, and the Adjustment Problem in *The Just State*," *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*, no. 65 (Spring/Summer 2012): 45–56.
- Brann, Eva, *The Ways of Naysaying: No, Not, Nothing, and Nonbeing* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001).
- Caporaso, James A., and Levine, David P., *Theories of Political Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
- Collingwood, R. G., *An Essay on Metaphysics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
- Derrida, Jacques, *Marges de la Philosophie* (Paris: Les éditions de minuit, 1972).
- de Soto, Hernando, *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
- Fodor, Jerry, "What Is Universally Quantified and Necessary and A Posteriori and It Flies South in the Winter?," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, November 2006, 80, no. 2.
- Foster, Michael B., "Christian Theology and Modern Science of Nature," part I, *Mind* XLIV, no. 176, October 1935.
- Foster, Michael B., *The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968).
- Halper, Edward, "The Logic of Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature*," in *Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature*, ed. by Stephen Houlgate (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998).
- Hayek, Friedrich A., *The Constitution of Liberty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).
- Hegel, G. W. F., *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
- Hegel, G. W. F., *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
- Hegel, G. W. F., *Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).
- Hegel, G. W. F., *On the Episode of the Mahābhārat Known by the Name Bhagavad-Gītā by Wilhelm von Humboldt*, ed. and trans. Herbert Herring (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1995).
- Hegel, G. W. F., *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).
- Hegel, G. W. F., *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956).
- Hegel, G. W. F., *Philosophy of Mind, Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, trans. William Wallace and A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).
- Hegel, G. W. F., *Philosophy of Nature*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

- Hegel, G. W. F., *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
- Hegel, G. W. F., *Werke 8: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830)*, Erster Teil: *Die Logik mit den mündlichen Zusätzen* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970).
- Hegel, G. W. F., *Werke 10: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830)*, Dritter Teil: *Die Philosophie des Geistes mit den mündlichen Zusätzen* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970).
- Hegel, G. W. F., *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein (1832)* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1990).
- Hegel, G. W. F., *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen (1813)* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1992).
- Hegel, G. W. F., *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff (1816)* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1994).
- Jonas, Hans, *The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001).
- Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
- Kant, Immanuel, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, ed. Michael Friedman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
- Kant, Immanuel, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
- Kant, Immanuel, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, in Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- Kant, Immanuel, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, in Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
- Kolb, David, "The Necessities of Hegel's Logics," in *Hegel and the Analytic Tradition*, ed. Angelica Nuzzo (London: Bloomsbury, 2011).
- Levine, David P., "Reason in Politics," *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*, no. 65 (Spring/Summer 2012): 1–17.
- Macmurray, John, *Persons in Relation* (New York: Humanity Books, 1999).
- Maker, William, *Philosophy without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994).
- Marx, Karl, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. I, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (New York: Random House, 1906).
- McTaggart, John M. E., *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic* (Bristol: Thoemmes Antiquarian Books, 1990).
- Peirce, Charles S., *Writings of Charles S. Peirce*, vol. 6, 1886–1890, ed. Christian J. W. Kloesel (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000).
- Plato, *Meno, Parmenides, Republic, and Sophist*, in *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997).
- Rapp, Carl, "Celebrity Election versus Lottery Selection: A Reconsideration," *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*, no. 65 (Spring/Summer 2012): 33–43.
- Ray, B. N., *Tradition and Innovation in Indian Political Thought* (Delhi: Ajanta Books International, 1998).
- Schuster, Graham, "The Logic of *Realphilosophie* – the End of the Science of Logic, Objectivity, and Objective Spirit" (unpublished).
- Spinoza, Letter 50 to Jelles, in *Complete Works*, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002).

- Winfield, Richard Dien, *From Concept to Objectivity: Thinking Through Hegel's Subjective Logic* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
- Winfield, Richard Dien, *Law in Civil Society* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995).
- Winfield, Richard Dien, *Modernity, Religion, and the War on Terror* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
- Winfield, Richard Dien, *Systematic Aesthetics* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995).
- Winfield, Richard Dien, *The Just Economy* (London: Routledge, 1988).
- Winfield, Richard Dien, *The Just Family* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998).
- Winfield, Richard Dien, *The Just State: Rethinking Self-Government* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2005).
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, 3rd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

# Index

- absolute freedom and terror, 147
- absolute Idea, *see* Idea, absolute
- absolute knowing, 11, 15, 97
- absolute spirit, 63
- action, *see also* conduct
  - dramatic, 177, 182
  - epic, 179–80
  - instrumental, 136–7, 145, 168
- Adorno, Theodor, 199n. 10
- aesthetics, 176
  - mimetic, 176
  - systematic, 176–7
  - transcendental, 176
- analysis, 29, 60
- Arendt, Hannah, 199n. 10
- Aristotle, xiv, 20, 57, 72, 104–5, 145–6, 147, 151, 176, 196n. 3
- art, fine, x, xi, 15, 179
- artifact, 69, 105
- Augustine, 128, 198nn. 16–17
- autonomy, *see* self-determination
  
- beauty, x, 15, 26, 119–20, 175, 177, 182
- becoming, 18, 21, 95, 114
- being, xiii, 13–14, 16, 17, 18, 20–1, 21, 57, 95–6, 98, 104, 115
  - determinate, 20–2, 23, 39, 40, 63
  - illusory, 33, 38, 40–2, 44
  - logic of, 33, 36–7
- Berman, Robert B., 155
- Bhavabhūti, 184–6
- binding mandate, 152–4
- Brann, Eva, 189n. 4
  
- capital, 151, 154
- capitalism, xiv, 143, 160, 161, 168
  - state, 167
- caste, 167, 169, 172, 178, 179, 181, 183, 184
- category, 10, 58, 59–60, 73, 96, 107, 108
- causality, 27, 52
  - efficient, 50, 105
  - final, 50, 105
  - formal, 50, 105
  - material, 105
- certainty, 7
- chemism, 90
- City of Pigs, 68
- civil interest, 133
- civil legality, 141–2
- civil society, xiv, xv, 132–4, 142, 149–50, 151, 153–4, 167, 169, 171
  - as the appearance of ethical community, 132–3
- civilization, 175–6
- class, 150, 151
  - see also* universality, of class membership
- cognition, 63–4, 87–8, 94as an
  - active instrument, 4, 5
  - as a passive medium, 4, 5
  - as a phenomenon, 6, 16, 17, 19
  - theoretical, 65, 75–8, 90–3
- Collingwood, R. G., 189n. 5
- colonialism, xv, 134, 167, 171, 172, 183
- comedy, 177, 183, 186
- Comintern, 167
- commodity exchange, 137, 140–1, 167, 170
- communitarianism, 132
- concept, xiii, 31, 46, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59–62, 63, 66, 76, 87, 89–90, 96, 113, 124, 125, 130
  - logic of the, 33, 36
  - and self-determination, 87, 96, 147
- conduct, x, 15, 71, 74, 145
- conscience, 180
- consciousness, 32, 49, 119, 121
  - as discursive, 123
  - and intersubjectivity, 122–6
  - inversion of, 8, 9, 16
  - as non-discursive, 123
- opposition of, 4, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16–17, 18, 19, 32, 34, 40, 62, 98, 119, 126
- as reason, 126–7
- unhappy, 10

- constitution, 155, 168, 170  
 contract, 138  
 contradiction, 33  
 corporations, 135, 142–3, 150, 153  
     *see also* social interest groups  
 correctness, xiv, 31, 71, 73, 75,  
     89–90, 126  
 craft, *see* technique  
 crime, 72, 135, 136  
  
 de Soto, Hernando, 142  
 definition, 77–8, 92  
 democracy, xv  
     bourgeois, 154  
     representative, xv  
     *see also* self-government  
 Derrida, J., 23, 24, 189n. 13  
 Descartes, René, 189n. 10, 200n. 6  
 desire, 125–6  
     recognitive, 125–6  
 desuetude, 141  
 determinacy, xi, 18, 21, 51, 95, 115  
     determined, 23, 25–7, 29–30,  
         86, 87  
     given, 23–5, 86, 87  
     self-determined, 23, 27–30, 86, 96  
     theory of, 84–6  
     theory of, 84–5, 110  
 dharma, 178, 184, 186  
 difference, 33, 39  
 diversity, 52  
 Divided Line, 70  
 division, 77–8, 92  
 drama, 174–5, 187  
     ancient Greek, xv, 187  
     modern European, xv, 185, 187  
     Sanskrit, xv, 180–6  
  
 economy, xiv, 69, 131, 137, 151  
 empiricism, 53, 87  
 Enlightenment, x  
 epic, 174–5, 187  
     Homeric, 179–80  
     Sanskrit, 179, 182  
 epistemology,  
     foundational, 3, 4–5, 6, 7, 10, 14,  
         15, 18, 49, 50, 106–7, 109, 119  
 equal opportunity, 141, 142, 144, 153,  
     154, 155, 156, 157, 161  
  
 essence, 28, 36, 54, 62, 89, 190n. 15  
     categories of, xii, 23, 25–7, 32–44,  
         58, 146  
     logic of, xii, 32  
     minimal determinacy of, 36–8  
 essential and unessential, 33, 38–40,  
     41, 44  
 essentiality, 43  
 estate, 150, 151  
 estate assembly, 142, 150  
 ethical community xiv, 10, 131, 132,  
     136, 138, 141, 143, 169, 187  
 ethics, 104, 131, 145  
 existence, 31, 50–1, 52, 63, 88–9  
 expression, 121, 123–4, 126, 129  
  
 factionalism, 146–7, 150, 151, 152,  
     153  
 family, 131, 133, 134, 138, 149, 150,  
     151, 155, 167, 169, 171  
 fascism, 164, 173  
 feudalism, 142  
 Fodor, Jerry, 129, 198n. 18  
 force, 124, 125  
     of attraction, 108, 114–15  
     of repulsion, 108, 114–15  
 force field, 115  
 Foster, M. B., 194n. 2, 196n. 2  
 foundation, x, xi, 11, 51, 52, 85, 87,  
     163, 168  
 foundationalism, xi, xii, 32, 98,  
     106, 110, 117, 118–19, 131,  
     161–3, 164, 177  
 freedom, *see* self-determination  
 French Revolution, 161  
  
 Gandhi, M. K., 178  
*Gegenstand*, 17  
 gender, 150, 151, 167  
 globalization, xiv, 159, 162, 163,  
     172–3  
     *see also* modernization;  
         Westernization  
 God, 104–5, 178, 180, 182  
 Good, xiii, 65, 68–72, 74–5, 82, 91–3,  
     98, 139, 145  
 gravity, 116, 196n. 13  
 ground and grounded, 51–2  
 guilds, 150

- Habermas, Jürgen, 199n. 10  
 habit, 72, 121, 123–4, 128  
 Halper, Edward, 112  
 happiness, 74, 166  
 Hayek, Friedrich A., 143, 155–6  
 Hegel, G. W. F. x–xi, xiii, xiv, 58, 59,  
     61–3, 66–7, 68, 75, 85, 86, 88, 90,  
     91, 93, 94–7, 104, 109, 111, 113,  
     114, 117, 118–30, 132–4, 135,  
     137, 139, 140, 141, 143, 147, 149,  
     150–1, 159, 160, 166, 170, 173,  
     177–83, 186  
*Encyclopedia Logic*, xii, 33–7, 44  
*Lectures on the Philosophy of History*,  
     161  
*Phenomenology of Spirit*, xi, 5–16, 98  
*Philosophy of Nature*, 112  
*Philosophy of Objective Spirit*  
     (*Philosophy of Right*), xiv, 62,  
     131–2, 141, 147–8, 151, 160  
*Science of Logic*, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, 11–14,  
     16, 17–18, 33–7, 43–4, 62–3, 85  
 Heraclitus, 21  
 heteronomy, 15  
 Hinduism, 178–9, 182, 184, 186  
 history, 111, 137, 159, 178–9  
     normative, 159–62, 173  
 Horkheimer, Max, 199n. 10  
 Hume, David, 176  
 Hussain, Saddam, 166  
 Husserl, Edmund, 118  
 hypnosis, 122
- Idea, xiii, 57–67, 90, 96  
     absolute, 63–4, 66, 81–2, 91, 94–9,  
     111–12, 113  
     practical, 79–80, 91, 92–3  
     self-externality of, 99, 110–11  
     theoretical, 75–8, 91, 92–3  
 identity, 33, 36, 38, 39, 43–4, 52,  
     53–4, 193n. 35  
 image, 56, 127, 130  
 imagination, 56, 130  
     associating, 87  
     semiotic, 130  
 imperialism, xv, 134, 171–2  
 individuality, xiii, 23, 24, 28–30, 50,  
     52, 53–5, 57, 59, 61–2, 77, 80, 87,  
     96–7, 148
- inference, *see* syllogism  
 intelligence, 121  
     and intersubjectivity, 126–30  
     linguistic, 120, 122, 126  
 intersubjectivity, xiv, 49, 73, 117  
 intuition, 127  
     intellectual, 54  
 Islam, 163, 167
- Jonas, Hans, 31, 191n. 28  
 judgment, 46–7, 59–60, 63, 64, 73,  
     88, 108  
     synthetic a priori, 31, 46, 60–1, 103  
 justice, xiv, 68, 69, 72  
 justification,  
     foundational, 15–16, 19, 33, 163
- Kālidāsa, 181–2  
 Kant, Immanuel, xiii, xiv, 26, 27, 30,  
     38, 50, 51, 58–61, 64, 65, 68, 72–4,  
     104, 107–8, 114, 115, 117, 123,  
     146, 147, 148, 166, 176, 191n. 3,  
     194n. 4, 196n. 13, 200n. 6  
 Kautilya, 184–5  
 Kierkegaard, S., 53  
 knowing, *see* cognition  
 knowledge,  
     analytic, 76–7, 81, 92–3, 97, 103  
     synthetic, 76, 77–8, 81, 92–3, 97  
     synthetic a priori, 31, 46, 60–1,  
     103, 147
- laissez-faire economics, 170  
 language, 23, 49, 128  
     acquisition of, 123  
     games, 129  
     original formation of, 123, 129  
     private, 127–8, 129, 130  
     law, 52  
     of matter, 26, 30, 47, 50, 107  
     of nature, 107  
 league of nations, 74  
 legality, 147  
 Leibniz, G. W. F., 26, 51, 191nn. 3, 26  
 Levine, David, P., 149, 199n. 10  
 liberty, x  
 life, 26, 50, 63–5, 91, 94, 148  
 literary form, xv, 174–5  
 literary genre, *see* literary form



- Locke, John, 53, 200n. 6  
 locomotion, 105  
 logic, xiii–xiv, 11–12, 19, 33–4, 63, 66,  
     81–2, 94, 98, 109–10  
     of being, 85–7  
     of the concept, 86  
     end of, xiv  
     of essence, 60, 85–7, 124  
     formal, 47, 81–2, 103, 119  
     method of, 94–7  
     place in philosophy, 84–5, 99  
     systematic, 34–5, 66, 82  
 lottery, 154  
 love, 105, 183, 185–6  
 lyric, 174–5, 180, 187
- MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 166  
 Macmurray, John, 122  
 McTaggart, John M. E., 192nn. 8, 20  
 Maker, William, 13  
 Marcuse, Herbert, 199n. 10  
 marginal utility, 137  
 market, 69, 134, 139, 141, 142, 147, 170  
 marriage, 138, 150, 169, 185  
 Marx, Karl, 137, 153, 160, 168  
 matter, 107–8, 113, 115, 116  
 meaning, 23, 129, 175  
 measure, 25, 26, 36–7  
 mechanics, 108, 109, 115, 116,  
     196n. 13  
 mechanism, 26, 90, 107  
 memory  
     mechanical verbal, 130  
     semiotic, 129  
 Merrill, David, 200n. 16  
 metabolism, 64, 137, 146  
 metaphysics, xiii, 61, 104, 107  
 mind, 111, 112, 117  
 modernity, xiv, xv, 131, 159, 161, 162,  
     163, 164, 165, 180, 182, 187  
 modernization, xv, 164  
     autonomous, 165, 167, 168  
     external, 165–72, 183  
 monarchy, 151  
 moral subject, 133  
 morality, 135, 139, 148, 166, 169  
 motion, 105, 108, 109, 113, 114, 115  
     *see also* locomotion  
 Myth of the Cave, 71, 72
- name, 128, 129  
 Napoleon, 166  
 natural kind, 129,  
     nature, xiv, 63, 66–7, 99, 110–11  
 negation, xi, 20–31, 50–1, 88  
     determinate, 96, 97  
 Nietzsche, F., 53  
 nihilism, 132  
 nominalism, 28, 30  
 noncontradiction,  
     principle of, xii, 20, 29, 45, 48, 51,  
     60, 71  
 normativity, 163  
 nothing, 18, 20–1, 22, 95, 115  
 novel, 179
- Oakeshott, Michael, 199n. 10  
 objectivity, xii–xiii, 30–1, 45, 47, 50–1,  
     52, 57, 63, 66–7, 75, 88, 89–90, 148  
 oligarchy, 154, 157, 158, 173  
 one, the, 24, 29, 39, 43–4, 52, 89,  
     189n. 14, 194n. 35  
     and many, 24, 29, 39, 44, 52  
 ontological proof, 58  
 ontology, 3, 5, 6, 21, 22, 73, 104, 106,  
     107, 109, 118  
 organism, 64, 68–9, 91, 118  
     *see also* life
- Parmenides, 20, 21  
 particularity, xiii, 23, 24, 28–30, 53–6,  
     61–2, 87, 96–7  
 Peirce, Charles, 25, 189nn. 6, 14,  
     190n. 16  
 perception, 123, 125, 197n. 6  
 perpetual peace, 74–5  
 person, 133, 135  
 phenomena, 31, 33, 38–40, 41, 44,  
     50–1, 52, 63, 88–9, 107, 109  
 phenomenology, xi, 5–9, 19  
 philosophy, 31, 35, 55, 63, 67, 82,  
     83–5, 120  
     of history, 159–61, 173  
     of mind, 120, 160  
     of nature, 99, 103–9, 160  
     philosophical presuppositions of,  
     104–9  
     of right, 131, 184  
     of science, xiv, 103

- systematic, xi, 67, 82, 109, 119
- transcendental, xi, 16, 18, 26, 32,
  - 38, 48–50, 73, 106–7, 109, 117–18
 without foundations, xi, 119
- place, 106, 108, 113, 114, 116
- Plato, xi, xiii, 22, 23, 30, 54, 57–8, 61,
  - 64, 68–72, 74, 87, 98, 146, 176, 189n. 14, 191n. 25, 195n. 1
- police, 135
- political parties, 147, 151–2, 157
- politics, *see* state
- possible worlds, 52
- post-colonialism, 172–3, 183
- Post-Enlightenment, x
- postmodernity, 162, 164–5, 166
- poverty, 134, 135, 143
- practice, xiii, 47, 62, 65, 68, 71, 79–80,
  - 92–3
- premodernity, 150, 151, 162–4, 165,
  - 167
- primitive accumulation of capital, 168
- property rights, 135, 138, 139, 148,
  - 155–6
- psyche, 104, 123, 127
  - and intersubjectivity, 120–2, 126
- as precondition of consciousness and intelligence, 123–4
- psychologism, 118
- public administration of welfare, 136,
  - 141, 143–4, 154–7, 170, 172
- punishment, 72
- quality, 14, 21–2, 25, 26, 28, 53, 54,
  - 88, 112
- quantity, 24–5, 26, 29, 39, 112, 113
- Rapp, Carl, 153–4
- reality, 22, 30, 31, 50–1, 52, 63, 88–9
- reason, xiii, 10, 26, 46, 47, 55, 56, 57,
  - 59–61, 67, 70, 145, 147, 156, 160
- recall, 152, 153
- reciprocity, 27
- referenda, 152, 153
- reflection, 33, 38, 41–3, 44
  - determining, 38, 42, 43
  - external or presupposing, 42, 43
  - positing, 42
- Reformation, 161
- Refutation of Idealism, 108, 114
- religion, 10, 15, 120, 161, 163, 167
- representation, 59, 73, 76, 89, 127
  - general, 56, 127, 128, 129, 130
  - political, 152–3
  - semiotic, 127
- reproduction,
- revolution, 166, 167, 168, 169
- right, 15, 119–20, 131–2, 139, 148,
  - 165
  - economic, 135, 138, 140–1, 143, 154–5
  - genesis of, 149, 160, 168–9, 173
  - property, 138
  - to work, 143, 154–5
- right opinion, 70, 71
- Rousseau, J. J., xv, 146, 151, 152, 154
- rule, *see* state
- Sache*, 10
- Saussure, F. de, 23, 24
- Schmitt, Carl, xv, 151
- Schuster, Graham, 112
- science, xiv
- self-consciousness, 10, 50, 60, 73
  - and intersubjectivity, 122–3
  - as nondiscursive, 126
  - universal, 126
- self-determination, x, 26, 28, 31, 50,
  - 54–6, 62, 85, 107, 148
  - economic, 135, 138, 139–40, 169–70
  - family, 149
  - moral, 139
  - and normativity, 15–16, 19, 85, 119, 131–2, 159, 162
  - political, 138, 142, 146, 148–9, 153, 154, 155, 161
  - social, 142, 168
- self-government, xiv, 69, 135, 136,
  - 138, 145, 146–7, 151, 154, 155, 158, 161, 166, 168, 172
- self-motion, 105–6, 146, 196n. 3
- self-relation, 24, 27, 29, 39, 43
- self-rule, *see* self-government
- sense-certainty, 17, 123, 125, 198n. 17
- sensibility, 56
- sentience, 120
- sexual orientation, 150, 151, 167
- sexuality, 122

- Shakespeare, William, 185  
 sign, 127–9  
 skepticism, 5, 8, 9, 13, 26, 38  
 slavery, 167, 169, 172  
 Smith, Adam, 134  
 social contract, x, 74, 132, 138, 141, 143, 155  
 social interest groups, 142–3, 149, 150, 151  
 socialism, 160, 167  
 Socrates, 68–71, 146, 148, 190n. 14  
 something and other, xii, 21, 22–4, 27, 29, 50–1, 88–9  
 soul, 69, 105, 146  
 space, 106, 107, 108, 113–14, 115, 116  
   absolute, 113  
   relative, 113  
 Spinoza, B., 23  
 spirit, 10, 63, 66–7  
   subjective, xiv  
 state, xv, 68, 69–70, 72, 74, 104, 131, 134, 142, 145, 146, 161  
 Strauss, Leo, 199n. 10  
 subjectivity, xiii, 88  
 sufficient reason, principle of, 26, 51, 148  
 supply and demand, 139  
 syllogism, 46–7, 59–60, 63, 64, 88, 96  
   disjunctive, 88, 194n. 3, 195n. 2  
 symbol, 128  
 system of needs, xiv, 131, 134, 137, 142, 143, 150, 170  
  
 taxation, 143, 156  
 technique, 69–70, 136–7, 146, 168  
 teleology, 64, 79, 90, 91, 96  
 theorem proof by construction, 77–9, 92  
 theory, xiii, 47, 62, 65, 68, 71, 75–8, 90–3  
   analytic, 76–7, 81, 92–3, 97, 103  
   synthetic, 76, 77–8, 81, 92–3, 97  
 thing,  
   and its properties, 23, 24, 53, 124  
   in itself, 27, 49, 73  
 thinking, xii–xiii, 29, 127  
   as objective, 47, 53–6, 62–3, 82, 90  
   as subjective, 45–7, 49–50, 56, 90, 194n. 4  
 third man argument, 87  
 time, 106, 107, 108, 113–14, 115, 116  
 tragedy, 177, 183, 186  
 triangulation, 129  
 tropism, 120  
 truth, xiii, xiv, 7, 15, 20, 25, 28, 31, 49, 51, 52, 60, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 70, 71, 72–3, 75, 77, 82, 89–90, 91–3, 97–8, 119–20  
  
 understanding, xiii, 10, 59–61, 67, 123, 125  
   intuitive, 54  
 universality, 23, 24, 28–30, 31, 53–6, 58, 76, 87, 96–7, 124, 147  
   abstract or formal, 30, 45–6, 48, 53, 61  
   of class membership, 30, 45–6, 48, 53, 61–2  
   concrete, xv, 80  
   of genus and species, 48, 64–5  
   of political action, 145, 146–7, 148–9, 153  
   and self-determination, 87, 96, 147  
 unmoved mover, 105  
  
 virtue, 72  
 Viśākhadatta, 184–5  
 void, the, 24, 29, 39, 43–4, 52  
  
 welfare state, 143, 155  
 Westernization, 164, 167  
 will,  
   as logically determined, 63–4, 65  
   will to power, 164  
 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 127–8, 129, 198n. 17  
 word, 129  
   *see also* name  
 wrong,  
   malicious, 135  
   non-malicious, 135